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RELIGION AND SEMIOSPHERE: FROM RELIGIOUS TO THE
SECULAR AND BEYOND

Rajka Rush, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2006

Religion is a system o f structural ideas that involve the natural ability o f the
mind to engage itself into the process o f unlimited semiosis which can be defined as an
existential openness o f one’s consciousness to the universe as a system. This primary
religious consciousness becomes limited by language, symbolic, and cultural constraints.
The religious semiotic space is a sub-cultural system open to culturally and crossculturally encoded idioms and concepts. These cultural potentials are interpreted and
settled by the religious exegesis expressed in the behavioral patterns o f the symbolic
actions that reflect a specific worldview of the closed community controlled by
institutional authority. In spite o f the religious exclusive position in the cultural space,
almost every religious worldview offers elements o f ethical and aesthetical universalism,
which religious potentials are seeds for the secularization processes o f the religious.
This dissertation offers a Semiotic Theory o f Religion, explaining concepts such as
dynamic signs, signification process, and unlimited semiosis developed in the semiotics
o f Charles Sanders Peirce, Umberto Eco, Yuri Lotman, and the religious semantics of
Jurgen Habermas.
Habermas thinks that religion still has semantic potentials that should be rescued.
The ethical aspect o f religion concentrates on the ideals o f universal solidarity,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compassion, and peace. These are the foundational values o f the autonomous religious
consciousness that should transform its individual ethos into the objective reality of
socio-economic and political norms.
Yuri Lotman’s semiotic theory o f culture is functional in the examination o f religious
pluralism and examines the diachronic continuum, explaining a vicious struggle for the
preservation o f the semiotic space, which emerges as the dominant in competition with
the other alternative religious movements.
The salient focus o f this dissertation concentrates on an unlimited semiosis. This
concept seems most curious to a human mind, requiring o f an interpreter to rediscover the
cognitive and aesthetic immanence o f the mind, where resides the religious source. The
Semiotic Theory o f Religion offers religion as one o f the most dynamic cultural
movements interconnected with all humankind’s cultural space— the Semiosphere.
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1

CHAPTER I

FOUNDING ELEMENTS OF THE SEMIOTIC THEORY OF RELIGION:
DYNAMIC SIGNS, SEMIOSIS, UNLIMITED SEMIOSIS,
AND FIXED BELIEFS

A man denotes whatever is the object o f his attention at the moment; he connotes
whatever he knows or feels o f this object— his interpretant is the future memory of
this cognition, his future self, or another person he addresses.
Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers 7.591

la) Application of the General Semiotic Theory to the Study of Religion
Semiology, or a general Semiotic theory, has become known through the unique
work o f the French linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, who compared his new subject of
study to a science which combines a social and general psychology in a way to explain
the ability o f the human mind to create and communicate concepts and ideas via
language. Saussure thought that Semiotics should become the most general science that
would present a connection between what is naturally presupposed with what is culturally
postulated and encoded in a language as a system. According to Saussure, this new
science would concentrate on language, which was defined, in a new way, as a
signification process, being highly complex and encoded through the integral web of
connections that people learn and know as convention. It seems that Saussure actually
envisioned the possibility for a general science that could unify different special sciences
into one line o f research via a new methodology.1
In his Course in General Linguistics (1916) Saussure’s definition for a language
is given as, “ . . . a system o f signs that expresses ideas, and is therefore comparable to the
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system o f writing, the alphabet o f deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, polite formulas, military
signals, etc.” This explains language as a semiological process, but also opens the idea
that in the progress o f future semiotic research an amazing amount o f different language
systems may be recognized which are relevant for human existence and its relevancy in
culture. The problem that arises from the Saussurean approach is the arbitrariness o f the
sign, i.e., a sign is always only a convention that reflects to some extent a collective
behavior relevant to only one culture.
The scholarly work and research done for this dissertation concretely finds a need
to outline religion as a unified language system that opens the analogy between the
system o f belief (general conceptions) and practices (conceptual gestures and
communicative acts) that are crucial to transform internally (experiences into
conceptions) and externally (conceptions into the system o f communication) nature into
the culture, which maintain the conceptions and symbolic signified practices through the
organized system o f communication with in-group identity. One o f the main ideas in the
study o f Comparative Religion is a cross-cultural comparison between different arbitrary
signification systems: rituals, object(s) of worship, ethical values, moral rules, system(s)
of symbols, integral social community, religious institutions, religious specialists,
religious ideas systematized in a code o f beliefs (dogmas, sacred texts, myths, etc.). The
main endeavor o f the Semiotic Theory o f Religion would be to explain the necessity of
putting the parts o f different signification systems into the web o f logical connections by
which religion could be explained as a complex cultural signification system.
As often happens, when a new concept is brought to the human pool o f
knowledge, it is questionable as to whether Saussure realized the breakthrough he had
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created by developing a new definition o f language, explaining the mode o f signification
process, and proposing a theory o f signs. The consequences o f Semiotics were that the
object of knowledge was no longer simply given or imposed to the subject, but it is a
code that functions as the process o f signification between the signifier and the signified.
Actually, the object o f knowledge is encoded as a mental space in the mind, and it has an
interactive function as a signifier which then is able to decode the meaning of the
signified.3
If one were to apply the process o f signification to religion, then the object of
study in religion usually corresponds with the idea o f a god that is defined as belief in
superhuman existence, agencies, and/or supernatural powers. In clarifying the issue, for
example, the idea o f god would be a relevant point for the religions o f the Book—
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, but one can equally talk about an object o f religion as
an ultimate reality in Hinduism where believers relate to the supreme reality o f the whole
universe, and in the idea o f Brahman, one can also relate to the consciousness which
becomes one with everything out o f compassion, like the Buddhahood consciousness in
Buddhism, or even the complex worshiping o f the supernatural powers and spiritual
agencies that are present in the worshiping o f Mother Earth, or a creator god, high god,
relevant for native religions. In the application o f the signification process this object of
religion as god, is no longer presupposed as the absolute that exists for all believers as
was usually presented by the phenomenological approach in the study o f religion (Eliade,
Jung) and as is cross-culturally compared in a historical or cultural sense as an arbitrary
sign, which can be used in comparison to the other signs o f the same range to emulate the
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similarities and differences through an unique interpretation, but it outlines a more
specific idea.
This idea is that there is a natural ability o f the human mind to transfer internally—
the most comprehensive experience o f the self—that which appears as one which is in the
state of acknowledgment that exits in the system arranged by the power o f higher
purpose. This system is something apart from the consciousness that experiences his/her
critical moment o f being apart, or the critical understanding o f being finite, or being only
a little part o f the universal system o f all things. So, the God/Ultimate
Reality/Buddhahood Consciousness; the “mystical participation” in the world that relates
different spirits and powers (native religions)— these concepts are all actually the result
of the systematization o f signs which brings dual analogical structure: signified is what
outlines a natural ability of the mind in every religion that relates to the object that is o f a
superhuman, supernatural, or mystical character and a signifier as a specific sign that
arbitrarily functions (historically, symbolically, and culturally) in one religious system.
Actually, the object o f knowledge is encoded as a mental space in the mind, and it has an
interactive function as a signifier which then is able to decode the meaning o f the
signified.
Very often Semiotics (the theory o f signs) opens a problem o f terminology,
because it is not entirely clear whether Semiotics is the same as Semantics (the theory of
meaning). Semantics is a discipline developed in the circles o f “Continental Philosophy”
in the early twentieth century and concentrates on the discourses and meaning related to a
new philosophy o f language that fluctuates from mathematical logic (Frege,
Wittgenstain) to the continuation o f Husserl’s phenomenology investigating the
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connotations o f an intentional object (Vienna Circle, Bolzano, Brentano). The intentional
object (modified traditional object o f knowledge) is now explained as the systematic
transformation o f the personal existing being and his/her consciousness into the higher
structure o f signification that interprets itself and acquires as the result the circle o f
meaning. Traditional continental Semantics also influenced the theory o f interpretation
called hermeneutics that puts in the main discourse aesthetical meaning. The main
concern in the works o f Dilthey and Gadamer is the amazing power o f art work and
literature where one can experience and reach the same meaning in these works as was
originally posited. The question is: If the various cultural systems have passed through
different socio-economic, political, even ethical changes o f paradigms, how is it possible
not to loose the original interpretative meaning o f a work o f art? The final crown of
continental Semantics that combines hermeneutics, philosophy o f language, and
phenomenology as a question o f human existence and meaning is given in the works of
Martin Heidegger. He tries to explain the phenomenological outline o f human existence
as Dasein (here and now being) whose main crisis involves the relationship to death— the
human being is a finite being— so, the only question worth investigation is that of
meaning, and meaning opens itself by authentic language.4
Sometimes it is difficult to definitely differentiate Semiotics from Semantics, and
this problem also reflects to a degree on this dissertation. This dissertation’s research and
approach has the goal to incorporate the two different contemporary Semiotic theories,
one o f Umberto Eco and the other o f Jurgen Habermas, as crucial for the formation o f the
Semiotic Theory o f Religion. The reasons for connecting these two theories into one
Semiotic Theory o f Religion are: (1) shared methodology rooted in semiotics o f Charles
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Sanders Peirce, which has successfully redefined the object o f knowledge as a
“production” sign in a new triadic semiotic methodology; (2) shared critical observations
to the traditional religious system o f beliefs and their institutions; (3) the importance of
the open and unlimited religious signs and symbols that still affect the modernity and
consciousness o f modernity; (4) the idea o f the transformation o f religious highest ideas
into the all modem social, political, and cultural sub-structures— from the work o f art to
the normative validity claims present in modem legislation processes.
While Eco takes Peirce’s Semiotics in the traditional way o f understanding it as
the theory o f signs, Habermas reconstructs Peirce’s Semiotics in the discourse of
communicative theory that, in his view, opens the Semantics o f religion, which
concentrates on questioning and analyzing all aspects o f the religious consciousness.
Habermas’ project o f “linguificaiton” o f the sacred offers the idea that the transformation
o f the religious idea o f the sacred is secularized by means o f Semantics, opening the
meaning o f values that are derived from the past religious experiences into the modern
principles that are preserved in the contemporary institutionalized world. One could say
that Habermas’ theory stands on the level o f Semantics, but the methodology that is the
underlying power o f his presentation is very much rooted in Semiotics. Also, one can see
that Eco’s research tends to concentrate more on symbolic dynamism that can be
interpreted as the revitalization powers o f religious through the symbols, signs, semiosis,
unlimited dynamic signs, and limits o f possible beliefs, while Habermas develops a
comprehensive insight on the social evolution through the religious symbolic actions that
evolve humankind in the new sublated form o f the modem consciousness and their social
and political sub-structures. In this sense, Eco’s research in Semiotics opens topics that
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are of cognitive and aesthetic value for the new Semiotic Theory o f Religion, while
Habermas’ theory opens the view on ethical and practical (politics, economics, and
creative human potentials) aspects o f religion, society, and the personhood. The
conclusive goal o f this dissertation is to summarize Eco’s and Habermas’ views on
religion and to reconstruct their Semiotic theories, giving a better picture on religion
within the context o f the universality o f cultural systems, and also to give the
methodological strength in explaining religious existence in our time.
The pattern— from the religious to the secular and beyond— is present in all
religions of the world. It is necessary to explain how and why the dynamics between the
religious and the secular exist and in what way it can be seen, the transformation of the
religious or religious consciousness from their primary existent forms to the
comprehensive functioning in the contemporary time, when the religious is no longer
dominant in the secular world, but is transformed in new qualitative forms by the means
of symbolic and dynamic sign transition.
The main tension and strength o f this research is to explain religion as the
dynamic organism that functions as the important part o f the larger system in the
dominant culture, but also in the dynamism o f all possible cultures. Religion, religious
reasoning, religious faith as the substrate o f one’s consciousness, religion in connection
to political affiliations and convictions, new religious movements, religious sacrifices,
religious symbols, and religious texts often surprises one with ideas that can range from
aesthetical stunning revelations to ideas which are totally opposite and pushes one away.
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The first step o f this presentation will offer to the reader a better understanding of
the main Semiotic methodology related to the open sign, symbols, and unlimited
sem iosis.

At the same time when Saussure’s semiology was becoming more and more
popular in the study o f the continental intellectual circles, Charles Sanders Peirce,
independently from Saussure, in the USA, presented the triadic general semiotic model
by which any object of knowledge acts as a sign and by this virtue is a referent, which
takes the form through its representament that is at the same time its interpretant. By his
triadic interpretation o f the sign, one can say that Peirce definitely moved general
Semiotic theory from linguistics to the realm o f epistemological investigation and
philosophical interpretation. His main idea is that a sign can be either possible or real, so
it encompasses everything, but either way—possible or real, a sign denotes the basic
structure of the process that communicates the sign, the intellectual abilities o f the one
who invents or acknowledges the sign, and finally the result o f the semiotic process is
settled in interpretation. The most important aspect o f Semiotics is the reproduction of the
signs. In this, Peirce has a view o f the universe as “. . . perfused with signs, if it is not
composed, exclusively o f sings,” so he calls this new discipline pansemiotcs, which,
according to him, will develop in the future as the most general science.5

lb )Open and Dynamic Signs
What is inspiring about Peirce’s Semiotics is the representation o f a sign as the
dynamic object. To Peirce, the universe o f signs cannot be absolutely conventionalized or
settled. This point contradicts Saussure, but it opens the line o f contemporary research in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
Semiotics that is used to compare the shift o f meaning and contextualization o f signs
from one historical paradigm to the other.
This investigation is present in the Semiotic works o f Umberto Eco where he
often researches the shift o f meaning in the signification process that occurs with the new
poetics o f modernity, or influences from one cultural system to the other. For example, he
shows that the system o f sings in the Middle Ages functions under the umbrella o f the
global theocentric allegorical structure, so every sign is a symbol that has a theological
aspect o f meaning and is fixed. With modernity, the old system is engaged in the
deconstruction process, which finally re-interprets signs that once were symbols, isolates
them from the former signification, and puts them into a new perspective. A sign might
be transformed into another signification process and from the association with the sacred
or theological aspect, by which it could be interpreted simply as an iconic sign— i.e., its
function that is naturally presupposed and possibly defined scientifically (the
Enlightenment period); or perhaps could be interpreted by the extraordinary personalist
experience that is important for the poetics o f romanticism where a sign becomes a new
open symbol (nebula); or simply a sign could be put in the processes o f experimentation,
changing different perspectives and modes, which is a crucial point for the Avant-garde
poetics. In any way, the sign opens its potential in each new epoch, and although
sometimes has a fixed meaning in one system o f signification, because it is a sign it is
also a possible object o f knowledge, so, does not necessarily stay fixed.
The value o f Eco’s research brings to the main focus the functioning of the
dynamic sign under different ideological, philosophical, and cultural changes. In his
book, Semiotics and the Philosophy o f Language (1986) Eco analyzes the changes of
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symbolic interpretation o f the Old Testament. He states that the Old Testament was used
by many o f Stoic philosophers, writers, poets, and even by Philo o f Alexandria who
influenced early Christian theology. They read the Old Testament as an example of
allegorical story that can be used for secular purposes— to enlighten or educate people
about opposites— good and evil— in their nature and they were giving a secular
interpretation trying to translate the allegorical message into the real aspect o f life. In the
first-century C.E. an opposite direction in interpretation took course. Clement of
Alexandria and Oregenes found themselves in a difficult position to decide: Were they
going to accept only The New Testament as relevant, or were they going to interpret
both. The Old and New Testament, as crucial to the Christian movement and theology?
They decided that the Old Testament speaks in a significant sense o f the New Testament,
so they are both engaged in producing semiosis (the signification process) with one sense
and meaning. For example, the Exodus story represents a signifier o f the signified story
with the redemption through Christ. As Eco states:
The semiosic process was thus rather complicated: a first book speaking
allegorically o f the second one, and the second one speaking— sometimes
by parables, sometimes directly— o f something else. Moreover, in this
beautiful case o f unlimited semiosis, there was a curious identification
between the message sender, message as signifier or expression, and
signified or content and referent, intrpretandum, and interpretant— a
puzzling web o f Identities and differences that can be hardly represented
by a bidimensional diagram ... ,6
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Because of the complexity o f problems in interpretation, and the necessity that
Semiotics takes a critical distance, Eco thinks that general Semiotics cannot function
without interpretation, which engages philosophy. Eco purposes that all research in
general Semiotics is primarily philosophical, rather than scientific. This means that this
research then requires a unique interpretation— a view on the issue, which also implies a
specific method o f investigation (theory) in order to process the abstract and complex
signs. In this approach, usual topics o f religion might be how one interprets or sees good
and evil in one religious system. These kinds o f signs cannot be scientifically explained;
the interpretation o f such signs requires what U. Eco says, “positing [a] question
philosophically,” i.e., a possibility to use one’s experience, interpretation, and all
faculties o f the mind to circle the possible authentic understanding o f the problem. If we
detach the concepts o f good and evil from philosophical discourse, then these concepts in
the scientific reasoning barely exist, and there is not “possible unity and cohesion” in
their understanding.7
There is another great value o f Eco’s research that can be applied to the problems
in the study o f religion. The most dynamic (unlimited) signs are symbols and they are an
important part o f a signification system in religion. According to Eco, there are open
symbols with the metaphoric transitional ability, and there are symbols that function as
the subclass to the larger allegorical system—where the symbols are fixed, but the system
itself is open.

Q

Both types o f symbols are also the signs relevant for the greatest concern

of religion.
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Every religion communicates its ideas through symbols, and tries to settle
symbols in a fixed doctrinal perspective where there is no fear o f collapse with the pillar
concepts supporting the dogma.
For example, in the book by Caroline Walker Bynum Metamorphosis and Identity
(2005), where in the introductory chapter there is given an exposition to the problem of
her research, the change and metamorphosis interpreted in the traditional Christian
theology o f the Middle Ages, she presents the question: What if a priest is asked to give
the Eucharist to the mate o f a lycanthrope? As shown in Dr. Thomas E. Lawson’s
cognitive methodology the use o f examples in comparative religion studies is crucial to
represent the obvious differentiation between the “theologically correct” reasoning,
usually highly philosophized and abstract (that might be compared to the U. Eco’s
semiotic allegoric system), and the religion o f the common people. Dr. Lawson’s
methodology has had a great impact on this dissertation and the way o f thinking about
religions o f the world and their complex dynamic structure that exist. Dr. Lawson defines
religion as a necessary organism/system o f the culture, which transforms what is
naturally presupposed into the culturally postulated “conceptual ideas” that reflect and
reason about the “superhuman agents.”9 In relationship to this approach, Bynum’s
example about the Eucharist given to the werewolf represents a problem that is
differently viewed by the eyes o f a theologian vs. the cultural spontaneity o f common
people expressed in their oral tradition and fictional story. As she describes, in the
writings o f Gerald o f Wales, who wrote the ethnography of Ireland in 1187, he tells the
story o f a priest who has been traveling from Meath to Ulster and meets on the way a
werewolf who tries to get the Eucharist for his dying mate. The priest, from this original
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story, gives the mate of the werewolf the Eucharist, but Bynum gives the great
observations on Gerald o f W ales’s comments, which are substantiated later on, where he
tries to explain and theologically justify the story and the act o f the priest who gave the
Eucharist to the w erew olf s mate. Wales has a problem how to explain the regressive
change that occurred from human to the wolf. It seems, according to Bynum, that Wales
doesn’t want to say that any substantial change or metamorphosis is just a make-believe
story, and not really related to the true belief as Christianity. At one point Wales talks
about real Incarnation and he defines it as a true miracle and metamorphosis from human
to superhuman, god’s, nature. So, he uses an analogy to explain the w erew olf s nature.
Now, Wales tries to compare the regressive change in human nature to the Eucharist,
which represents the real substantial change in one’s nature. In short, Wales says that the
werewolf represents the hybrid change that is not substantial to the nature but is only
changed in appearance, while the Eucharist represents the true change in quality, and so
is substantial, but not related to the change o f appearance.10 This example nicely
underlines what kind o f problems can be faced in religious symbolism. This example
gives a picture that the signification o f symbols in religion is a very complex problem—
the highly theological, “clean” systems o f signification are in constant contact with the
culture in change. One can notice, when religion spreads and is missionary, rather than
stationary, then as the body o f believers change, the religion and its symbols modify and
change. In this sense, the Semiotic Theory o f Religion relates to the symbols as
metaphors (transitional symbols— in the above noted story a werewolf) and the
mainstream fixed symbols in the allegorical system, which the main concern is to re
enforce the belief concepts in one religion as true and absolute.
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Every religion develops a system o f signs and symbols. This system o f symbols
acts as the main motivating power to the believers and, also, it is the most important
factor in the unification o f the religious community into one recognizable identity.
Religious signs and symbols have the most immediate access to the supreme religious
content, but also they are an active force, because they represent the transformative
powers in religion: they initiate, for a believer, the transformation from the denotative
level, ideas and beliefs, into the gesture, action, and finally, they may represent the whole
meaning for one’s religious worldview, which directs a person’s practical aspect o f life.
Therefore, religious symbols are dynamic signs in a semiotic sense, having multiple
intentions, possibilities, and powers for the religious community and the personal
religious consciousness. The problem is that the religious dynamic signs are interwoven
with the cultural, historical, and social heritage, so very often the existence and rise of
symbols relevant for one religious tradition might not be always distinctively pure in
meaning and have a clear message. This problem appears with the religious movements
that grow in the multicultural surroundings, so they generate different cultural codes as
their possible subsystems. This alternative subsystem very often becomes deeply buried
and hidden under the surface of the theological accepted ideas and canonized religious
texts that through time become the exclusive interpretative authority for the symbols.
There is no better example than that o f the rise o f Christianity, which outlines perfectly
the religious symbolic dynamism and the existence o f the alternative semiotic subsystem
within the mainstream theological interpretation o f the Christian church.
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lc) Semiotic Dynamism in Early Christianity and Overinterpretation Beyond
Belief
In the last half of the century from the discovery in Qumran, Nag Hammadi of the
Dead Sea Scrolls (1945) and the comparative studies o f the Gnostic Gospels in contrast to
the created traditional Christian Canon (E. Pagels), to the question o f identity and the role
of Jesus during his life-time in the scholarship o f Jesus Seminar and works o f J. D.
Corssan, it has become obvious that Christianity, indeed, is rather a very syncretistic
movement, rather than an unified and monolithic as known from theology and the canon
o f the C hurch.11 One o f the Gospels found in the hidden jar o f the cave in Nag Hammadi
was the Gospel o f Thomas, whose existence was known to Biblical scholarship prior to
this discovery, but finally the whole text revealed itself. In this Gospel the idea o f the
Kingdom o f God definitely contrasts the one in the synoptic gospels and Paul, which
presents an Apocalyptic Jesus, where the Kingdom o f God is put in the perspective o f the
future event, in the theology known as a “parousia” delay (Matt. 24-25; Mark 13; Luke
21; 1 & 2 Thess.; 2 Pet. 2-3).12
In the Gospel o f Thomas 113 Jesus says that “The Father’s kingdom” will not
come by expecting the great apocalypse “there” or “here,” but it is stated that the
Kingdom o f God is here, “spread out upon the earth, but people don’t see it.” This
definition o f the Kingdom o f God is similar to the ideas o f ethics presented in Greek stoic
philosophers that traces its roots in ideas o f Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle who believed
that ignorance is the source o f all wrongdoing. If one might doubt that the Gospel of
Thomas has a different view on Jesus, how then can one interpret the Gospel o f Thomas
3? There, it is quoted that Jesus said: “When you know yourselves, then you will be
known, and you will understand that you are children o f the living Father. But if you do
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not know yourselves, then you live in poverty, and you are the poverty.”

IT

Definitely, the

Gospel o f Thomas appears in recent discoveries as the most compelling text o f the early
Christianity which has the purpose to express, not the story o f Jesus, as J. D. Crossan
suggested “prophecy historicized,” but simply the collection o f original teachings of
Jesus.14 This Gospel is presented in a different structural manner than the Synoptic
Gospels, only as the combination o f Jesus’ original quotes.15
Still, it is left to our time to puzzle how to interpret the Gospel o f Secret Mark
where it is given the clear message that the knowledge about the Kingdom o f God is a
mystery that can be told only to the chosen disciples and p u p ils.16 Also, the Gospel of
Secret Mark awakens again some suspicions about Jesus’ sexuality: Jesus is presented as
the one who resuscitates a rich young man who recently died, but then “the young man
looked at Jesus, loved him, and began to beg to be with him” (Secret Mar vs. 8). The
similar case is presented a few lines later in the Gospel o f Secret Mark when Jesus spent
the night with the young man and Jesus “taught him the mystery o f [the] Kingdom of
God.” The interesting point being here, that the term “mystery o f Kingdom o f God” is
also used in the canonical Gospel o f Mark (Mark 4:1 1).17
Perhaps, the most stunning story presented in the non-canonical Gospels is the
story about Jesus’ infancy, where in The Infancy Gospel o f Thomas, Jesus was presented
as a child with the strong “magical” powers that he uses for revenge when someone
crosses him. One o f the stories says that Jesus killed his teacher who didn’t recognize his
talents and his mystical interpretation o f the Jewish letters. Jesus was presented that he
made so much troubles using his powers, that the people of Nazareth asked Mary and
Joseph to lock the child at home. 18 Finally, it is presented that Jesus decided to use the
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powers only for good deeds and to help. Interestingly, we know that there is no one
canonical Gospel referring to Jesus’ childhood in any extensive sense, but we know that
all Synoptic gospels present the rejection o f Jesus’ teachings when he went to visit his
birthplace, Nazareth (Mark 6:1-6, Matthew 13:54-58, and Luke 4:1-13).
With the discovery o f the Gnostic Gospels, and all non-canonical Gospels, it is
proved that the canonization process o f the Christian Church was borne through the
political and theological battle, which arose in the late second century C.E., when the
persecutions o f Christians became a serious problem. At that time Irenaeus o f Lyons
proposed the four Gospels as the main canonized story o f Jesus’ life and mission, which
definitely opposed to Marcion, who wanted only parts o f Luke’s Gospel to become a
canon, because he wanted to separate the new covenant and Testament from the Old one,
being prone to the Gnostic type o f Christianity.19 In the light o f these discoveries, one
thing is clear: the theology or the main Christian ideas were not unified and settled from
the beginning. For example, it is a known fact that in 367 C.E., Athanasius, Bishop of
Alexandria, declared that all noncanonical books should be destroyed in the land within
his rule (Egypt).

90

Today, with the new comparative analysis o f the apocrypha and early

Christian artifacts whole symbolic subsystems are discovered which reveal the diverse
multicultural connections with the so called “pagan world.”
Unlike the Mosaic interpretation o f Christianity, which necessarily contextualizes
the Christian tradition in the discourse o f the Prophetic writings, Jewish monotheism, and
the idea that the Christ is the Messiah, there is also the other Christian tradition that can
be interpreted in connection to the Hermetic philosophy, concepts o f Pythagoreanism,
and the Neoplatonic mysticism, which influenced Jewish mysticism. A large number of
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the common Christian practices show how Christianity has emerged from the cults o f the
mystery religions, where actually the central rituals are related to the concepts o f the birth
and resurrection.
The initiation rites in the mystery cults were secret (Eleusis), but modern studies
were able to reconstruct the main concepts, ideas, and ritual significance. The central idea
in all of them is the enlightenment o f the soul that has to undergo through death, which
symbolizes the detachment from the biological, pragmatic, and earthly life and coming
into the other, spiritual realm, as a new birth that is resurrection, where the consciousness
moves in the spiritual life. The final goal o f the spiritual life is that the person unifies
with the powers o f god himself, usually named and glorified as the “light o f the world.”
These ideas ware present in worshiping Dionysus and Orphic traditions, where Orpheus
was presented as a “fisherman” for human souls. Many symbols from the Orphic cults are
found in the Christian tradition too. Just the resemblance between Dionysus and Jesus is
stunning: both are the sons o f supreme gods— Dionysus is son o f Zeus; Jesus is son of
god; both are the sons o f virgins, Semele and Mary, both survived the attempt o f being
killed (Hera almost killed Dionysus; King Herod almost killed infant Jesus); both battle
supernatural evil (Dionysus struggled against Titans; Jesus against Satan); Dionysus
invents wine; Jesus transforms water into wine; Dionysus is wounded and is killed by
Titans; Jesus is crucified by Romans and undergoes a shameful death; Dionysus becomes
immortal and join his father Zeus; Jesus is resurrected to glory and unifies with his father;
Dionysus punishes opponents to his divinity; Jesus will return on the judgment day to
punish those who do not believe (Matt. 24-25; Rev. 19-20).21
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In Mithraism, Mithras is presented as a solar deity o f the whole universe, whose
birth was on December 25, when Mithras would slay a bull (Taurus) as a form o f a
sacrifice, from which a new life arises. The initiation ceremony has represented usually a
spiritual rebirth where a person which undergoes through the symbolic death, now is re
born spiritually and then is committed to follow the principles o f light and life.22 Mystery
cults in Eleusis were associated with worshiping mother goddesses: Demeter, the goddess
o f fertility and life, who gave grain to the world as the substance o f life— bread, and her
daughter Persephone, was abducted by the underworld king Hades (Aidoneus).
During the Roman Empire’s time a more popular cult than that o f Demeter, was
Isis, an Egyptian mother goddess, usually portrayed as a goddess that holds her little
infant son, Horus. The Roman writer, Apuleius, in his work The Golden Ass, describes
his mystery experience by which the goddess Isis appears to him as a savior. He gives the
details about his religious enlightenment, explaining that this new spiritual life gives him
blessing, and knowledge o f what life and death are, and the goddess Isis appears to him
as a redeemer who saved him from his animal soul.24
Some research shows possible connections between the Egyptian worship of
Amon-Ra and an understanding o f the Christian god, some concentrates on the important
role of John the Baptist, who influenced Jesus and even might be that both were
associated with the Essene movement which assumes even the possible influences of
Buddhism and probable connections with the mysticism o f Pythagorean schools that
influenced some Essenes groups o f the Jewish scholars.25 Definitely, some form o f the
Jewish mysticism is ascribed to John the Baptist and after the Dead Sea Scrolls discovery
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there is a serious attempt of scholars to explain the connection o f John the Baptist and
Jesus in a new way.
Burton L. Mack argues in his book The Lost Gospel o f Q (1993) that the whole
methodology o f the Biblical scholarship in the past was wrong, because they wanted to
prove the existence o f the Christian community along with the appearance o f the first
Christian texts. The modem comparative religion approach to Early Christianity shows
that this was not the case. The Christian movement was developed despersivelly
throughout the Mediterranean area, North Africa, and the parts o f the Middle East where
the originated Jewish Christian sect was separated from the new becoming Christians and
their way o f beliefs and practices. A. N. Wilson, in his book Jesus (1992), tries to prove
the point that in the Mediterranean area actually spread the religion o f John the Baptist
rather than that o f Jesus, which was a different type o f a Christian movement more prone
to the mystery cults, so important to religious practices o f the ancient Greco-Roman
world.26 Today, modern research shows that more than half a century passed after Jesus’
death the existence o f the larger and ideologically unified Christian community in
Jerusalem or any other Jewish territory can be confirmed.

97

The modern biblical studies

as well as comparative religious studies in Early Christianity concentrated on the
anthropological Biblical research and archeology, comparative linguistics, history o f art,
and contextualization o f the Hellenistic culture o f that time. The main idea was to
historically contextualize Christianity as a social, political, and religious movement (R.
Stark) “painfully” separating the theological and dogmatic aura from the facts (D.
Crossan).28
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Perhaps, before half a century ago no one could predict how far and beyond any
expectations Biblical connectionism along with the history o f art, history, church history,
comparative literature, and religion would progress. Presently, most are familiar with the
enormous popularity o f David Brown’s novel Da Vinci’s Code, which was inspired with
the earlier popular book by Michel Baigent, Richard Leigh, Henry Lincoln Holy Blood,
Holy Grail (1982), the adventours scholars in comparative literature and journalists.
Both, Brown’s novel and the historical mystery about Jesus’ blood line Holy Blood, Holy
Grail —the Merovingian dynasty in France is the result o f the direct bloodline o f Jesus
and Mary Magdalene—were inspired by the works and research style o f Lynn Picknett
and Clive Prince, which specialized in the theories o f paranormal, historical and religious
mysteries, and the occult tradition. The crown o f their research appeared in the bestseller-a pseudo-history book that uses a methodology “if it is possible to happen, then it has
happened, or if it is possible to see this way, then it signifies this”— The Templar
Revelation: Secret Guardians o f the True Identity o f Christ (1997) where Picknett and
Prince constructed a sensational, new story o f Christianity as a 2.000 year h o ax .29
According to Picknett’s and Prince’s theory, Jesus was a competitor with John the
Baptist, who was his religious leader. John the Baptist is presented as the mystic who was
introduced into the Egyptian mystery religions o f Isis and Osiris. Their theory goes so far
that Jesus’ group, which separated from John the Baptist, was actually responsible for
John the Baptist’s death through their treason. Jesus him self organized the treason
because he was expected to become the successor to John the Baptist, but the honorary
position was given to Simon Magus. Also, Picknett and Prince disputed the role of Mary
Magdalene in early Christianity. Picknnett claimed that she had a “ritualized” sexual
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relationship with Jesus, signifying through the sexual act the access to god him self and
unification with him.30 Mary Magdalene was presented as the main “initiator” into the
sacred mystery cult to which Jesus belonged. Finally, Jesus him self was described as an
“aggressive” political charismatic leader who was introduced into the magical powers by
John’ the Baptist, but his miracles were publicly acknowledged after John the Baptist’s
T I

beheading.

Their final saying on Jesus’ role in the early stage o f the formation of

Christianity was that Jesus hid from his disciples the mystery and initiated knowledge
learned from John the Baptist, so he manipulated the whole movement. As the main
support for their thesis these authors use the interpretation o f the term “Christ,” which at
the time o f John the Baptist in his circle meant simply the initiation ritual into the circle
by baptism .32
Picknett and Prince, prior to their popular book The Templar Revelation,
published the text Turin Shroud: In Whose Image. They concentrated on the mysterious
picture titled Shroud o f Turin, the 13-1/2 foot long piece o f fabric having a photo-like
image o f the crucified body o f a man. The Catholic Encyclopedia interprets the Shroud o f
Turin as an extraordinary image that projects “the Holy See.” Picknett and Prince tried to
prove that this photolike-picture is the work o f Leonardo who was able to use a camera
obscura technique. The Shroud o f Turin became one o f the most important relics to Pope
Sixtus IV. Picknett and Prince posed the question: Why would Leonardo “fake” the
image o f Jesus’ body for the Christian Church? For a true believer this would be an
offence. Their final interpretation o f the Shroud o f Turin is that Leonardo him self was
involved in the battle against the Church. The head on the picture appears to be beheaded,
which might send a message that the real leader was beheaded, and to Leonardo this
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leader might be John the Baptist. Picknett and Prince created an idea that Leonardo
might be associated with the underground movement that was oriented towards the
Johannite tradition, and that he developed the web o f encoded symbols which generate
the movement opposite o f the traditional Catholic Church. Consequently, Picknett and
Prince concluded that there is a possibility o f connecting what is known as the legacy of
the Priory o f Sion to Leonardo’s work and possibly his religious convictions.33
O f course, the alleged secret organization o f the Priory o f Sion for which it was
claimed that was founded in the 11th century and created by the medieval order of
Knights Templars to protect a secret about the bloodline o f Jesus, supposedly continued
in the Merovingian line o f rulers, was shown to be actually a pseudo-history. Namely,
May 1956 was the first time when this organization was registered as an existent society
and was established by Pierre Plantard. He was also responsible, along with his friend,
de Cherisey, for the production o f the forged documents known as Secret Dossiers o f
Henri Lobineau, planting them in the French Bibliotheque Nationale and using the
pseudonym “Philippe Toscan du Plantier.” The content o f these forged documents was
presented in the form o f different parchments used to prove the existence o f the Priory of
Sion and the line o f the Grand Masters. The list o f the Grand Master includes names such
as Marie de Saint-Clair (1220-1266), Leonardo Da Vinci (1510-1519), Isaac Newton
(1691-1727), Victor Hugo (1844-1885), and Claude Debussy (1885-1918). On the Secret
Dossiers i.e., a modem myth, is based Dan Brown’s novel Da Vine ’si Code.34
The most appealing argumentation in both o f their published works was that in
Leonardo’s The Last Supper located in Santa Maria delle Grazie (Mila) to the left of
Jesus from the viewer’s point o f view is painted Mary Magdalene rather than John the
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Apostle. The whole theory o f Picknett and Prince is laid-out in the fashion o f a mystery
story, where the scholars act as detectives and re-write the meaning and signification
processes o f the whole history o f Christianity. Seven years after their popular book, Dan
Brown’s novel reached enormous popularity and, even more interesting, engaged people
o f different agendas in the great public debate in the American Media. What this public
debate about Dan Brown’s book opened for the American society was that common
religious men and women showed fear and disappointment that the cannon o f religion,
with the whole meaning o f Christianity, could be highly disputed if separated from the
theology and main Christian set o f beliefs, and put into the historical perspective with the
interpretative freedom from the researcher’s point o f view. The true Christians asked
themselves: Is it possible that the Christian Church and Churches hid from the public and
their own believers a “thread o f heresy” for more than two-thousand years? Is it possible
that what was believed to be on Leonardo’s picture The Last Supper is actually an
encoded story o f Jesus’ betrayal? Is it possible the “John’s gesture,” an index finger
pointing up, is a sign on The Last Supper that denotes and defines Jesus as a traitor?
This example o f reinterpretation o f Leonardo’s signification o f religious symbols
in his paintings shows what is the power o f the religious symbolization: they tend to be
open to interpretation as time changes and the structures o f society changes aspiring in
modem time for secularism rather than theocentrism. One might say; these, in many of
ways, “paranoid” interpretations seem to be strictly secular and critical to the religious
establishment. These free interpretations o f Christianity today radically dispute the
apocalyptical, the eschatological, and the Christological picture o f Jesus that the Christian
theology and religious establishment preferred for Jesus as the “wise teacher” or even
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Jesus as only a man and the charismatic leader o f a religious movement. Although only a
novel, David Brown’s book opened a war in the media between the pious Christians with
their Churches and his poetic license to use the research o f Picknett and Prince for his
plot of the hoax story that lasts for centuries. For example L.D. M eagher’s for CNN book
review concludes about Picknett and Prince:
In the end, Picknett and Prince propose that a murky conspiracy has been
at work for nearly 2.000 years. Two conspiracies in fact: one, involving all
denominations o f the Christian faith and spearheaded by the Vatican,
suppresses the truth while the other, stage-managed by the Priory o f Sion,
hides it. Their theory makes the "X-Files" look like "Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington". The publicity for ‘The Templar Revelation" claims the book
"could shatter the foundation o f the Christian Church.’ It's been more than
a year since it was first published in Great Britain and there's no indication
religious institutions are beginning to crumble.
(http://www.cnn.eom/books/reviews/9902/l 9/templar, accessed June 6,
2006)
The making o f Christianity a mystery story with a paranoid plot, o f course, is an
appealing and new method that opens material interesting for scholars, writers, academia,
those open and prone to secular ideas, but definitely seems offensive to pious Christians.
Meagher ironically concludes in his review that there is no sign o f the breaking o f
religious institutions by all o f these alternative truths about Christianity. This is, of
course, a simple truism, but still doesn’t give a full explanation o f why and how
Christianity exists, and even reaffirms its position in the time when science, history,
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comparative methodologies developed in diverse scholarship projects offer more
common sense explanations and answers to human existence and problems, than the ones
offered in religion.
The question of belief and what are the limits o f possible beliefs, is a critical
question that Semiotic Theory o f Religion vigorously discusses, because sometimes
beliefs are also viewed as the expression o f foolishness or craziness. So, the questions for
the Semiotic Theory o f Religion are: How does the human mind distinguish foolish ideas
from righteous ones, or acts of free imagination from the valuable beliefs? O f course,
when talking about the nature o f belief, in the semiotic approach, one should always take
into consideration the faculties/abilities of the human mind and what are the limits of free
imagination.

Id) The Nature of Belief and Cognitive Limits of Belief
The nature o f belief has been one o f the crucial questions that also has amazed
semiotician C. S. Peirce. His idea is that the source o f belief can be anything. This view is
supported with an idea that any object o f knowledge can become signified not just as the
“real” object o f knowledge, but can also become a symbol, a sign for something else.
Peirce expands the theory o f knowledge in semiotics. The object o f knowledge is not
fixed only as an object in reality, it is only a sign, so it can change or switch from the
fixed meaning to the open sign again.35
Based on the research and in-depth study for this dissertation, the Peircean
concept o f belief is founded on the strong influence, but also criticism o f David Hume’s
skepticism, who put in question the continuum o f consciousness existence, metaphysics,
god, and morality. One work that specifically has triggered Peirce has been Hume’s
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-1 /

criticism o f the religious miracles.

First, Hume argues that the consciousness is

problematic in its existence, because it is rather the entity that emerges from various
discontinuous time fragments. Besides this problem, Hume thinks that this “disappearing
s e lf’ is in the constant change o f the roles while processing through experience
knowledge about the world: (1) consciousness first becomes one with the object of
knowledge and so it looses itself in the process o f understanding the object; (2)
consciousness interprets the object o f knowledge, putting it into the perspective of
causality; (3) and the final circle o f knowledge is an achievement o f differentiation o f the
•

•

•

object and the self, distinguishing one from the other.

^7

According to Hume, the most

dangerous part o f “knowing” o f an object is the application o f causation, which, he
perceives, is one o f the greatest limitations o f human knowledge. The idea that one event
makes another happen assumes that there is a necessary connection o f events, but Hume
is skeptical that the causation is a sufficient explanatory theory either for the object of
knowledge, or the problem o f consciousness/the self. According to Hume, what we know
as the self is established as the habit and the self as a continuum is explained through the
cause and effect pattern, so, it is a belief rather than the objective knowledge.
Analyzing the problem o f superstitions, for example, Hume thinks that the belief
in miracles is one o f the superstitious elements o f reason, and he is critically positing the
question: Why does the mind use the explanation o f events that are contrary to logic and
reason? Hume thinks that the problem is in the connection between the impressions
(matters o f fact) and the association o f impressions with the ideas. While ideas are
presented as the rational conceptualization o f reality and backed up by reason, the
impressions are derived from experiences, and finally, they are associated with ideas.39
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The human predicament is to apply causation logic to every single thing. The problem
occurs when the idea is associated with the impression as a short-cut explanation that
denotes the pattern between the cause and effect. The whole human perception is intuitive
rather than scientific; so every day we see the sun rising from the East and going down in
the West, and our perception that is based on the causation intuitive logic is wrong, while
scientific proof that the sun doesn’t go anywhere is truth.40 In this sense, Hume sees the
par excellance problem: How can one be sure about anything that is perceived and what
might be the consequences o f the limitation o f knowledge by causality?
In summarizing the problem, to Hume religion appears as a critical problem
because faith is based on the acceptance o f miracles or stories that are imaginative and
symbolic, rather than rational and logical. Hume rejects miracles, because they contradict
to the laws o f nature. Hume also doubts god because all our knowledge is derived from
experience and therefore all our knowledge is a construct based on a-posteriori access to
reality. The miracles presented in the Gospels contradict to reason, and so the miracles
should be suspended as the suitable reason for being religious.
Peirce, however, would have a hard time to accept this argument. He states in his
text The Laws o f Nature and H um e’s Argument against Miracles that this is a wrong
argumentation based only on a simple inductive logical method, which doesn’t apply real
aspects of probabilities that are even becoming the part o f modem scientific reasoning.
He goes so far to confront Hume’s argument with the definition o f miracles by the church
fathers: “The fathers o f the church defined a miracle as performance so far beyond
ordinary human powers as to show that the agent must have had extraordinary super
human aid,” and he states that Hume was not familiar with this definition, but rather
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Thomas Aquinas’s, who opposed miracle to the law o f nature. Peirce argues that what
Hume sees is only the “regularity” o f the phenomena in the law o f nature that is projected
by the scientific method.41 Actually, Peirce proves that the irregularity o f the phenomena
is a common aspects o f the modem scientific theory o f probability, but also that the
irregularity of phenomena is the issue with which humans live everyday. To count the
Gospel story o f miracles as “evidence” that counter reason because it is an extraordinary
story with nothing like it in history or in other life experiences, to Peirce, is an absurd
idea. To him the objective probabilities are statistical facts that have an origin in the
insurance business, subjective probabilities, or likelihoods, all o f which rely on
preconceived notions.42 What Peirce says is the following, yes, the sun appears as
traveling around the Earth, so the Ptolomaic view is common to our experience based on
perceptions, but at the same time we know the scientific truth, and this is not going to
change the perceptions in anyway. So, the sun can co-exist in two different aspects of
signification, one perceptive, and another scientific, but also can function in different
cultural signification processes as one can find in ancient Greeks, to whom the sun was
the God Helios.
On the matter o f belief, Peirce comes close to a problem presented and outlined
by Hume. Still, Peirce goes further in his inquiry and asks why don’t we accept the
simple beliefs that are the most opportune, convenient, and comfortable to us as truths?
The belief is a will powered conviction. In his text How to Make Our Ideas Clear (1878)
published in Popular Science Monthly 12 Peirce says: “And what, then is belief? It is the
demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony o f our intellectual life. We
have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
second, it appeases the irritation o f doubt; and third, it involves the establishment in our
nature o f a rule o f action, or say for short, a habit.”43 When Peirce investigates the power
of beliefs, he sees that lots o f beliefs are indeed in contradiction to reality, but a person
who believes feels that this belief, although against the objective reality, is somehow
settled and he/she doesn’t think that the statement o f the belief is in contradiction to
reality. Peirce asks a further question: why then don’t we have only beliefs, but also
knowledge that is backed up by reason and science? His answer is that beliefs are not
simply voluntary things, but are settled not only by our faculties and abilities o f the mind,
but also by and in the community. In his text The Basis o f Pragmaticism Peirce writes:
“Now a sign as ordinarily understood is an implement o f intercommunication.”44 If
anyone would simply believe what he/she wants, there would no longer be even a
possibility for any communication.45 That every person has a different explanation of
what is the sun, god, or goodness, this would mean a total disintegration o f the human
race. Therefore, all beliefs are settled in the community. The communication community
establishes a simple system o f language— to every object it is assigned the word, and the
word is encoded through the system o f written signs, letters. One can interpret Peirce’s
view on religious beliefs as a very interesting concept. Religious beliefs are those which
trigger equally the imagination, the powers o f life, and reason, and are settled in the ideal
communication community. This ideal communication community reflects what is taken
as the norm o f belief, which now reflects its value and content throughout time o f the
past, present, and future.
Surprisingly, to Peirce, knowledge established by science is the highest aspect of
beliefs, because there is no possibility to know something in the context o f absolute
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objective knowledge or in the realm o f noumena. According to Peirce, every science
begins with the hypothesis, and this hypothesis should be confirmed by the methodology
that the scientists have established. Science is not the absolute knowledge. It is only the
best belief we can finally settle upon: science acknowledges the object o f knowledge as
independent of our intentions or opinions, by science is confirmed only as a thing that is
put in the perspective o f predictable and regular laws, and when the hypothesis is
confirmed by the experiment, we can agree easily to one conclusion.46
Peirce finally concludes his observation on the problem o f beliefs: belief is a
habit, and doubt is the lack o f a habit.47 On one hand, the religious beliefs and simple
personal convictions are beliefs that often bring forth doubts, a sense o f relativism, or
even rejections. On the other hand, beliefs are necessary to straighten a person’s will and
power as a condition from which one behaves in a specific way when the occasion arises.
Without beliefs it would not be possible to act and fulfill the practical aspect o f life. The
doubt is something that urges a person on the journey o f inquiry, but this is rather a rare
moment o f our existence than the rule according to which we act. We accept beliefs as
long as we have no cause to doubt. Truth is a fixed belief.

Aft

There are definitely different ways how beliefs can be fixed in the community: by
tradition, by authority, and by accepting what is the most reasonable or favorable
explanation. What is important for religious studies is that the fixation o f beliefs is one of
the great parts of every religious tradition. It has been discussed on the former pages
about the canonization processes in Christianity, and how this process was crucial to the
formation o f settled Christian ideas in theology and in the Church. It seems that the
Mosaic interpretation overpowered any Hermetic or philosophical interpretation of
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Christianity. One can also see that even a forgery or a myth— something made up and
thus the result o f imagination—can become sensational for the public discussions and
viewed as real. Consequently, often the imaginative ideas act as the real ones, as one
could see in the examples o f the popular story about the secret society Priory o f Sion
which was a hoax, but still it has been engaged in a labyrinth o f false connections to
scholars and writers. The best example is given in the popularity o f Dan Brown’s book
Da Vinci’s Code.
Eco in his collection o f essays, Serendipities: Language & Lunacy (1998)
discusses in what way a myth, a fake story, or a fake narrative can become a part of
history or an important cultural idiom.49 The essay The Force o f Falsity discusses known
historical forgeries, which were created and designed to maintain the desired worldview,
to sway political directions o f the rulers, produce a feeling that the world is governed by
the higher secret authority on which a common person cannot have any impact, so called
the conspiracy theory. Eco notes some examples: (1) the official stand o f the Medieval
Christian Church (Eastern and Western) that the earth is a flat disk in the shape o f a
tabernacle with Jerusalem in the middle, the very idea o f Cosmas Indicopleustes, the
geographer committed to the Church fundamentalism, which idea became accepted as
official for a thousand years after its publication; (2) the Donation o f Constantine, a
forged document by the Roman Church between 750-850 C.E. that proves how the
Roman Emperor Constantine I had granted Pope Sylvester I and his successors as those
who has the right to rule over the city o f Rome, Italy, and the Western Roman Empire;
(3) the letter o f Prester John to the Pope and the West in which is described the non
existent land o f non-existent ruler where one can even find the beings o f imagination
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such as hippopotami, metagallinari, cametennus, tinsirete, onagers, gryphon, centaurs.
This letter is believed to be the main motivation for the third Crusades under the
leadership o f Frederick I; (4) the manifest o f Roscirucians for which it was believed to
exist as the secret society, the organization allegedly established in 1615, but no person
has ever seen one Rosicrucian, so it is most likely to be the popular idea o f utopian
aspirations o f the intellectual elite; (5) and the text the Protocols o f the Elders o f Zion that
was written as the satire on the events during the French Revolution between 1797 and
1798 and has made the whole literary journey from France to tsarist Russia. There, a
Russian Monk, Sergej Nilus, added to the original text his vision o f reality. He was
inspired with the romantic Rasputinian mysterious religious experiences, so he associated
the idea o f “the Antichrist” with the underground movement embedded in the secret
societies of Europe i.e., Masonry, which he has presented to have an intention to provoke
the line o f revolutions in all European countries in order to enhance social injustice and
ensure the mass control o f the rich ruling class over the common people, adding the
chauvinistic perspective on the Jewish nation, accusing them that the final goal o f this
conspiracy was de-Christianization and conversion o f the ruling class to Judaism.50
In examining the nature o f belief one could easily see that even fake tales, false
theories, or ideas opposite to reality and reason can become accepted in the society, so we
can interpret such ideas as the myth-making constructs. Analyzing the unifying aspect of
all fake stories/new myths that caught on and have become accepted, Eco states that the
power o f these stories lays in their persuasiveness. Some historical events that resulted
with the unexpectable consequences seem to be not logical or believable at all. With the
split between the Christian Church in the East and the West to true Christian may seem
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incredible and foolish. So, if one would add to the plot o f events, the text such as the
Donation o f Constantine, the split would look more logical and acceptable to people. The
same power o f persuasiveness can be seen in the anti-Semitic text o f the Protocols o f the
Elders o f Zion. The idea o f the total conspiracy theory is a short-cut story that puzzles
together a complex situation o f modern political developments that are going astray,
against the rational reasoning, against social, political, and economic piecemeal, making
dialogs in societies, so it is easy to piece together the story that makes sense and blames
someone for all o f what was done wrong in the complex reality. After the critical
observations of how does the society accept as the truth, the fake tales or stories, which
then make them the modern myths, Eco concludes his text with an observation that the
“cultivated person’s first duty is to be always prepared to rewrite the encyclopedia.”
Eco’s point is again important for the Semiotic Theory o f Religion. In the modern
world that is split between the religious and the secular worldviews, there is an attempt to
analyze the main beliefs o f religions as ideas that are presented in the stories that have the
elements o f the myth, and therefore, o f the fake. Naturally, no one immediately associates
the problem o f the fake as closely related to the religions of the world because these
mythical stories became such an important part o f the common human knowledge and are
associated with the cultural norms and values that are observed by the global community
as an important source o f culture, society, and personhood.

le) Eco’s Differentiation of Religious Symbolism
In every religion there are the fixed set o f beliefs and practices by orthodoxy,
which is given as the primary resource for a specific religious worldview. Once when this
code is absorbed, a believer has to engage his/her own experience by the power o f one’s
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own reasoning and imagination in order to rejuvenate faith and to understand what
religion stands for in reality.
Analyzing the power o f religious symbols Eco gives an interesting analysis on
how did the vision o f Saint Margaret Mary Alacoque, who experienced the mystical
presentation o f the Sacred Heart o f Jesus in the 17th century, became accepted by a large
amount o f the Catholic followers in the 20th century.51 Margaret Mary Alacoque was born
in 1671 in France, and after surviving a rheumatic fever at age 11, she became a devotee
of the Blessed Sacrament. A few years later she joined the Order o f Our Lady o f the
Visitation at Paray-le-Monial where Mary Margaret received visions o f the “Lord
Himself,” who appeared to her and asked her to be devoted to his sacred heart because
CO

the heart is the center o f true love.

Eco states that Pope Pius XII, who wrote the

Encyclical that promulgated the devotion to the Sacred Heart in 1956, definitely knew
that the heart is a human organ with the crucial physical function for the organism’s
survival, and not a place o f a religious or spiritual significance or sense o f love, but he
still insisted on the symbolic significance o f the sacred heart o f Jesus: “Who does not see,
venerable brethren, that opinions o f this kind are in entire disagreement with the
teachings which Our predecessors officially proclaimed from this seat o f truth when
approving the devotion to the Sacred Heart o f Jesus? Who would be so bold as to call that
devotion useless and inappropriate to our age which Our predecessor o f immortal
memory, Leo XIII, declared to be ‘the most acceptable form o f piety’?”53 It was in the
Middle Ages when the majority o f people believed that all human emotions and feelings,
especially the sense o f love, were placed in the heart, so the heart was understood not as
an organ, but as the place where the soul reflects all turmoil in the emotional sense. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
scientific and commonly accepted knowledge in the 20th century that the heart is an organ
with strictly physical function didn’t put aside the authentic mystical experience of
Margaret Mary. In her vision a symbol o f the heart appears as the sign that serves as the
vehicle and detonator for the “transcendent voices” o f what Jesus stands for and what true
faith in Christian parameters is, or should be. In this sense, religion always involves the
action as semiosis— interpretation o f the signs that are open to its interpreter which
acknowledges at the same time present other higher concepts hidden in the religious
message. Eco accepts the definition given by Peirce who says that a sign is “an action, or
influence, which is, or involves, an operation o f three subjects such as a sign, its object,
and its intrpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into an
action between pairs.” (C.P. 5.484).54
A religious symbol is not only a picture o f something that represents something
else by the virtue of analogy. It is a full representament o f the communicative process
between the sign that is open for interpretation to its interpreter, and at the same time an
object that stands open for interpretation as it is in the role o f dynamic object. This object
then transforms one thing to the other. This thing might be even a concept, but under its
appearance underlies the importance o f the deep religious experience as the faith and
mystery. Religious symbols and the religious highest concepts are similar to nebulas and
are religious symbols because they are open for interpretation. They are open signs in a
sense that they are often ambiguous, empty and full at the same time. Analyzing symbols
as archetypes and the Sacred, Eco concludes that these symbols as universal images and
representations o f the collective unconsciousness such as solar, lunar, vegetal,
meteorological representations are fundamentally vague. This vast openness o f religious
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symbols gives the tri-level hermeneutic circle in order that the symbol can be understood:
a religious symbol appears as a sign which involves interpreter, but at the same time
appears as the object whose identity is changed by the virtue o f analogy with the other
object whose meaning is more open and again involves the interpreter’s experience to
participate in its transformation.
According to Eco, for any religious tradition the most difficult problem is to
translate the exegesis o f one religion into the other culture. Although every exegesis tends
to give a strict and orthodox interpretation, the religious symbols are so vastly open and
require immediate and often spontaneous reactions o f believers that every translation
requires as well reinterpretation. Every religion, o f course, has symbols, even more so, a
system o f symbols. In every religion allegorical representations are crucial for
understanding fully what this religion is about. As Eco thinks, “allegory transforms an
experience into a concept and a concept into an image, but so that the concept remains
always defined and expressible by the image.” Once when the system o f symbols is
transferred into other cultures the interpretation o f specific symbols might slightly change
or these symbols can be accepted as important because they are analogous with the codes
and symbols o f the other culture. One example is that o f the Virgin Mary o f Guadalupe.
Eric R. Wolf, an anthropologist and an expert in popular religion associated with
their main symbols did research about the Virgin Mary o f Guadalupe that is perceived as
the main national symbol o f Mexico as well as the main patron saint o f all Mexican
Catholics. The Virgin Mary of Guadalupe is perceived as a stunning symbol, the main
refuge for the poor, especially women, and the common people o f Mexico. Also, under
this symbol were fought two great battles— the War for Independence o f Mexico and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

revolution led by Emiliano Zapata and his followers. Wolf, interested in the specifics of
the regional religious past, found a curious fact that on the mountain Tepeyac where was
built the shrine to “Our Lady o f Guadalupe” was prior to the Christian worshiping place a
shrine to the mother, fertility goddess, Tonantzin, which in translation means Our Mother
and was often addressed by people as Our Lady. Also, Tonantzin was surrounded with
the symbol o f the moon as well as was the Virgin Mary.
When in 1531 the Virgin Mary was said to appear to Juan Diego, she addressed
him in the area’s native language, and demanded o f him that the archbishop o f Mexico
build the church on the hill where she appeared. Diego’s request was denied several
times, and finally, it is said, the Virgin Mary acted miracouslly; she caused roses to grow
in the desert soil, gathered roses in the Indian’s cloak, and gave them to Juan Diego as a
proof o f her presence. When Diego came with the bundle of roses before the archbishop
the Virgin Mary miraculously appeared and the archbishop soon built the shrine in her
behalf.
Researching the church documentation about the Virgin M ary’s appearance, W olf
has discovered that the Catholic Spanish establishment was very much aware o f the
syncretism that occurred between the goddess Tonantzin and the Virgin Mary. Two
church officials, F. Bernardino de Sahagun and F. Martin de Leon, stated that on the hill
which the common Mexican people address as Our Mother or Our Lady is actually the
old goddess, Tonantzin. They even express their fears that this kind o f mixing o f the old
goddess with the Virgin Mary might have some “satanic code” or the whole worshiping
can actually be idolatrous for those who address the Virgin Mary as Tonanzin. W olf
presents an interesting quote by F. Jacinto de la Serna who stated discussing the
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pilgrimage to the Virgin Mary in this way “ . . . it is the purpose o f the wicked to
[worship] the goddess and not the Most Holy Virgin, or both together.”55
The Mexican people didn’t consciously compare these two religious symbols and
made a simple replacement as the result o f their rational decision, but the long process of
semiosis was involved in this substitution. Semiosis is a process o f having a dynamic
object as the signifier which significance is in correlation between the interpreter, its
interpretation, and the possible modification o f a dynamic object by the interpretation.

If) Aesthetical Hermeneutics of Religious Experience
The semiotic process is similar in its methodology to the process defined as the
hermeneutic circle by Hans Georg Gadamer.56 Trying to find a new methodology for the
Humanities and Social Sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey and H. G. Gadamer investigate how to
explain why and how works o f art, literature, mythologies, philosophies, religions, and of
different cultural values persisted throughout time, and even are still o f value in the
modem world where science is the dominant tool for explaining reality. Gadamer asks
the following questions: How is it possible that a modem reader or an intellectual can
relate with the same passion to an ancient Greek tragedy? How is it possible, for
example, that the text o f Sophocles’s Antingona can be still understood and its meaning
recovered but the audience does not live in the Athens o f 5 B.C.E?
It can be easily recognized that the context o f reading has drastically changed
throughout the cultural and historical developments. While, in the Athens o f the 5th
century B.C.E. the tragedy had a great ritualistic character and was played on the behalf
o f the god o f darkness, Dionysius, celebrating his “resurrection,” usually in early or mid
April. The tragedy represented the great collective catharses which involved the whole
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community. The modem form, however, is reduced basically on the contact between a
single person and the text (whether it is dramatized on the stage) stripped from its
original mythological and ritual character. These generational, political, and cultural
changes are called in the German tradition the “Zeitgeist.”
According to Gadamer, it is amazing that the meaning o f Antigone’s great moral
action—choosing death in order to save the memory o f her loving brother Polynices by
giving him a proper burial and homage, and opposing the absolute rule o f the king Creon-is still preserved in its original sense. How is it possible that this meaning is not lost
throughout historical changes and translations o f original Sophocles’ text? Wilhelm
Dilthey and Hans Georg Gadamer have found an answer in the human ability to
reconstruct the past involving the cultural and individual potentials in a sense to circle the
experiential path that was given as an input in the original text. This means that every
person who is capable o f understanding the tragic event when read Sophocles’ Antigone
has, on the objective level, enough and efficient information that is preserved in a proper
translations, commentaries, and understanding o f what was the Greek tragedy as the
literary form, but also has freely open one’s self to become one with the characters and
can experience the tragic event in the same way as the drama unfolds in the actions of the
main protagonists.
In order to explain the horizon o f understanding, Gadamer powerfully uses
Schleirmacher’s description of the aesthetic experience that is similar to the process of
divination by which “all individuality is a manifestation o f universal life and hence
everyone carries a tiny bit of everyone else within himself, so that divination is
stimulated by comparison with oneself.”57 In this sense, the peak o f the aesthetic
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experience is in the transformation o f oneself into the aesthetic object, where the truth of
this object becomes as well the truth o f its observer, but both transcend this recognition of
the universal human value as the act o f collective consciousness that stands potentially
open for the future. The hermeneutic circle is like the kaleidoscope o f mirrors that
unfolds one image that reenacts itself through time. In other words, one is able to grasp a
meaning o f Antigone if it is able to reenact the same moral feelings, doubts, and
experiences, as the part o f him/her, the tragedy o f confronting rules where morality
appears as the center o f one’s autonomous acting. Gadamer would say that one
transforms one’s self into the other.
To Gadamer, hermeneutics appears as the “art o f understanding” that is circular.
He even defines the hermeneutical rule as the “whole in terms o f the detail and the detail
in terms o f whole.”

CO

. . .
It is similar to what M. Heidegger has defined as the hermeneutical

circle that can be expressed in terms o f “the most primordial kind o f knowing,” where
intuition such as fore-sight or fore-conception is in action.
The hermeneutic circle appears as a great methodology from the mid 20th century
that has been able to explain how occurs the transformation o f the aesthetical and moral
potentials from the distant historical into a modem time.
In this sense, what is given in the example o f the Virgin Mary o f Guadalupe,
when in the 16th and 17th centuries indigenous people from Mexico at the same time
greeted the goddess Tonanzin and the Virgin Mary making the identification o f the two
female goddesses is not a simple translation o f one symbol into the other, but it is a
process o f interpretation where two different traditions - the indigenous and the
Christians - are becoming one in a sense that the meaning o f the one, almost, divinely,
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becomes the other. Syncretism as blending of two different traditions is a powerful
expression of the human ability to correlate two different cultures and their symbolic
idioms interpreting both in a new form and a new experience.
The discovery o f the aesthetic experience that has become a new salient point of
modern philosophy from Kant to the post-modernist thought could be seen as crucial for
the interpretation o f the religious experience, but also for the movements that try to
primarily concentrate around the value o f personal religious experience, spiritual growth,
and new interpretations o f the traditional religious concepts. Movements that would
imply redefinition o f the old concepts or a search for a new spirituality are usually
perceived as off-shoots o f the mainstream religions such as religious syncretism, new
religious movements, and the modem audience cults. The elitism and high training o f the
members o f these groups often require the sophistication o f the religious concepts,
symbols, or unlimited religious objects such as deities, spirituality, or other intelligible
forms. For instance, the religious training in the Wicca movement requires o f the
members a high level o f study and intellectual training in a specific either pagan, some
mystical, or ancient tradition that the group arranged by their interests is dedicated to.
This intellectualism is then used for designing the rituals that would enhance the religious
experience and achieve a full dedication o f the member o f the movement to the group and
their practices.59 This new spirituality can be comprehended by circling a religious
experience, similar as described in acquiring the aesthetic experience in modem
hermeneutics. Religious experience, as C.G. Jung would define is indisputable, and
represents the pivotal point for a person dedicated to a religious tradition. It requires of
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its members deep “divination” processes in which one’s individuality becomes one with
the acquired religious object or power in order to transcend it in the future.60
Kant was the first who defined the importance o f an aesthetic experience in the
discourse o f modem philosophy in his book Critique o f Judgment. As he defined, the real
aesthetic object when it reaches its actualization through one’s experience, it escapes any
utilization, interest, or even conceptualization biased on the schematism o f reason. The
aesthetic object becomes real through one’s experience demanding the normative
validity. The individuality and extraordinarity o f aesthetic sublimation is so important in
the circling o f the aesthetic judgment that one feels his/her objectivity is not questionable,
but because the individuality is crucial in expressing one’s tastes, this supposable
universality is only tentative and not real. In this sense, the aesthetic judgment is defined
as “a free play between the imagination and understanding” where one becomes the
other, and the other becomes the one, and both transcend a possible universality by
opening a sensible meaning that transcend beyond the limits o f time continuity.61

Eco acknowledges the importance o f Kantian aesthetics and later hermeneutics,
which both have led modern investigations from aesthetics and epistemology to redefine
the object o f knowledge. If the hermeneutic circle insists on the point that the
understanding horizon o f a true aesthetic object means for the subject to become one with
its object in the act o f his/her sublime experience, this does not mean that differentiation
o f the subject, and the object has become an invalid inquiry for sufficient understanding
o f the world or even applicable to the aesthetics.62 The point o f their identification means
that the aesthetical object can no longer be seen as a static object, let alone as only an
object. The importance o f the aesthetic object that unfolds itself through the free play of
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parts and the whole is in the reaching o f the understanding that can be explained as the
identification o f the subject o f knowledge and its object in experience, where this
experience, then, in the breadth o f life into the object and its intention becomes fulfilled
action.

In many o f ways the dynamics o f the aesthetic object with the underlying
intention to integrate the subject o f knowledge in a process o f understanding is similar to
the grasping o f the knowledge about the highest spiritual objects o f religion. The objects
such as gods, god, the ultimate reality, angels, spirits, mandalas, and enormous range of
other religious dynamic symbols are intentionally unlimited objects that engage the
subject o f cognition into the process which result is in the achievement o f the sublimity
of experience and transcendence. This kind of experience that is described as important
for modern art in the aesthetics o f the 19th and 20th century is present in religion from its
beginnings. In the primary oral and basic traditions, rituals are still associated with the
mystical and transient experiences.

For instance, in the Navajo culture, the manadalas are important. When the
Navajo medicine man constructs with the colored sand the Creation image (a symbolic
picture), it has the intentional healing purposes or it is strictly used for a ritual o f the
tribe, but for the public display no mandala is ever finished. The purpose o f the mandala
construction is to reenact the sacred powers o f the Mother Earth and to apply this power
to some purposes such as a healing ceremony. The mandala is to restore an “inner” lost
balance that is believed to be expressed in illnesses. The one to whom the mandala is
dedicated has to undergo through the transformation o f consciousness and become one
with the powers of the universe. The person that undergoes the ritual must be encircled
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by the sand image to regain the balance with the universe. C.G. Jung explains the purpose
of the Navajo mandala as bringing “a sick person back into harmony with him self and
with the cosmos.” 63
In analyzing the example o f the Navajo mandala one can recognize that the
Navajo people perceive the power o f their mandala symbol as unlimited within their
cultural experience, but they also set well the limits o f interpretation that come, one might
say, from their cultural code. In the New York museum o f the Navajo, all mandalas are
presented unfinished because the pure presentation o f the mandala as an object without
any healing purposes and engagement o f real actors o f the ritual can be considered
“sacrilege” to the Navajo people.64 The point here is that every religious object that has
the intention o f the unlimited object also implies limitations that are crucial for its
understanding and is associated with the cultural code.

lg) Cognitive and Aesthetic Aspects of the Dynamic Sign and Unlimited Semiosis
The value o f Eco’s interpretation o f Peirce is in his focusing on the dynamic sings
and unlimited semiosis and applying these concepts on the religious symbols and their
historical interpretations or re-interpretations. Religion always develops its tradition
through the dynamism o f the signs, that are transformed into the symbols, and sometimes
goes beyond the expected, into the unlimited signification process that is, for example,
one of the chief characteristics o f the mystical insights.
In summarizing this part o f the research, once again, religion could be defined as
an open system o f signs that is originated in the cognitive ability o f the human mind to
become engaged in the process o f an unlimited semiosis (un-ended signification
processes). The unlimited semiosis denotes a cognitive ability o f the mind to create the
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possible system o f connections between all things, whether they are existent or not. This
ongoing process o f thought which can create the idea o f arranged connections between all
things is very much analogical to the ability o f a traditional believer relating to the
supreme idea existent in his/her religion that is traditionally known as the object of belief.
This object of belief is defined usually as a superhuman/supernatural being or an ultimate
reality, which, for different religions, is common to refer to as god, gods, could be also an
all encompassing reality such as Brahman, consciousness o f the world and supreme
(Buddhahood), or creator (native peoples o f Northern America or Africa). The semiotic
theory defines the idea o f this “absolute” as a dynamic object that is put in the process of
unlimited semiosis. This ability o f the human mind to project a supreme being (God),
ultimate reality (Brahman, Buddahood), or the way o f truth that reveals itself in the world
(Tao). comes from a natural presupposition o f our consciousness to project a connection
between all things that are separated from the mind itself (thinking consciousness) in a
way of purposive relationships. The unlimited semiosis process tends to outline the
unified system in an ethical and aesthetical sense (theleology), which opens the
meaningful solution for the existence of the self and the world, that is not, o f course, a
common ability o f the actual natural world.
Besides this natural presupposition o f the mind, there are also critical amounts of
the cultural constraints that influence the process o f thought and how a person reflects
and outlines this unlimited semiosis. Accordingly, the Semiotic Theory o f Religion
interprets culture and the environment as the base for the interpretation o f the unlimited
semiosis. However, semiosis is a process that denotes the ability o f the human mind, and,
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so, is, on the one hand, universal to all humanity, but, on the other hand, is very much the
matter o f a personal experience.
As a personal experience the process o f unlimited semiosis reflects the tripartite
structure: the appearance o f a generic sign that represents the unity o f all things, the
referent who stands as the observer o f the generic sign, and finally, the intepretant, who
creatively interprets in a meaningful way the sign that transforms itself into the symbolic
system of signification. The idea that the cognitive ability of the religious is in the
interpretative strength o f the mind, which connects the imaginative and real, the
conceptualized and phenomenal, is very much an aesthetical ability, whose roots are in
going beyond what is known and given. This level o f semiosis represents the unique
aspect o f the human aesthetical potential. O f course, the cognitive aspect always lacks to
fully comprehend the process o f knowledge because it separates it from the social
contextualization and interaction with the world. Very often the unlimited semiosis
process is constrained by the social aspect o f the religious and religious practices. How
do the symbols and their openness influence the religious praxis is the task for the next
chapter to discuss.
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CHAPTER II

SEMIOTIC THEORY OF RELIGION: COMMUNICATIVE PRAXIS AND
LINGUIFICATION OF THE SACRED

2a) Evolution of Communicative Praxis and Ethical Semantics of J. Habermas
The transformation o f religious consciousness into new forms o f secular ethics,
which transforms the highest religious ideals into the longings for universal ideas such as
solidarity, equality, and justice in social reality, empowered by the idea o f the welfare
state and democracy, has deepened the crisis o f the religious, requiring o f the religious
institutions to undergo through diverse processes o f reforms and re-evaluation o f their
traditional canon, exegesis, and practice. There is also another serious problem. In the
contemporary world it seems that the enlightenment ideal o f scientific inquiry and the
openness o f communicative rationality has been challenged with an intention to
instrumentalize the social, political, and humanistic world to the point o f dehumanizing
each person and putting everyone into the realm o f numerical expression (every
institution associates a numerical code with the real person) and quantitative value that is
then used to express the human condition, situation, or a problem by the means of dry
statistics which is reduced to the strictness o f mathematical reasoning. The instrumental
rationality depends on the advanced technological development that tends to build greater
and greater control by means o f the administrative society. This control engages the
greater and greater institutional, political, and social control which dehumanizes every
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individual o f society. The administrative society threatens every individual with the loss
of one’s true identity, so the only protection against loosing one’s human value is to
search for any form o f spirituality or spiritual community. It seems that this dehumanized
aspect o f the instrumentalized rationality strengthens the need o f individual to associate
themselves with religious communities that already exist, or the search for new spiritual
movements. In this sense, the new religious revivalism is associated with the crises of
modernity. In the contemporary world, the religious revivalism that is present in the
USA, in post-communist countries, in India, and other world religions fluctuates from the
blossoming o f new religious movements and spirituality to the revivalism o f religious
fundamentalism. The social, ethical, and political aspect o f the religious is the primary
concern o f the social philosopher Jurgen Habermas.
One could say that Habermas agrees that the study o f religion is continuously
engaged in the interpretation o f the dynamic signs, but the religious dynamic signs can
vary from the representations in cultural symbols to the symbolic actions that denote the
practical aspect o f the religious in rituals. This is the focal point for J. Habermas’
communicative praxis. In the exquisite interpretation o f Cassirer’s theory o f symbols, J.
Habermas, in his text The Liberating Power o f Symbols, explains in what way symbols
trigger practice and action: “The world o f symbolic forms extends from pictorial
representation, via verbal expression, to forms o f orienting knowledge, which in turn
pave the way for practice.”65 In the first half o f the 1980’ Habermas worked on his
philosophy o f communicative praxis and this approach brought a new theory o f religion
and a new aspect o f a semiotic theory.66 This theory concentrates to explain the
evolutionary change from the symbolic actions o f the significant language o f rituals in
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pre-linguistic religious reality to the emergence o f the comprehensive socio-economic
and cultural sub-systems. He sees the communicative praxis as the dialectical interplay
between the private and the public. The personhood or the life-world (inter and intra
personal communication) reflects its reality in the normative actions that set the value
system through the validity claims, established and preserved in the social, political,
cultural, and economic institutions. This evolutionary view on the humankind
communicative praxis in Habermas’ work has taken into consideration two traditions: (1)
the tradition o f rationalization processes and reification, which he associates with the
Enlightenment philosophy, modernity with the critique o f metaphysics and modem arts,
critical social-cultural philosophy from Marx and Weber to Lukacs; (2) and the tradition
of social theory o f communication that is founded on Durkheim’s theory o f religion,
communication theory o f G.H. Mead, and semiotics o f C. S. Peirce.67
In his study o f religion, Habermas brings as necessary a combination between the
semiotics, philosophy o f language, and the communication theory. This new approach
seems to work well for explaining the evolutionary process from the symbolically
expressed actions o f the religious collective consciousness in the pre-linguistic condition
o f humankind to the liberation and emancipation o f the personhood. The formation o f the
emancipated person in a social and political sense is achieved through the autonomy that
is present in the governance o f the person, where the set o f convictions, or beliefs, even
religious ideals are put in the perspective o f the discourse ethics: the inter-subjective
argumentation by which the main moral or ethical values exist in the practical
reinforcement o f social tolerance, solidarity, and humanity that are derived from the
appropriation o f the principle o f universalizability. Habermas says: “For the justification
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o f moral norms, the discourse principle takes the form o f a universalization principle.” To
Habermas, universalizability is the appropriation o f the idea o f equality and impartiality
to all people to whom we perceive ourselves eq u al.68 The idea o f morality is in itself
discursive (inter-subjective argumentation and justification o f actions) in a way to re
affirms the personal view as justified by “all others,” who are equals, and in this sense
others appear as the unlimited communication community.69
In the traditional theory o f religion, the evolutionary approach usually represents
the dawn o f the academic study o f religion. The most popular representatives were the
British evolutionists E. B. Tylor and G. J. Frazer, who both tried to explain human
evolution as the journey from the “primitive” to the “scientific” mind. Both o f these
theories were highly criticized by modem scholars who pursued their research in the filed
of the anthropology o f religion. As James Thrower in his book Religion: The Classical
Theories (1999) has presented, for Tylor and Frazer, religion as well as the primary forms
of beliefs such as magic and animism represent a type o f erroneous thinking, the
“primitive” mind.

For example, the French thinker L. Levy-Bruhl argues that native

peoples didn’t think about their world in an erroneous way, but they simply developed a
different type o f reasoning that prefers mystical participation to strictly logical
reasoning.71
The traditional evolutionists argue that human knowledge evolves from the basic
religious forms o f beliefs to scientific reasoning, which, then, dismisses the old
superstitious beliefs. The primer forms o f beliefs are magic and animism, by which the
world is explained as the interplay o f the different supernatural powers that can be
controlled or modified in some ways, using the magical formulas and ritualized actions in
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which a person becomes one with the spiritual power(s) or divine source (divination). In
the next stage magic and animism become more and more obsolete, but religion appears
as a new form o f a belief that offers universal ideas o f human origin, destiny, and the
projection o f the afterlife. In the stage o f religion, humankind expresses its dependence
on the will and grace o f the god(s). The traditional evolutionists conclude that the final
progression o f knowledge comes with the full maturation and enlightenment through
science.
In comparison to this view on evolution, Habermas concentrates on the social
evolution that, in his point o f view, begins with the notion o f the sacred in association
with the collective consciousness and then leads toward the personal autonomy by
substituting the collective consciousness with new institutionalized social and political
sub-structures, in which the humanization process is important because it preserves the
idea of the human regard to ethics and morality as an universal solidarity in normative
actions and validity claims. Basically, Habermas thinks that moral regard and the idea of
solidarity should be rescued from the semantic materials o f religion, so that the
experience of the transcendence would not be closed. Habermas doesn’t think that
science represents the final liberation o f humankind. He actually thinks that science, in
association with technological progression, alienates. The instrumental rationality is the
biggest part o f the modern scientific consciousness and it reflects to all sub-structural
elements o f the society.

77

Therefore, Habermas’ approach to the evolution o f humankind

is radically different than a simple application o f the Darwinian evolutionary theory in
the social world. Besides this, Tylor and Frazer didn’t, in any way, concentrate on the
idea of a collective consciousness. They would rather explain that religion emerged from
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different speculations about the death and experience o f the dead body. This experience
to them was a crucial trigger for evolving the concept o f the spirit that the “primitive
mind” then associated it with every living being, and it finally became an abstract
concept o f the existence o f invisible spirit, and later became known as the concept o f god.
Habermas comes close to the traditional evolutionary idea in the application o f W eber’s
idea of disenchantment to the different forms o f religions o f the world. Definitely,
Habermas’ new attempt to reconstruct the evolutionary development o f humankind also
requires systematic research o f the diverse religious forms and beliefs.
Habermas’ theory o f communicative praxis combines the communication theory
o f G. H. Mead and the modem semiotics o f Charles Sanders Peirce in order to support an
idea that the “collective” consciousness in the primer and re-structured public mind in
modern societies is a necessary condition for understanding the personhood. Habermas
accepts Peirce’s stand that all beliefs are framed by imposing semantic discourse onto
them, and by this virtue beliefs are settled in the community presuming the existence of
the ideal communication community— the concept o f community which settles beliefs by
accepting them as norms. The ideal communication community represents to Peirce the
primer form of the consensus. The consensus is achieved when a belief becomes a norm
to the people o f the present through the assumption o f those who are accepting a specific
belief which is something that could be accepted by people who lived in the past, and if
they were present now, they would be able to accept these ideas presently— as they
would have in the past—and in the future. In this sense, the ideal communication
community o f Peirce is the very concept o f Habermas’ “collective consciousness” that
existed in the pre-linguistic society, and has been transformed in the modern society as
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the discourse and argumentation language that settles ideas, beliefs, and discourses
socially as norms through the political consensus.

2b) Evolution of Communicative Praxis and Types of Rationalization in World
Religions
Besides these two important influences, still one should not forget that Habermas’
theory is developed in the discourse o f the Frankfurt School’s critique o f modem society.
One can see this when Habermas discusses the critical aspects o f modern civil society
which function in the discourse o f socio-political and economic developments o f late
capitalism as monopoly capitalism; problem o f identity formation and preservation in
modem structural society that is polarized between the different worldviews; critique of
traditional metaphysics and rescue o f rationalism; and the consequences o f modern
nihilism and subjectivism on the personhood. Also, Habermas doesn’t define his method
of research as the critical theory, but one can see the critical theory’ imports in his
methodology. The following concepts can be seen as strongly tied with the critical
theory: (1) the objective rationalism in methodology o f investigation, (2) elements of
dialectical thinking between the personhood (life-world) and societies’ super-structures,
and (3) Habermas’ insistence
that one should view the globalized world as the result o f transformation o f the JudeoChristian worldview into the objective social and political norms and standards.
Habermas’ stand seems to have the intention to again revive Hegel’s old idea o f “the
objective mind” and to apply it to the contemporary configuration o f the modern sub
structures o f the social, political, and economic world. The main problem with this—
Habermas’ idea—is the assumption that no other civilizations than Western civilization
have taken the course o f secularization o f religious ideas, transforming them into the
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ethical values and norms, and no other culture has transformed the par exallanlce
religious experience, faith, into the further experiment o f subjectivism which is so
important for the modernization processes that one can see in romanticism, or even later
in the Avant-garde.73
Habermas comes to this point o f understanding by taking into consideration Max
Weber’s analysis o f the world religions; especially the differentiation between the
Eastern and Western religions, and he outlines the comprehensive concepts o f the world
religions patterns as to their rationalization processes, attitudes toward the world, and
evaluation o f the world.74 Habermas defines religion as the worldview and world order
that “reflect some totality that is meaningful.”75 Although all religions reflect the
meaningful totality, there is a crucial differentiation between their objects o f beliefs.
Habermas analyzes the god creator as God o f Action or a personal god that is dominant in
the religions o f the Book, and the God o f Order or impersonal supreme deity that is
common to the Eastern religions o f Hindu, Taoism, Confucianism, and even Buddhism.
The Eastern religious consciousness perceives itself as being the vehicle o f the supreme
energy and by this position, a believer has to work on loosing one’s self and giving one’s
self to the supreme by meditations or experiencing unification with “it” by the mystical
insight. Consequently, Habermas divides religions on the theocentric (Judaism,
Christianity, Islam) and the cosmocentric (Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism)
worldviews.
Habermas also accepts, but as well expands W eber’s concept o f rationality. He
agrees with Weber that rationality o f religious ideas depends on the level o f
disenchantment from the magical, mythological, and divination aspects o f religiosity. At
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the same time Habermas makes a distinction between the cognitive aspects of
rationalization in religions, and ethical, which is inspired with the salvation principle. The
cognitive rationalizations are the principle oriented, but they are not always in opposition
to the magical, divination, or mythological practices and religiosity. Cognitive
rationalization can achieve the diverse aspects o f the mastery over the world, but the
ethical rationalization is inspired by the salvation theory, which maintains the dualism
between the world o f appearances and the world transcending principle envisioned in the
salvation.76 The salvation principle, according to Habermas, has a pessimistic worldview,
so world rejection is the dominant attitude in Judaism and Christianity, but also is shared
with Hindusim, which also offers the path to salvation, although Hinduism is also a
cosmocentric religion. Here, as he posits, is the difference between the ways o f seeking
salvation and securing the world: Judaism and Christianity via the dominance o f ethical
commands and values require believers to turn from asceticism and the private
experience to the mastery o f the world, objectifying reality, while Hinduism requires,
rather, a passive mysticism o f the believer, so the flight from the world is the desirable
final goal. An example o f this can be found in the idea o f sanyasin, the one who
renounces the world by leaving everything he possess, including his family.77
Confucianism, Taoism, and Greek philosophy, Habermas says, are not religions
o f the salvation. These religions lack the experience o f the world that is divided on the
real world of phenomenological appearances and the transcendent realm that is of
noumenal character. Obviously, Habermas refers to the Judeo-Christian worldview which
perceives reality as ephemeral, transient, and temporary, so the whole life is in
anticipation o f death. The living and the dead, Jews and Christians, equally expect the
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coming of the apocalyptic end o f time which is signified by the second coming o f the
Messiah, where the natural world will be transferred into the new nominal and ethical
realm: for example, the lamb will sit with the lion and justice will be fulfilled on Earth.
Consequently, Habermas sees the differentiation between cognitive and ethical
rationalizations. The cognitive rationalization presents the world as the system o f “forms
and processes” that can be contemplated and grasped by the faculty o f the mind.78 He
disagrees with Weber that one should interpret Confucianism and Taoism as primarily
ethically oriented religions where the rationalization processes didn’t succeed fully.79
Weber interpreted the worldview o f these two religions as the “ethic o f unconditional
affirmation” and “adjustment” to the authority, where actually the traditional forms o f
beliefs such as magic and animism overturned the possibility o f final rationalization.80
Habermas uses Joseph Needham’s field work about China and reconstructs in a new way
the theory o f cognitive rationalization. He states that it was not the ethical rationality that
was dominant in China, but rather a cognitive one. Habermas supports his thesis by the
fact that from the first century B.C.E. to 15th century C.E. the Chinese were more
successful in “developing theoretical knowledge” and using this knowledge for practical
purposes.81 The point o f this great knowledge is that it was supervised by the authority of
the local and dynastic rulers, so this knowledge didn’t develop the alternative worldview
based on the theoretical insight independent from the cultural and religious constraints.
Habermas interprets the Chinese example o f rationalization as the “potential
rationalization process” that was not developed as the dominant worldview. The salvation
aspect o f religiosity was missing for further development o f the full rationalization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58
The idea o f rationalization and modernization processes is highly disputed in
China, and there are views that are in strong opposition to Habermas’ interpretation, but
also there are existent ideas that go along with Habermas’ concepts. Tong Shijun, in his
book The Dialectics o f Modernization (2000), compares Haberm as’ theory to the
discussions about the modernization processes in China that were popular among Chinese
scholars from 1920-1940. He states that popular Chinese cultural thinker Lian Shuming
in his book Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies (1921) stresses the
point that the Chinese culture would never move toward the reconstruction o f institutions
which would engage the modernization processes and reformation o f the traditional
Chinese society that was in its base feudal, unless it was imported from the West.82 This
point supports Habermas’ analysis o f the Chinese religions. On the other hand, in
opposition to Shuming’s stand, Hu Shi argued that the Western modernization processes
are developing in the stress crises where the biggest problems had occurred on the level
of interpersonal relationships i.e., in Habermas’ terms, the subjective identity
construction o f the lifeworld and its imbalance with the objective social and political sub
structures. At that time, Hu Shi proposed that the West should be more introduced to the
original aspects o f Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism and should apply some Eastern
models to the Western developments. Today many different ideas are present as the
response to the problem o f the rationalization processes. For example, Peter Berger
doesn’t believe that the strong development o f individualism is necessarily linked to the
development o f capitalism, because we can see strong capitalistic developments in
Asia—Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, and China. The development o f individualism as
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personal autonomy was one o f the main tenants o f W eber’s sociology, which became also
one of the main concepts accepted by Habermas.83
Rudolf J. Siebert, the critical theorist o f the third generation, has been inspired by
the works of Habermas and he defines the critical theory o f religion as the rescuing
potentials of the “traditional religious-metaphysical and mystical systems o f
interpretation and orientation that the practical communicative rationality underlying
them and a corresponding universal communicative ethics, expressed, e.g., in the golden
rule, intrinsic to all presently alive world religions.”

Obviously, the modem critical

theory o f religion too, contests Habermas’ “conservative” view that only the JudeoChristian worldview has engaged a complex secularization processes where the religious
potentials are transformed into the social and political sub-structures. The new critical
theory o f religion wants to bring the multi-cultural perspective in a sense that all world
religions have the enormous ethical potentials in their religious concepts and these
potentials are transforming into the socio-economic structures.
The important value o f Habermas’ investigation is that the religious potentials are
already transformed into the secularized world. For example, Habermas refuses
Horkheimer’s idea that morality with a sense o f justice is only possible if it is derived
from a concrete religion. This association with religion for Horkeheimer can vary from
normal religious profession i.e., employing the whole range o f religious experiences and
ideas, to the negation o f a religion and rebellion against it as atheism, or even the highly
developed concept o f inverse theology. “Longing for the totally other” is a new form o f a
modem theological transcendence inspired by Karl Bath and is conceptualized as a
critical question in the works of Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer where the “totally
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other” stands as a symbol for the universal solidarity and justice, which opposes to the
"slaughter bench” o f the history that is symbolized in the critical theory o f the first
generation through the horrific experience o f the Holocaust.85 Contrary to Horkheimer’s
idea that religion is a necessary condition for the conceptualization o f the universal
ethical ideas, Habermas thinks that Horkheimer confuses the role o f religion in modernity
and that he still “insists on the kinship between religion and philosophy,” which is not a
relevant issue any longer for the post-metaphysical thinking.86 Habermas builds his
theory o f religion in a way to show that the religious has already been transformed into
the secular. The linguification o f the sacred transforms the authoritative sacred (absolute
social or moral norms justified through the authority o f god, myth, supernatural powers)
into the rationalized forms that preserve moral values o f justice and solidarity in the
structures o f institutionalized reality and in the communicative rationality, which
necessary condition sets in the personal autonomy and speech acts.

87

The problem is that

the institutions themselves are in the competition o f one with each other, because they
belong to the different aspects o f the modem superstructures such as economic, political,
social, scientific, cultural, ethical, aesthetical, or religious realms. In this sense, the only
answer to the problems o f competition between the worldviews and institutions is the
discursive ethics. The new discursive ethics can be translated as the argumentation ethics.
In the modem world, Habermas sees, also, a great gap between the public and the
private spheres, between the religious and the secular, between the religious
consciousness that reflect the transcendence o f the highest human longings such as the
prevalence o f goodness over evil, humanity, compassion, and solidarity versus
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instrumentalized rationality where a person sees himself/herself as the object and means
that serves as one o f the vehicles in the system o f the objective world.
The domination o f the secular is based in a political sense on the transformation
of the particular or personal will via the procedural tools of modem political systems into
the normative actions. The public sphere o f civil society is maintained through the culture
experts whose main agenda is to rationally explain natural and cultural phenomena
putting themselves, most o f the time, in contradiction to the religious consciousness and
worldview.88 For example, one o f the predominant psychological theories in the United
States is Behaviorism, which influences today the majority o f clinical psychological
practices. The main idea of behaviorism is that the human psyche should be explained
and researched strictly scientifically, i.e., all human behavior is a response to the past
contingent set o f conditions that engage in the brain a response as a reinforcement.
Accordingly, behaviorism stays on the course that concepts such as the mind, the set of
beliefs important to a person, ethical ideals such as freedom, compassion, and kindness,
or religious concepts such as the soul, really do not exist objectively. All o f these
concepts are subjectively clothed expressions that are reinforced through the environment
and maintained as culturally relevant. The reality o f the human behavior is determined
through the cause and effect connection between the conditioning and reinforcement.
Perhaps, the most radical view was expressed in the positivist philosophy o f Harvard
scholar B. F. Skinner who argues in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), that
“freedom is a dangerous myth,” because freedom has a meaning similar to supreme
quality or, even, sacred. Skinner thinks that what we “experience” as a free choice is
actually a false feeling that our will is not determined, while actually it is. He thinks that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
the scientific reality shows that “free choice” is simply the response to the given
conditions. In this example one can easily see that behavioral psychology stands in
opposition to the traditional religious worldviews, which glorify the moral human
dignity, the soul that transcends existent conditions, and ethical ideals o f universal
solidarity and humanity.

2c) Semantics of Ethics
For Habermas’ theory o f religion, the two most critical aspects are the
secularization processes by means o f the socio-political superstructure (change o f the
society structure and acceptance o f the rational worldview that separates irrational
thoughts and actions as unacceptable) and the transformation o f religious ideas into the
secular ethics and morality (recognition o f personal autonomy and acceptance o f the
argumentation dialogue in achieving the normative values). Both aspects actually present
the hegemony process o f the secularization norms, which are not easy to define, describe,
and analyze.
To outline this problem, the best example can be given by the Kantian idea of
morality and ethics. Any discussion about morality always begins with examples o f what
a society considers a good moral deed. The analysis o f the moral action always includes
the consideration o f two important aspects: one aspect is that o f inclinations and motives
for an action, another is that of the consequences o f the action. Immanuel Kant thinks that
humanity cannot ever predict the consequences, but one can control only the thought
process that results in an action. He thinks that every moral action is rationalized by
virtue that requires the decision and choice; therefore, there is no moral action without
prior thought that settles the will in one direction as a maxim that then appears as the
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principle upon which one really acts. In this sense, moral action is a fully cognitive
process that follows the dictate oaf the imperative that is created in the consciousness
itself. For any moral act the decision has to come out o f the personal autonomy. The only
imperative one’s mind follows is that, directed from the free will which constitutes a
person and acts at the same time as the maxim, and is only acceptable as a moral act if it
fulfills the moral law. Now, the moral law is comprehensively defined in Kant’s
Categorical Imperative: “But what sort o f law can that be the thought o f which must
determine the will without reference to any expected effect, so that the will can be called
absolutely good without qualification? Since I deprived the will o f every impulse that
might arise for it from obeying any particular law, there is nothing left to serve the will as
principle except the universal conformity o f its actions to law as such i.e., I should never
act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal
law.”89
Following this thought Kant later clarifies more specifically that the moral law is
what people use to perceive through religion as the kingdom o f ends: “By ‘kingdom’ I
understand a system o f different rational beings through common law s.... For all rational
beings stand under the law that each o f them should treat him self and all others never
merely as a means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby arises a
systematic union o f rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom that
may be called a kingdom o f ends....” In the final instance, what Kant has done with
defining the Categorical Imperative as a moral law (law that is acceptable to all people) is
that he explained the Christian ideal o f solidarity and human dignity as interdependent.
What was expressed in the simple idea o f the Golden Rule, with the Kantian moral law
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now is presented as the rationally explained concept which serves to explain the
connection between personal freedom and integrity. The Golden Rule summarizes the
expression, “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you,” and is based on
Jesus’ original saying reported in the Gospel o f Matthew, “Therefore all things
whatsoever ye would that men should do to you do ye even so to them: for this is the law
and the prophets” (7.12). When comparing the religious expression to the Kantian
Categorical Imperative one has to notice that both ideas correspond with the same
message/meaning— the universal law is to act in a way that everybody treats everyone
with respect and dignity, because everyone perceives themselves in this way, as beings of
dignity, so they are ends in themselves and not only means to others, and this equal
treatment is perceived and understood as a value to all people, without exception. The
only difference between these two expressions is that the religious one is commanded
because o f righteousness and authority, while the Kantian one is based on the internal
input that appears to a person as the self-imposed authority.
This Kantian methodology o f the rationalization o f the religious commands via
the concepts into the modern personal consciousness tremendously inspired J. Habermas.
He thinks that on this level o f comparison between the Christian Golden Rule and the
Categorical Imperative one could explain the rationalization process only as a paradigm
shift from the religious to the secular, where the religious moral rule is sublated on the
higher level o f personal understanding. Habermas calls this methodology the reification
theory that is present in the philosophy o f the Enlightenment era, social philosophy of
Marx, theory of religion in Weber, and Critical Theory o f the Frankfurt school.
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2d)Linguification of the Sacred
The transformation o f the religious into the secular is a much deeper problem than
it appears on the surface and Habermas precisely diagnoses the problem: the
transformation o f the religious into the secular actually denotes the transformation o f the
collective into the personal consciousness in an evolutionary sense. According to
Habermas, religion is engaged as the main cohesive social force that is transformed by
the powers o f the ontogenetic and phylogenetic changes into the structural transformation
of worldviews: secular and religious. To explain this evolutionary transformation,
Habermas is inspired with Durkheim’s theory o f religion. He presents the beginning of
this evolution as the formation o f the sacred that powerfully stands in its pre-linguistic
realm. Habermas says, in the modern world, where the individual personality, a
worldview, and institutionalized normative rationality are in the conflict o f powers and
wills, what still has the value is the personalist intentionalism o f morality, which appears
to transform a personal will into the idea o f universal solidarity and then acts proactively
in society. This unchanging aspect o f the universal solidarity as an ideal o f humankind
and its communal identity— recognition and acknowledgment o f others—is equally
important for the social aspect o f the sacred in the past as it is for modern society.
Habermas thinks that all validity claims (values that are pertinent for personal and social
worlds) relevant for modem societies and even one’s culture are established through the
comprehensive process o f the transformation from the symbolically mediated to
normatively regulated actions. Habermas brings Durkheim’s concept o f the sacred into
the focus o f his research. The sacred is one o f the best points in the modern theory of
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religion which explains the true process o f the socialization pattern, but still is missing
the explanation o f communicative action and linguification o f the sacred. According to
Durkheim, the sacred stands in society as the main source of authority and it means all
things that are “set apart” from the ordinary, personal interests, one’s passions, or desires.
This sacred is expressed as the will o f the collective consciousness that represents its
power through the set o f symbolic actions or rituals that are o f great importance for the
identity o f society, where society acts celebrating its own authority and power (great
yearly ceremonies and celebrations). According to Habermas, these symbolically
mediated actions are explained as salient symbols o f the dominant religious tradition that
can steer behavior and he wants to progress in research as to this aspect o f religious
symbolism.
The problem with the sacred is, as Durkheim put it, that the sacred authority,
which is the expression o f the collective consciousness, acts often in a way to express the
terror and punishment toward acts o f the followers of the group who oppose to the main
commands, which are important to maintain the unity o f the collective. Sometimes the
arbitrariness o f the punishment takes place and then the moments o f crisis appear. The
negative sanctions filled with terror and punishment are the rites associated with the
Taboo, and it is a common way to maintain the continuity o f the community unified with
the sacred symbols (Totem). Habermas gives credit to Durkheim on his unique
interpretation o f the sacred as the symbol o f the domination o f the collective
consciousness in society. Habermas considers that what is really missing in Durkheim’s
theory is the semantic analysis o f how the religious potentials have been transformed
from the symbolic to the normative actions, by which one can explain the need and
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necessity o f separating the religious from the political or legislature powers, and the
growth o f the personal consciousness that is realized in the social surroundings by
fulfilling the social roles (division o f labor) and through interpersonal communication
acquiring the set o f responsibilities and freedoms that are equally relevant for the private
and public spheres.
Habermas sees that there is a necessary fusion between Durkheim’s and M ead’s
theories in order to explain the evolution o f the social consciousness from the prelinguistic realm o f the sacred that is symbolically represented in the collective
consciousness to the rational acceptance o f the standard and moral idioms as the
normative actions and validity claims:
Durkheim shares the social-evolutionary perspective with Mead.
But he is unable to conceive the transition from forms of
mechanical to forms o f organic solidarity as a transformation of
collective consciousness reconstructible fro m within; thus it
remains unclear what entitles him to conceive o f the changing form
of social integration as a development toward rationality. The idea
of a linguistification o f the sacred is, to be sure, suggested by
Durkheim, but it can be worked out only along the lines o f a
Meaden attempt at reconstruction. Mead does in fact definitely
conceive o f the communicative thawing o f traditionally solid
institutions based on sacred authority as a rationalization. Jurgen
Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 2.,
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Translation: Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987, p.
91.
While Durkheim has given the explanation o f how has emerged the idea o f the
universal solidarity explaining the social unity as the collective and symbolic act of all
members, which relate to the sacred, Habermas thinks, George Herbert Mead was able to
explain the very point o f how the structural transformation o f the life-world and
personhood occurs in the objective world. Durkheim and Mead are similar in the idea that
the social is prior to the private or to the individual personality. Every personality is pre
structured i.e., limited to the conditions o f the social interactions and structures. Mead
sees that the personal identity is the result o f the comprehensive processes of
socialization and the inter-personal relationship with others.
The communication act, first as a gesture and the speech act, represents the
internalization o f the objective environment. The communication begins with the
conversation and the exchange o f gestures, then moves on significant gestures, and
finally forms through language symbolic meaning which is internalized in the person.
Language through the processes o f transformation o f symbolic meaning is able to open
semantic potentials that the person can use as the response to the systematized
environment. What the person is learning through the socialization is to adequately act
responding to the environment by accepting specific social roles that design behavior and
actions. Also, this internalized world should become externalized through assimilation
process, when the personhood associates with the external as a group.
The concept o f time is inhabited in a person through the experience o f the
emergence situations, which require o f a person immediate responses to the environment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69
An emergency situation gives to a person the sense o f discontinuity, and, o f course, by its
virtue the continuity reaches the point o f meaning in the inhabitation o f the self as
continuity in the social environment.
Habermas adopts M ead’s theory o f communication as an important step of
communicative praxis. The social evolution begins and ends with the semantic realm
which unfolds, through social interaction and communication, the emancipation o f the
self in the autonomous rational reasoning through socially mediated argumentation,
which final argument is humanized through the acceptance o f morality as universal
solidarity embedded in institutionalized forms o f standards and norms.
Habermas still critically analyzes the modern self and its existence. Modern
consciousness is born in the crisis o f identity construction: on one hand the emancipation
and recognition o f the self requires acceptance o f the social roles and playing them as
games, but then the universality o f moral norms and validity claims settle the personhood
giving it the meaningfulness in the domain o f the public sphere unifying personhood with
the group identity, on the other hand, the self requires its authenticity that is derived from
the subjectivity o f the experience and, at the same time, circles the separateness o f the
self from the public and the collective.
However, Habermas sees in the religious the very source o f humanity. As the
sacred once represented the source o f the collective consciousness that symbolically
accepts the higher authority as the expression o f the absolute, so in the modern time when
some semantic potentials of religion are transferred into the secular norms and values, the
religious still represents a challenge even to the modem atheist, because in its theological
and reflexive thought religion calls for openness i.e., consciousness o f transcendence,
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search for unconditional, ethics o f compassion, and redemption. In his text
Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World (1992) Habermas sees that the
universality o f the religious is in openness for transcendence, but this transcendence is a
semantic realm, where the linguistic condition opens a communicative act, which reflects
the self, what was communicated, and the other in a perspective o f understanding.
Religious transcendence is too illocutionary for Habermas, because it is present with the
in-group community, shaping the basic validity claims as positive dogmatic or
theological concepts relevant for this specific religious tradition. True transcendence
should exist from these restrains, and save those linguistic potentials that are universally
accepted. Habermas as a methodological atheist sees in the transcendence the
configuration o f linguistic potentials that are important to form a proper understanding of
the self and the community, even the ideal community, but he doesn’t see in the
transcendence openness for truly supernatural or absolute. Both, the supernatural and
absolute are comprehensive signification processes of the true linguistic condition that is
sui generis human and, therefore, intersubjective. The lifeworld is a pool o f forces where
a personhood is pre-structured and already defined, but still through language and
understanding can reach the point to really be and act in a sense o f preserving one’s
autonomy, but also acknowledging the others o f the in-group structure as equals. This
linguistic condition shows that it appropriates the self and the others as the autonomous
integral beings by the power o f a reflexive communicative act. That a personhood has a
possibility o f self-determination and self-cause is expressed in the ability o f language to
go beyond what is only communicated, or what is practical and purposive; language
reflects the human condition and the human relationship emerges from the linguistic
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reality. The intelligible aspect o f transcendence is actually the experience o f going
beyond what is known, given, or expressed for the sake o f understanding the position of
the self in the universe and bonding the self via linguistic condition with others.
Habermas defines this important search as:
The Logos o f language founds the intersubjectivity o f the lifeworld, in
which we find ourselves already pre-understood, in order that we can
encounter one another face to face as subjects. Indeed, we meet as subjects
who impute to each other accountability, that is, the capability to guide our
actions according to transcending validity medium o f our communicative
actions which are to be accounted for by us. Yet, this does not mean that
the lifeworld would be at our disposal. As agents o f communicative
actions, we are exposed to a transcendence that is integrated in the
linguistic conditions o f reproduction without being delivered up to it. This
conception can hardly be identified with the productivist illusion o f a
species that generates itself and which puts itself in the place o f a
disavowed Absolute. Linguistic intersubjectivity goes beyond the subjects
with putting them in bondage. J. Habermas, ed. E. Mendieta
Transcendence form Within, Transcendence in this World, in, Religion
and Rationality, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002, p. 91.
Habermas’ linguistic intersubjectivity resides in every personhood and the
transcendence as the sense for openness is integrated within a possibility o f language
itself. These elements o f understanding—the self and the community—are present in the
linguified religious that should be rescued in modem society. The rescue o f the religious
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potentials requires the process o f communication in which it is possible to reach semantic
openness o f the self, the validity claims through which the community is bounded. This
communicative praxis can help to loosen the totalization o f a crisis between the religious
and the secular, fundamentalism vs. openness o f modem theology or endeavors of
ecumenism, cultic totalitarianism and open spirituality, closed worldviews and
disenchanted openness o f meaning.90
Habermas also acknowledges that the secularization processes began with the
crisis of the religious consciousness. The crises o f the religious consciousness can be
defined as a compendium o f doubts about what is common in society to be interpreted as
the supernatural power(s) and its/their impact on the world. For example, from the
anthropological field work o f E.E. Evans-Pritchard about the Azande, one could see that
even in the basic and culturally isolated societies o f the African tribes, a person might
have such crises and have doubts about the sacred authority, but the person who
experiences such crises cannot openly reflect to it. The Azande person who doubts is not
able to present or define clearly the problem, and finally has no alternative system to the
belief system that would support for a long time these thoughts.91 In this sense, the
Azande society is not ready to publicly acknowledge such an experience and to openly
deal with it.
Unlike indigenous societies, the crisis o f the religious consciousness in modern
society is a significant problem because it has the alternative theory or a system to which
a person with the doubts can refer. Habermas stresses in his work that the Ancient Greek
philosophers had established an intellectual and ideological tradition o f the rationalism,
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anthropocentrism, and skepticism that formed a strong alternative to the religious and
mythological consciousness.
Even under the influences of the Christian theological ideas, Western philosophy
was never able to definitely dismiss the philosophical anthropocentrism, rationalism, or
skepticism, so there was formed a strong metaphysical tradition that combined religious
inspiration with the strong secular thought—the rationalism, idealism, and the theodicy
argumentations. For instance, it is enough to remember the continental rationalists and
works o f Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz.

During the Enlightenment period in Europe

and the U.S.A. the rationalism and anthropocentrism have been enriched with the
secularized idea o f the historical self-sufficiency and ideal o f freedom that was derived
from the interpretation o f Christianity as emancipation theology. It is obvious that
secularized ideas have served as the corrective to the strict Christian theocentric
worldview.
It seems that in Western society the crisis o f the religious consciousness is
substantial for a m odem man/woman because it leaves him/her to struggle for an
individual set o f rules, which are crucial for forming one’s identity. Whether one is
religious or an atheist, both have to acknowledge the leap between strictly rationalized
world explained through the facts via the diverse scientific entitlements (economy,
medicine, biology, zoology, sociology, political science, positive history, etc.) and the
world o f the human potentials that is build upon the different value entitlements (culture,
philosophy, religion, art, morality, ethics).
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As Habermas suggests, the processes of secularization o f religious ideas are
specified and can be summarized in a way that in modem societies, religion undergoes
the following changes:
1. Demythologization of traditional religious semantic potentials - back
away from the reification in a sense o f literal interpretations o f the original
religious sources;
2. Development o f more open and philosophical theologies by which
religious ideas are rationalized and interpreted in a more open way
insisting on ethical and humanitarian contents rather than on extravagant
and closed interpretations o f religious potentials;
3. Religious communities direct their existence as the moral, ethical, and
spiritual resources for the individuals who make choices;
4. Competitions between different religious paradigms, religions, and secular
- religious worldviews is a common position o f religions that exists in the
modem world;
5. Definite split in the religious communities between liberalism and
fundamentalism;
6. Religious communities experience an essential change as to their role and
status in community as voluntary organizations that are separated from the
legal and political body o f society/separation o f the church and the state.
M odem semiotics stresses that its methodology is capable o f explaining humanity
in a new way; where the relevant aspects of the modern world and the differences of the
historically or culturally different worlds are not categorically juxtaposed, but put in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

same perspective o f the growth o f dialog between cultures, religions, and different socio
economic cultural units. In the semiotic theory any aspect o f the communicative action
(personal thoughts, public observances, religious rituals, gestures, political speech,
religious cannon, etc.) stands as a sign which necessarily underlies, as its signifigher, the
significant interaction between the subject matter that appears as the object to its
interpreter, and implies the interpretation that is possible to become socially or culturally
relevant. O f course, the most curious aspects o f the communicative action are related to
the analysis o f the signs that are transcendent and unlimited in its appearance to the
intepretant. In this sense, modem semiotics, from C.S. Peirce to J. Habermas and U. Eco
always has reflected on diverse aspects o f religion such as the different interpretations of
the power of the sacred, supernatural being, transcendent realms, superhuman entities,
and spirituality. In this regard, one o f the most appealing questions o f the modern
Semiotic Theory o f Religion is to analyze and explain the resources o f the transcendent
(unlimited semiosis) in modem, secularized, and critical to religion world, that can offer
to contemporary men and women a meaning providing the space for the realization of
their creative human potentials.
This dissertation has the agenda to present the new Semiotic Theory o f Religion
as the theory that can outline the transformation o f the religious into the secular and
beyond. Definitely, the important part o f it is Habermas’ communicative praxis because it
explains in a new way m odem rationalization processes which maps the journey from the
realm o f collective and religious consciousness bound to external authority to the modern
emancipated personhood that stands open for the universal principles o f solidarity, ethical
values, and compassion by the virtue o f the personal autonomy. Also, the value of
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Habermas’ theory is in the attitude that the preservation o f the unlimited semiosis or, as
Habermas would say, semantic potentials o f modern religions, is crucial to prevent the
humankind of becoming totally mechanized and instrumentalized by the powers of
technology, ideology, modem scientific positivism, or the comprehensive systems of
social, political, cultural, and economic sub-structures. The important issue here is that
Habermas sees that these religious potentials are present and embedded in the functioning
of the modem world and personhood. Only the preservation o f the unlimited semiosis, not
its dismissal, can release the space for conquering human nature that can be enough
strong to resist to the vast inconsistency o f human fallibility.
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CHAPTER III

CONTEXTUALIZING RELIGIOUS SEMIOSIS: MODERNITY DISCOURSE
AND THE SECULARIZATION PROCESSES OF THE
RELIGIOUS IN THE WEST

3a) Philosophical Rationality in the Old Greek Philosophy

“Enlightenment is m an’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is
the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another. This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack o f understanding, but in
lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. Sapere Aude!
“Have courage to use your own understanding!— that is motto o f enlightenment.”
(Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Perpetual
Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1983)

The secularization processes can be understood as the critical sum o f various
scientific, rational, materialistic, ethical, and agnostic arguments that stand in opposition
to the traditional religious worldviews. In the cultural history o f the West first formation
o f the arguments based on logic, scientific observation, critical, and moral reasoning are
associated with the formation o f the philosophical methodology.
For the first time in the Western Culture philosophy defines itself as the rational
investigation o f the world, universe, and human nature where gods are put aside from
explanations o f how all nature really functions or even how the whole universe function
in connection with the particular beings (Epicur). With the emergence o f the powerful
Athenian sophistic thinkers, gods and religious beliefs are interpreted as the result o f the
social conventions (,nomos) and the ruling class which establishes the political control
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using religion and religious piety o f believers. First time religion is interpreted as the tool
of social control and supernatural beings are interpreted as culturally postulated, which
explains religion materialistically (Xenophanes, Protagora, Trasimach).
Even the idea o f god, developed in time o f Plato and Aristotle, as absolute being
presented either as the great architect o f the universe (Demiurgos) or pure form and
natural light (in Aristotle noes noetos, pure form) doesn’t need any form o f human
religious practice, but rather rational mathematical reasoning and knowledge o f the first
physical principles. This firm inquiry o f philosophy for rationality as a thought that is
self-standing in a form o f arguments and methods causes a serious split between the
secular and the religious. In Athens, the most culturally advanced polis o f all Greek citystates, philosophy has faced in several occasions public challenge registered in history as
trials against philosophers.
First, Anaxagoras from Clazomenae in Asia Minor, a presocratic philosopher and
a friend o f Pericles, who has observed the system o f eclipses and heavenly bodies, has
claimed that the sun is a mass o f blazing metal and not any sort o f god. Also, he has
stated that heavenly bodies are masses o f stone ignited by rapid rotation. For these ideas
Anaxagoras was soon put on trial for not believing in the official gods and promoting
medism (Persian religious ideas). Pericles spoke in his defense before the Athenian
assembly, and was able to save his life making a deal for Anaxagoras’ exile to
Lampsacus in Ionia.93
Almost the same charges were brought to the Athenian assembly against Socrates
by Miletus and Anytus in 399 B.C.E., but besides not believing in official gods of
Athens, to his accusation are brought two new things, introducing the new gods and
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corrupting the youth. Socrates has openly opposed to the political corruption and was
teaching that the ignorance is the cause o f all wrongdoing. He didn’t want to take any
public job that would be connected with the administration and Socrates was very
disappointed o f how the Council often handled cases related to the war. It seems that
Socrates was the first to oppose to the great Pericle’s idea that each free person has a duty
to care for a common good o f the state and therefore should be engaged in the public
service.94 He thought that after Pericle’s time the idea o f public work that benefits all
community lost the primer meaning and the course o f practice.
Instead following this rule, Socrates openly proposed that the only way to secure
the freedom o f critical investigation is to act as a private citizen.95 Hegel in his
Philosophy o f History described this Socrates’ endeavor as Athens coming to the state of
the “self-consciousness,” “inwardness o f knowledge itself,” “absoluteness o f true
knowledge,” “consciousness reflecting upon the self,” and finally free thinking that as a
result encounters a subjective moral independence that might be in opposition to the
written and unwritten conventional laws.96
Socrates has developed his own style o f reasoning by questioning the base of
knowledge through the dialectical investigation—prose and cons, and moving argument
towards a secure concept that can be defended by reasonable definition or proofs and
examples from reality. He often stated that all philosophical investigation begins with
^^daimoniori,— a spirit o f curiosity that doesn’t settle truths without investigation and
questioning. Socrates was persecuted for his active engagement against the political and
social utilitarianism o f that time that put Athens in the horror o f continuous wars known
as Peloponnesian Wars. It is good to remember that Socrates was in several occasions
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during Peloponnesian Wars a soldier in Athenian army doing heroic deeds, saving his
wounded fellow soldiers (Alcibiades, Xenophanes) from the battles.97
It was not Socrates’ piety toward Athens, the laws, or main ideas that brought him
to the court. It was that the public and the Athenian political establishment couldn’t put
up with his personalist approach to the objective problems because this way was a new
style of communication and a new level of consciousness with which Athenians didn’t
use to deal with in the public life.
In order to maintain his independence the cost was high. Socrates faced the unjust
accusations and finally a court decision that he was guilty o f impiety and leading youth
astray. Socrates decided to accept these accusations taking the burden o f collective
consciousness on his life and he drank a poisonous hemlock. He didn’t want to accept the
counter-offer and leave Athens going into the exile. In this sense, Socrates is used in
history o f philosophy as a step-stone o f Western path o f philosophy. Socrates was a
person with the vision and as such he anticipated the path o f modernity: personalist
ethics, methodological investigation o f the highest truths without any limits, and free
thinking.
We should not forget that Aristotle also faced the accusations by the Athenian
political establishment, but he decided to leave Athens. It is well documented his
statement: “Athens will not sin third time against philosophy.”
These examples o f the interaction between politics, religion, and philosophy
vividly testify that the split between the religious and the secular have had dramatic
climatic moments in ancient history o f Athens. It seems that the political establishment
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felt an enormous fear o f exposing people to the critical thinking and rational explanations
of natural events.
Although in ancient Greece philosophy became a great source o f education for the
elite intellectual class, it failed the primer Socrates’ mission to become the part of
everyday life o f common people. This great spirit o f liberation against the psychological
dependency o f humanity from supernatural forces and political utilitarianism will become
a predominant quest for Western Culture in all times ever after, but it will culminate
during the Enlightenment movement in Europe and the New World.

3b) Political, Religious, and Natural Rationality of the Enlightenment
During the Enlightenment period in 17th and 18th centuries, the arguments that
cherish diverse rational forms o f thinking and link themselves with the investigation of
nature and humanity, first time became systematized to the point o f offering secularism
as a solution to theocentrism, causing at the same time serious social and political
changes throughout Europe and the New World.
One o f the crucial change that is going along with the formation o f the national
states in Europe and formation o f the United States was the establishment o f the positive
state laws that are grounded on the presuppositions o f the theory o f natural rights, social
contract theory, and understanding that human rationality has its full realization in
freedom o f moral choices. Within the Enlightenment philosophy o f liberation that is
coupled with an idea o f self-responsibility: state laws are becoming more and more
separated from any religious laws as well as powers o f the monarchs, feudal lords, or
domination o f the Church.
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Countries o f the Commonwealth accepted this serious process as the continuous
legislation processes by the secular means o f the Government, the state rule, the
legislator, and the people that is called a Common Law. In the continental European
countries is accepted the Civil Law, which reconstructs the base o f the Roman Law into
the modem legislation process. The very idea that the law should be statutory, rather
written than oral, although dependant on the contextualization o f either the precedent
court decisions (Common Law) or former law codes (Civil Law) it has to be confirmed
by the political and juridical authorities, and finally adversarial or inquisitorial, has to
involve the jury. All o f these requirements o f modem legislature process resulted with the
separation o f the positive state laws from the authority o f the state religion (Christianity),
and powers o f the monarchs. The French Revolution (1789) with its “code civil” (1804)
placed the matter o f marriage and religion as a totally private matter, and finally with the
American Constitution (1785) and the acceptance o f the First Amendment (1791) religion
was definitely legally interpreted as the private matter o f every citizen. Although, this is
a change that will fully become realized in the late 20th and 21st centuries, the main
framework was established in the existence o f the positive laws in 18th century.
The systematic and continuous challenge o f the secular Enlightenment ideas
including the growing Deist movement as a solution to the problem o f religious
intolerance and religious wars became the great intellectual challenge o f 18th century.
The secularization process became dominant in the social and political reality o f Europe
where the practices such as the expropriation o f the church properties, formation o f the
public school systems, and fragmentation o f the “universal church” into the competitive
Protestant churches have radically changed the old feudal system and the Middle Age
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picture o f the world. Within these practices the understanding and the meaning o f religion
for a modem man/woman began to change too.

08

The first changes occurred within Christianity, more specifically with the Western
Christendom unified in the authority o f “a universal Christian church,” which began to
dissolve into a serious crisis." The Reformation movement demanded the redefinition of
the substantial religious elements—beliefs and practices— o f Catholicism. Although,
Reformation was not an ideologically unified movement in any sense, it showed the
extraordinary revolutionary courage o f its people who were even willing to sacrifice their
lives in order to change traditional view s.100 Let us illustrate for what kind o f changes
they were struggling for.
The central question was directed on the investigation o f meaning o f the main
Christian rituals known as the sacraments and the question was posited as follows: Are
the sacraments the authentic expression o f beliefs that are grounded in the Bible or later
invention o f the Early Catholic Church? One o f the most discussed sacraments became
the Eucharist, which was always perceived as the central symbolical expression o f the
Christian faith. The Lutherans have proposed the doctrine o f con-substantiation that is
opposed to the traditional transubstantiation. According to the Lutherans, Christ is
present in the Eucharist, although the bread and wine did not actually become his flesh
and blood. At the same time, the Lutherans also strongly opposed the Zwingli’s concept
that the Eucharist denotes only the symbolic presence o f the Christ.
The same happened with the understanding o f Baptism: while the Lutherans
thought that the baptism can take place when a child was bom or very young, and that
really a person doesn’t need to wait until adulthood to accept the faith, the Anabaptists
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opposed this idea, teaching that only an adult person through the ritual o f baptism can
experience a real conversion to the faith. The Anabaptists, then, faced the most severe
prosecutions by the Catholic Inquisition o f all Reformation movements. Soon, in Europe
began mushrooming o f different churches that split with the Catholic mainstream. Just
the redefinition o f the main religious practices that were perceived substantial for the
church put in action hundreds o f different Christian movements and their new churches.
Besides redefining the main sacraments’ practices, the Reformation was
determined to attack the church corruption that grew out o f the Papacy and the church
high officials which in the course o f time built an enormous wealth in lands given to them
by the secular rulers in order to preserve their sovereignty.101 Taking into consideration
this point, the Reformation soon demanded the serious redefinition o f the Christian
beliefs too: they were definitely unified in an idea that the system o f penance should be
rejected, the ultimate authority o f the Pope overthrown, and that the power o f the
universal Catholic Church has to be challenged and turned back to the local level. As to
doctrines, they accepted the old Augustine idea o f predestination that opposed the one,
traditional, Aquinas’ by which every person earns the beatified and eternal life by the
means o f the deeds that they had done during the lifetime.
Different protestant denominations have argued about the details o f how
predestination unfolds affecting reality, but the main idea that G od’s wisdom and
knowledge is transcendent was accepted. True believers can only try through the
institution o f the church to maintain the level o f Christian awareness about Jesus and his
suffering. Theology o f crucifixion (theologia cruces) has replaced the scholastic
philosophy by which the reason can logically proof the existence o f God. According to
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the new Protestant theology no one can earn their salvation, but can welcome
graciousness o f God, so the final outcome o f salvation is given by the grace o f God that is
absolute. God is only revealed to us through the scripture alone (sola scripture) and his
absolute power and reasoning is hidden to us. The idea o f dues absconditus, the hidden
God that is concealed and indirect to us, puts human rationality, philosophy, and human
nature as autonomous entities separated from the project o f salvation. This very thought
opened the door for the improving theology in a more anthropological sense than ever,
which then became liberal and philosophically rational.
In many o f ways, these continuous changes within church and critical
observations addressed to the traditional views on beliefs, ideas, representations, and
practices, have then brought diverse rationalization processes by which the socio-political
sphere became secularized. As the result o f these processes religions in modern society
are not any longer self-explainable and self-understanding, let alone, self-sufficient.
Today, m odem societies face religious pluralism and competition o f different
religions. Perhaps the biggest challenge for the mainstream religion is split of the
religious organizations on the part that is more open for the dialog with the secular world
and scientific arguments, and the other part, which still wants to preserve their
fundamental ideological course and the extraordinary position in society.
The most interesting question about religion in the modem world is, o f course, its
persistence: Why in a world that can be explained with science and other scientific
entitlements modern men and women still need religion? This main question opens the
line of other questions that are important for the further research in the modern
secularized world: What is the role o f the religion that exists in a secularized society? Is
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there anything worth rescuing from the religious world that can be transferred into the
modem society? Is it possible that the religious consciousness acts in the society as the
reconciliatory element between the drastic economic-materialistic reality and need for
human spirituality? Why do we experience in the contemporary world a rise o f the
religious consciousness which is reflected in the popularity o f traditional religious beliefs
in all post-communist countries, the growth o f new religious movements that acts as the
splinter groups o f the mainstream world religions, new religions, and a new spirituality
among the intellectual elite? Can we talk about this worldwide new religious revival in
terms o f post-secular society, as Habermas put it? Finally, what would be presuppositions
of this new society as to traditional enlightenment idea that stands on the course of
transformation o f the religious into the secular sphere? These questions are crucial for the
time o f modernity that in its multi-faced forms goes even beyond expected.

3c) Crisis of the Enlightenment: Modernity
As Jurgen Habermas has defined, modernity is an “unfinished” and “dynamic
concept,” never definitely complete. It began as a systematic movement that has
challenged the old Medieval closed paradigms with “revolution, progress, emancipation,
development, crisis, and Zeitgeist.”

Putting the modem world with the Enlightenment

progress into the secular sphere, i.e., people themselves are responsible for their destiny
and can direct it as they want to, modernity opens itself for the future. Modernity means
for Hegel, as well as for Habermas, a “continuous renewal” o f the Enlightenment, i.e., the
quest o f the individual, which comprehensively relates to the objectives o f social,
economical, and political super-structures in order to direct its future.
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For Hegel, the medium through which an individual becomes aware o f itself is the
kingdom o f passions. Passions, desires, and emotions motivate the practical aspect of
human nature.

These passions sometimes transform their impulses into the steady

continuum, which than defines an individual’s life. The transformation o f the passionate
aspect of human nature to the steady inclinations that are accepted from the person as the
autonomous and rational decision making process results in “will.” According to Hegel,
this subjective “W ill” finally becomes realized when the individual subjectivity rationally
directs its morality (moralishe), based on personal autonomy, in accordance within the
objective spirit which is realized through culture, religion, laws, the state, and finally
generational-historical challenge (Zeitgeist). This ethos that reflects the value-system
(Sittlichkeit) o f Hegelian objective spirit is realized in the Western culture through the
lives and actions o f individuals.
“Subjective volition— Passion— is that which sets men in activity, that which
effects “practical” realization. The Idea is the inner spring o f action: the State is
the actually existing realized moral life. For it is the Unity o f the universal,
essential Will, with that of the individual; and this is “Morality.” The Individual
living in this unity has a moral life: possesses a value that consists in this
substantially alone. Sophocles in his Antigone, says, “The divine commands are
not o f yesterday, nor o f to-day; no, they have an infinite existence, and one could
say whence they came.” The Laws o f morality are not accidental, but are the
essentially Rational. G. W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy o f H istory104
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Hegel still thinks that the Christian religion represents the symbolic and abstract form of
the liberation spirit for every individual. More than this, he really thinks that an
individual can reflect this spirit o f liberation on the objective level. Providence, the great
“thought” and “idea” that “the world is governed” by the higher principles giving at the
same time meaning to the world, all existence, all human suffering, and all historical
challenges. Philosophy should serve to a purpose to transform the abstract idea o f the
Providence into the particular experience o f the individual. Hegel states in his History o f
Philosophy. “In the Christian religion God has revealed Himself—that is, he has given us
to understand what He is; so that he is no longer a concealed or secret existence.” To
Hegel, Christianity appears as the “thinking spirit,” the way how a person can explain
his/her existence as valuable, positive, and congruent within the historical challenges,
destiny o f the state and nation.105
Habermas cannot accept any longer the part o f Hegel’s philosophy where
Christianity is viewed as theodicy or “a justification o f the ways o f God.” Instead o f the
messianic role o f Christianity Habermas accepts Hegel’s point that passions, authenticity,
and “grounding modernity out o f itself’ is the core o f the modern decentered
individuality. In his lectures The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity Habermas
analyzes modem aesthetic criticism o f Baudelaire, Benjamin, and Nietzsche in
comparison to Hegel. All o f them stressed the importance o f the philosophy o f history
projecting shift from the Enlightenment paradigm to the new age era. In this new era the
true moral value o f the individual would be equal to the aesthetic value that comes from
the authenticity o f individual creation, which establishes the norms out o f its passions,
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feelings, aesthetic contemplation, intelligent criticism, and a “now time” that fights the
oppressed forms from the past (Benjamin).
All the three thinkers, Baudelaire, Benjamin, and Nietzsche, who opened for
modernity an idea o f the shift to the new ages, critically think that the state, religion,
culture, political or social super-structures, or even the philosophy o f the Hegelian
objective spirit can be no longer congruent with the quest o f individuality. The individual
cannot find his/her substance any longer in the objective sphere. Nietzsche’s idea of the
death o f God represents a strong criticism o f the traditional religious practices and beliefs
of Christianity— religion and God, both are dead, because there is no any longer presence
of the living God where the practical is congruent with the theoretical, or aesthetical.
Nietzsche in his Will to Power in the section On the Natural History o f Morals defines
family alliance, community, tribe, peoples, states, and churches as the advancement of
human herds and structures o f obedience to authority. He thinks that the individual is
weakened by the dictate o f the formal conscience that represents in its core “the moral
hypocrisy o f the commanding class.” 106 For Nietzsche the real individuality rests on the
experience o f the pessimism; being alone, functioning as a self-sufficient being, and
creating out o f this experience an invention which expresses true human morality as
congruent to the aesthetical enchantment. Habermas seriously takes into consideration
Nietzsche’s criticism o f the Hegelian objective sphere and substantial importance o f
strong creative personality. Using this important model o f decentered individuality that
creates innovative and new challenges, Habermas defines modernity as the creation of
•

normativity that comes out o f itself.

107
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If one examines the new religious movements in the contemporary world it would
find that all o f them offer, whether in a good (syncretism, audience cults) or bad sense
(brainwashing cults), the set o f corrections, alternative, or radical opposition to the
mainstream religious ideas or practices. This spirit o f change and revolution juxtaposed
to the old paradigm, rebellion against the theological and doctrinal uniformity of the
traditional churches, and experimentation in the field o f religious practices; these all very
much define the new religious movements. Habermas’ definition o f modernity as the
“creation o f normativity out o f itself’ is substantiated in the practices and beliefs of the
new religious movements. Although Habermas is skeptical to the new religious
movements in the contemporary world calling them “symptoms o f ego weakness and
regression” and signs o f “returning to mythical forms o f thought” such as magic, and
esotericism, which “the Church overcame” centuries ago, interestingly, his own
definition o f modernity fits new religious movements just fine.
The “post-secular” society, one o f the crucial Habermas’s notion, is a term that
denotes society where the dominant movements are associated with the revival o f the
religious consciousness, growth o f the new religious movements, and/or flourishing of
the traditional religious beliefs which bring fourth negative elements such as nationalism,
religious intolerance, religious conflicts, and conservativism instead o f their decline. This
neo-conservative revival in the global world is one o f the most critical problems.
Habermas actually thinks that the religious renewal in the most secularized parts
of the world, the United States o f America, is strengthening, which causes deeper and
deeper political division in the country and in the world, especially with the present war
in Iraq.108 Habermas sees September 11 as the most tragic sign o f a dangerous religious
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revivalism: the economic, technological, and political supremacy o f the United States is
interpreted by al Qaeda, Bin Laden, and other Islamic fundamentalists as the real body of
the “Great Satan,” so with September 11 began the attack on the most powerful symbol
of the economic and political supremacy o f the West. In response to the terror attack the
Bush’s administration pronounced the “war against terrorism” and began to take the
struggle against Islamic fundamentalism in a “new crusade” fashion. 109 These recent
political events brought on the public seen problems o f the Western dominating
democracies to lapse in protection of the human rights at any cost, protection of the
citizen rights and their privacy, creating the politics o f the fear and insecurity with the
projection in the public sphere o f the everlasting war, and the collapse o f the trust
between the government and the people.
Habermas urges that only the protection o f the secularism o f the democratic state
can open a society for success, because the modern world is more and more multicultural.
In his recent text Religion in the Public Sphere Habermas writes in what way should be
open process o f tolerance between the citizens who belong to the different religious
confessions and the state:
It must albeit expect o f them that they recognize the principle that an
impartial rule is exercised with neutrality toward competing worldviews,
but it must not expect them to split their identity in public and private
components as soon as participate in public debates. I would therefore
suggest the following interpretation: Every citizen must know that only
secular reasons count beyond the institutional threshold that divides the
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informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries, and
administrations. J. Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, p. 11. 110
Although there is fear for fragility o f Western civilization that might loose its normative
actions and validity claims under the pressures o f new challenges competing with the
dangerous religious fanaticism and fundamentalism, still it remains Habermas’ conviction
that the Western civilization was able to open the argumentative and dialogical humanity
where every person can use its world-view as the opportunity to teach others and learn
from others. Habermas says:
For under certain circumstances secular citizens or citizens o f a different
faith may be able t to learn something from these contributions and discern
in the normative truth content o f a religious expression intuitions o f their
own that have possibly been repressed or distorted and obscured. The
force o f religious traditions to articulate moral intuitions with regard to
communal forms o f a dignified human life makes religious presentations
on relevant political issues a serious candidate fro possible truth contents
that can then be translated from the vocabulary o f a specific religious
community into a generally accessible language. J. Habermas, Religion in
the Public Sphere, pp. 11-12.
Habermas’ solution to the post-secularism is that the language potentials o f believers and
secularists should not be closed. Each world-view and lifeworld has its own authenticity
and is worth to be heard. The main value o f democracy and Western normative actions
within the culture is in the possibility to leave the room for the diversity o f the
worldviews and their plentiful semantics that can be involved in the further process of
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dialog, argumentation, and growth o f knowledge, which can benefit the society as the
whole.

3d) Classical and Modern Theory of Religion and the Secularization Processes
In reflection to religion and the secularization processes, the classical theory of
religion has given diverse answers for this problem. One o f the first interesting concepts
that explain religion as the result o f human’s deepest hopes, longings, and ideals is
exemplified in the philosophy o f Ludwig Feuerbach and his analysis o f the idea of
God.111 He has offered the projection theory, by which the notion o f God denotes a pure
human condition expressing the anthropomorphic structure in the main statements of
belief.

119

In his The Essence o f Christianity, Feuerbach powerfully concludes that the

essence o f religion is “M an,” as well as its “beginning, middle and end.”
Almost in line, Karl Marx developed a substantial critical socio-economic
analysis o f religion, pointing out its political character in modem, national states, where
the mainstream religion highly supports the powerful mling class o f the society. He also
stressed that modem states need new legislation, where all religions are perceived as
equal, by which religion is becoming a very important private matter and its role is
secularized by state law.

113

•

Marx also points out that where the state is more open

toward different religions, at the same time it is becoming much closer to the social use
of religion. His main idea is that for modem humanity, religion is a source o f alienation
and men/women become alienated from their essence. The condition o f religious
dependency disables the ability o f a person to act against the social or political
oppression. Religion is the means o f oppression for the class o f the oppressors.
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In his Theses on Feuerbach he writes that Feuerbach has not seen in “religious
sentiment” a problem. To Marx, religion is a social product and the result o f a “particular
society,” and a tool o f keeping religion as the main psycho-social addiction for those who
are alienated from their own essence. To him, religion still preserves the right to be a
“general theory o f the world,”, but the world is the world o f man, so religion is an
“inverted consciousness o f the world.” 114 Definitely, in his mind, religion is the result of
a social, political, historical, and economic complex structure as its surplus as well as the
superstructure in order to maintain powerless class in a good state o f hope and addiction.
115 In this sense, the main task o f the religious dominant institutions is to support a status
quo power relationship in society maintaining the supremacy o f the ruling class.
The modem anthropology and sociology o f religion soon followed Feuerbach and
Marx, who first time outlined what are the secularization processes o f the religious
sphere. From E. B. Tylor and J. G. Frazer, to E. Durkheim and M. Weber, or B.
Malinowski and E.E. Pritchard— all research concentrated on explaining, contrasting, and
describing religion as an important anthropological and cultural fact that outlines a
systematic structure o f the beliefs and practices in every religion o f existence.
Whether it is the world o f the mainstream religion, basic (native), or new age
movements, all o f them exist in a same form having a code o f beliefs and practices. All
religious movements show through their codes o f beliefs and practices the following: (1)
compendium o f materials that explain their statements o f beliefs (exegeses, sacred texts,
myths, dogmas); (2) maintain by their own means a community o f believers; (3) establish
the important body (sometimes the system) o f symbols that are mediators between the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95
beliefs/practices, exegeses, and the community; (4) acknowledge their experts for the
purposes o f preserving their spiritual ways, practices, and beliefs as a tradition.
In this sense, one of the best definition o f religion as a cultural system was given
by Clifford Geertz who transformed the beliefs and practices into a term “symbols,”
which then are presented as important codes that transform human motivations into a
clear and steady direction which can then produce conceptions relevant for the existence
and translate the expressions o f the existence in the “general order.” He also states that
every religion gives a “unique” explanation o f the relevant concepts by giving its
symbols special status of being factual i.e., believers do acknowledge that their
(expressed in symbols) statements o f beliefs are true.116 For instance, a true Catholic
does take as relevant that the mother o f Jesus is a virgin, even though this statement of
belief clashes with the human natural experience, or can be perceived as questionable if it
is taken into consideration that the Gospels o f Mark and John never ever touched upon
the story o f the Virgin Mary.
A very important point o f the anthropological and sociological research is that all
religions can be compared as to their substantial systematic elements either crossculturally or in an evolutionary sense—from the emergence o f the primer forms o f beliefs
to modern scientific reasoning—as well as historically.
As the knowledge o f different religious traditions progressed as well as the
knowledge o f their main anthropological, historical, cultural, aesthetical, and social
forms, for the scholars the rationalization processes became more and more a focus of the
research.
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“Liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty,” is one o f the strong
definitions o f the rationalization processes given in the famous book Dialectic o f
Enlightenment (1947) by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. They have seen in the
Enlightenment period a turning point for modem men and women by which selfgovernance has destroyed the authoritarian, enchanting, magical, and mythological
powers o f religion.

117

The result o f putting the self-governance and responsibility instead

of the authority o f religion, taking free choice instead o f following blindly the religious
and culturally idiomatic demands, and using the power o f the scientific knowledge before
any enchantment forces o f the faith have transformed a human consciousness into the
giant master o f the world that finally appears to transform itself even beyond expected
limits.
Adorno and Horkheimer have seen in the modem technology a problem. The
overuse o f the scientific methodology based on the mathematical logic (application of
numbers to the interactive entities and social subjects), statistics, induction, and
experiment that is dominant in the modem world, they found, have unexpected
consequences on the everyday human life. With this drastic change, the Enlightenment
ideal fell into its contradiction. Adorno and Horkheimer were seriously concerned that
modernity in this new form threatened a survival o f any moral, aesthetical, philosophical,
or any higher meaning for humans.
It seemed that modernity has resulted in a crisis o f the human spiritual and
intellectual potentials. Modernity has built a new world in which the human existence has
become subjectively minimal, dominantly materialistic, ethically utilitarian, politically
manipulated by the power of the mass culture and media, senselessly instrumental,
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atomistically isolated, and fearfully alone. In this sense, they found that beyond the limits
of the disenchantment and enlightenment ideas, stands a terrifying vastness and
emptiness o f the human existence that can even loose the belief in reason itself.
In a serious concern with the rationalization processes in modern society one can
find not only in the critical analyses o f Horkheimer and Adorno, but also in other works
of the first generation o f the Frankfurt school (H
Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Eric Fromm), which also has tried to
outline the comprehensive structure o f modem society in which they found that the
secularization processes were cmcial triggers o f transforming the religious potentials
(beliefs, ideas, concepts, sacred texts, theologies) into the history, philosophy, secular
ethics, secular laws, and individuals orientations.
For the explanation o f the secularization processes they have seriously analyzed
the works o f Hegel’s Philosophy o f History, Philosophy o f Right, and Phenomenology of
Mind, where the world religions, although presented in the Euro-centric fashion, are
understood as the main wheel o f the historical development which crown is the final
achievement o f the society o f the free and consciousness o f the freedom, self-sufficiency,
and responsibility.
The Frankfurt school has seriously, but critically, examined the role of
Christianity in Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, Christianity represents in its historical
sense the par exellance example o f the religion that on its historical journey passed
through the abstract idea o f the transcendence o f human freedom to its historical
realization to become an active subject in creating the society o f the free. According to
Hegel, Christianity that has accepted the idea o f the absolute God rooted in Judaism,
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where God serves its people in the great story o f emancipation which is presented in the
symbolism o f the covenant between the God, chosen people, and exodus from Egyptian
slavery, becomes more progressed in the idea o f freedom, because with Christianity all
people, despite their origin, are equal in the eyes o f God and ready to build their freedom.
The example o f Jesus as a man and god at the same time describes this idea symbolically.
Substantially, Jesus’ sacrifice for humans gives the example that the messianic demand in
the history is present in every human being where Jesus becomes the ideal for every
Christian individual (individuum), even accordingly, for every living individual. In this
sense, an individual is not only abstractly free before God, but is free substantially, before
his consciousness, which is transformed through the example o f Jesus, himself.118
Finally, the secular recognition by the positive laws that in one organic unity
(nation) all humans are substantially free and that they are designers o f their life by free
choices, and as such they are in accordance by the responsible, just and ethical governing,
Hegel defined as the progression o f reason itself in the historical sense. This progression
of the historical consciousness o f freedom is theologically expressed in the concept of
providence i.e., in Christianity symbolically expressed through the idea o f the Holy
Ghost. With Hegel’s idea that religion in its highest conceptualization o f beliefs/ideas and
historical consciousness are in the Western society analogical through the dialectic
development o f the growth o f consciousness o f freedom through the abstract thesis
(theology, philosophy, art), its historical antithesis (wars and human suffering), and
finally unified in the great historical synthesis (becoming in accordance with the
“objective spirit”), as it occurred in the example o f the French Revolution (1789), the
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secularization processes are defined as sort o f a transformation o f the religious ideas into
the social, political, and humanistic realm.
Inspired by this idea of the transformation o f the religious potentials to the secular
sphere, Horkheimer has even tried to rescue religious consciousness and the religious
potentials envisioning that they might be transformed in the secular society as the
demands for the absolute i.e., transcendence and the absolute justice. The historical
tragedy o f the institutionally torched in the concentration camps and six million killed
Jews in Nazi Germany during World War II, for Horkheimer, and other intellectuals of
the Frankfurt circle, became an important sign o f terrible crises o f the Enlightenment and
modernity. It seems like that the progress o f the consciousness o f freedom became the
paradox and irony to itself in this historical atrophy.
Searching desperately for answers that would overcome —not in a sense of
forgetfulness, but as the historical and conscious remembrance—this new horrific face of
the negation o f the progress o f the human freedom, Horkheimer and his followers from
the Frankfurt school tried to outline the path o f the transformation o f the religious
potentials into the secular world. Horkheimer and Adorno have an idea o f the new role of
the modem arts, philosophy, sociology, morality o f the individual, and ethics. They
thought that these spiritual disciplines can developed a strong critical analysis o f the
modem instrumentalized rationality and take over the power o f the religious forms in
modem society. According to Jurgen Habermas (who began his philosophical career as
the member o f the third generation o f the Frankfurt critical school), Horkheimer and
Adorno in their late works acknowledged the strong skepticism to their capital idea that
the transcendence as the secularly transformed idea o f the absoluteness o f the religious or
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the God, and the demand for the absolute justice as the regulative idea o f the religious
fulfillment o f the justice as the end o f time in Judeo-Christian tradition, could be rescued
through the expressions o f modem arts, concepts and ideas o f philosophy, value ethics,
personal morality, and other entitlements o f the humanistic disciplines. Habermas found
himself disappointed with Horkheimer/Adorno’s giving up on the future demands o f the
social philosophy, interpreting this skeptical aura o f their work as coming into the crisis
o f reason itself, which is going to enhance the chaos o f modernity, as so called post
modernism.
Habermas has found him self on a new mission, trying strongly to rescue the
reason o f the Enlightenment with its transcendent potential, but now, this potential
appears to us in its totally secularized form, which is to him, an important appropriate o f
the linguistically open subject, as an individual, which can critically evaluate the only
thing he/she has, and that is reality.
This post-modem reality appears to Habermas as extremely complex in a sense
that is irreconcilable with its parts and it grows in the grotesque difference (difference).
The two structures appear as the post-modern reality continuous: either the brutally
arranged order present in the social, political, economic, national, military, legal,
religious consistency encaged in the institutional-bureaucratic (as it is) everlasting
persistency, or the chaotic inconsistency o f the simple human subject with its lifeworld
that is in constant identity transformation as to the consistent world. As the continuum
appears the public sphere, which in the traditional Hegelian sense can be understood as
the objective world, as the diachronic momentum appears the private sphere as an
individuum in a crises, impossible to realize its potentials.
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In an ontological sense, these two worlds are irreconcilable, and too different that
can ever reach each other and exchange any mutual meaning. In a sense o f the
materialistic, dialectic-historical method these two worlds has to negate each other,
because they cannot any longer sublate a synthesis between the individual and the
objective spheres. Because o f these reasons, Habermas sees that the social philosophy has
to accompany itself with a new methodology, which can rescue reason and its
transcendent residue as well as its potential and finally sublate the private (as individual)
and the public (as objective) spheres in a new meaningful reality.
Habermas sees the new semiotic philosophy, as the new shoes for his social
philosophy. Although, the post-modern world appears as a great difference, it is one
equivalent between these two worlds: a communicative action that in a linguistic reality
appears as the sign that can with its potentiality o f interpretation and significance become
transformed in the discourse, which would open the dialectic between the public sphere
and the lifeworld. The final result o f these dialectic parts is possible improvement o f both
worlds, on each side, which accomplishment Habermas sees as the discursive ethics.
Regarding our concern as to the rationalization processes o f the religious
Habermas would agree that they can bi understood in a dialectic fashion as the challenge,
critical inquiry, disposition, opposition, and dismissal o f the religious beliefs. What is
difficult to explain is how these rationalization processes have become the political,
scientific, and cultural alternative to the closed, rigid, and orthodox religious worldviews,
but at the same time, through the criticism some o f the religious potentials such as a sense
of transcendence, ethical ideal o f justice, goodness, and righteousness are preserved in
communicative action o f the public and the lifeworld? More than this, as the biggest
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problem o f the communicative action as general semiotic theory o f religion is why and
how are religious potentials translated into the public sphere as the normative standards
o f the legal system and system o f values.

3e> American Experience: Religious Freedoms and Freedom from the Religious
Religion o f the Christian Reformation has always played important role in the
culture o f the United States. In the Declaration o f Independence it is stated that God has
granted people with basic natural rights and sense o f freedom ."9 The God o f singers of
the Declaration was understood as a God who realizes itself through reason as an
invisible, inner part o f nature that unfolds historical progress through the development of
human freedoms. The main meaning o f life has been seen in the fulfillment o f the liberty
that naturally expresses natural human rights, which source is in the Creator itself. The
idea that a human stands as the equal to God and represents with the comprehension o f its
freedom the realization o f the creation process was the idea very much in opposition to
the traditional Pilgrim, Evangelical, or Presbyterian movements o f that time.
In the Declaration it is also stated that the realization o f humanity can be seen in
the “pursuit o f happiness” o f each individual and this new nation itself. Well being and
pursuit o f happiness are quite different ideals than those spread in the different colonies,
which called their communities “New Jerusalem” and promoted moral rigorism based on
the literal interpretation o f the Biblical texts. At the end o f the Declaration it is stated that
the new leadership would struggle for freedoms and well being o f its citizens by having a
faith in the “divine Providence.” There is no question that people who signed this
document had a very generic, deistic, and modem view o f God, a Creator, and the
Providence that stood in many o f ways as the challenge and even an opposition to the
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strictly Biblical notion o f God spread among the Pilgrims in New England, revivalists in
Pennsylvania, or Anglicans, Presbyterians, and later, Episcopalians in Virginia.120
It is interesting that the name o f God is not mentioned in the American
Constitution and it is stated in the Article VI under the session Official Oath that “no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the United States.” In this sense the separation o f the state and the church become one of
the main priorities for the founding fathers o f the United States, even before was
proposed and passed the First Amendment in 1791. Definitely, the first American
politicians have had been very aware that different American colonies have very diverse
Christian ideas that might come into the serious conflict with each other once when these
colonies are united in the federation. 121
Founding fathers o f the US, J. Washington, T. Jefferson, and J. Madison were all
inspired by the Enlightenment European movement and ideas o f John Locke, J.J.
Rousseau, and Voltaire as well as with ideas o f Bishop Joseph Butler and Anglican
minister Samuel Clarke.122 The Enlighteners tried to overcome terrible challenges
regarding the interpretation o f which Christianity is right by giving a concept o f the
intellectual generic concept o f God in their idea o f “natural religion” as deism. Today we
know that deism was the dominant idea in the Masons Lodges in the US. The
Enlighteners and the members o f the Masonic Lodges have believed that God emanates
itself through nature, o f which reason is its inner part and the highest expression o f God’s
will. God was understood as a great Architect o f the human history in which people can
see the progress in a sense that humans are becoming more emancipated and realized as
individuals than in the former historical stages and political systems. These lodges were
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important because they became the main institutions for designing the trade and other
connections between the different colonies. Very often the lodges in the main city centers
would plant the Liberty Tree, and these places would become important to the
revolutionaries and their followers who wanted to free themselves from the British rule.
Finally, it is good to remember that 52 out o f 56 signers o f the Declaration were members
o f the Freemason lodges. 123
Besides the main ideas o f God expressed in the funding document o f the USA, the
creation o f the United States is associated with remembrance on the role o f diverse
Christian religious groups that have had opposite views on political and social challenges
in their colonies. For instance, Pilgrims in Massachusetts have thought that Native
Americans have to convert to Christianity—their original culture was perceived as bad or
“savage” and the conversion was seen as the process o f Enlightenment o f their
consciousness. At the same time Pilgrims strongly opposed to the slavery practiced in
Virginia and other Southern states. The revivalist in Pennsylvania have opposed to
legality o f slavery in Southern Colonies, but were more open for the interactions with the
Native Americans, and the Anglicans with Presbyterians in Virginia wanted a firm state
church as a tool o f maintaining institution o f the black slavery.
American early Colonial experiences are important in History o f Christianity and
further development o f Western Civilization. Never before one could see so many
opposite voices within Christianity which resulted in concrete application o f specific
beliefs to the secular and political life. Also, this American experience is extraordinary in
a sense o f creation o f first normative laws that would legislate as necessary religious
tolerance and allowed the growth o f religious pluralism. For instance K. Marx in his early
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writings The German Idealism and The Jewish Question praises American legislators
which at that time accepted The First Amendment (1791). He pointed out that states in
Europe at that time (1886-1890) still didn’t emancipate the state from the state religion.
He used the text o f the First Amendment associated with American Constitution to stress
that emancipation o f Jews in Germany, have led by Bruno Bauer, doesn’t mean that Jews
should became equal to Christians in their rights for religious freedom, but that the state
has to emancipate itself from any religion in order to grant this right to its people.
Today is still wide open for interpretation the meaning o f the first amendment:
although the state should totally separate itself from religious institutions, movements,
and ideological influences, it has to secure the freedom o f religious affiliations and
expressions. Open, sharp, and sometimes emotional discussions such as evolutionism vs.
creationism, use o f religious prayers in the public schools, placing a statue o f the Ten
Commandments in an Alabama courthouse, abortion, removing a word God from the
Pledge o f Allegiance, and the embryonic stem cell research are good examples of topics
that repeatedly shake American media and engage people of all ages and professions in
open dialogs that tend to form two different political sides— a conservative and the liberal
one.
American society is very polarized and often unsure how to balance religious
freedoms and high standards that are result o f democratization processes which support
cultural and political pluralism and autonomy o f the scientific, social, and academic
research. One o f the highest ideals that have formed American great pluralistic Nation is
the First Amendment by which is secured the freedom o f speech, but is also ensured the
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freedom o f religious convictions and beliefs, whether they are extreme and sometimes
even harmful for their followers.
For example, one o f the highly disputed religious groups in the USA today is the
white supremacist movements that use the right o f the First Amendment in the inverse
manner. They teach as a legitimate the hate toward other races as Jews, Afro-Americans,
and so called “mud” races. The Creativity Movement and the Church o f the Creator
inspired by Ben Klassen and Matt Hale are similar in their program to the Nazi ideology.
While the Nazism was crashed in 1945 by the American and Western European military
intervention (and the post-war rule which established democracies resolving the right
totalitarian tendencies in Germany and Italy based on justification o f racist laws toward
Jews, Slavs, Gypsies and other smaller Eastern or Southern European Slavic minorities),
this group feels quite comfortable in continuing the thread o f hate. It is awkward that the
movement which promotes as the main slogan “race is our religion” and as the main ideal
a racial holy war (RAHOWA) by which the white race will become the dominant one in
the future of the Earth, uses for its survival in the public sphere the most humanistic and
liberal norm o f the West, embodied in the philosophy o f the First Amendment.124
The freedom o f religious affiliation and the freedom o f speech guaranteed by the
American Constitution is one o f the most important norms that m odem societies
developed in a sense o f protecting human rights and dignity as an ideal o f the secular
humanism. The First Amendment designed in 1771 by Madison and Jefferson still
represents the norm as an ideal o f the true fulfillment o f emancipation processes in the
modem world. Both, M adison and Jefferson, have experienced what it means when only
one church is licensed in the state, which was the case with the Anglican Church in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

Virginia. The domination o f one church in the state is a dangerous ideological monopoly.
Immediately after the First Amendment was accepted by the Congress, in Virginia began
flourishing o f the revival movements such as the Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers who
then licensed black preachers and established the black church movements who were
going to change the attitude by which black slaves should not be baptized. It was the
Anglican/Presbyterian idea that if the black slaves are not baptized then the slavery can
be justified for the Christian community because slaves are not Christians themselves.
The First Amendment broke the monopoly o f one church as well as the ideological
indoctrination that the slavery can be justified.
One o f the discussions that exemplifies the confrontation between the religious
and the secular we can find in the broadcast presentation Creation vs. Evolution: Battle in
the Classroom produced by the National Science Foundation in 1982, where it is
presented the case study o f Livermore, California public schools. The school offered a
course in the Science using both “scientific” approaches: evolution and creation. Lots of
students and their parents, although pious Christians, opposed the idea o f teaching
creationism, saying that in this class the mythological stories from the Book o f Genesis
about Noah’s Ark and the creation story are misrepresented to the students’ as science.
They were also taught that the Earth in the physical sense is only ca 6 - 8 thousand years
old.
The school board had to respond to the disappointed parents and students who
complained about creationism as a science, while the other half o f the students liked the
class because it offered to them a possibility to take the side and choose which model
works better for them. Parents who argued that creationism and evolutionism should be
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taught side by side in the public schools thought that a true Christian believer could have
a problem to follow its religious convictions if only evolution is taught in the public
schools. Soon it was decided that science class should not teach creationism in the public
schools. Many o f parents supported creationism, but a slight majority won in favor of
evolutionism.
One might be confused o f how creation theory can function as a science.
Creationism as a science is the main project o f the Institute for Creation Research (ICR)
in San Diego, California. The main data about the institute and the scientists involved in
this project can be found on the Internet at this address www.icr.oru.
The founder o f the ICR is Henry M. Morris, the specialists in the hydraulics,
hydrology, geology, and mathematics, who has published 24 books in which the science
is presented to support the Genesis story. One o f the most popular biologists in ICR,
Duane T. Gish, is Associate Director, interviewed in the broadcast presentation which
published numerous books trying to prove that the Genesis story about N oah’s ark can be
scientifically proven. Before Gish became one o f the founders o f the ICR, he worked for
many years as a biochemist in Upjohn Company, Kalamazoo, Michigan. He tried to
defend the fact that the Earth is only 6-8 thousands years old, as well as to prove that all
living beings existed simultaneously before the big flood (amoeba, man, and dinosaur),
which took place before several thousands years, as the catastrophic event that changed
the Earth only in the course o f one year.
Along with ICR a very active is the Creation Research Society in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, from which the majority o f scientists are recruited to work for ICR. Amazing
subtitle appears as one finds the web-site “we are Christ focused Creation ministry,”
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which bluntly shows that the scientific methodology is biased and that the Bible truth is
understood as the main hypothesis that frames their scientific research and interpretation
of the facts that are the result o f this pseudo-science.
To show polarization over the issue whether is evolution acceptable for the
Christian believers today, two local preachers were interviewed and both o f them had
totally different answers on understanding science and evolution. While the local
fundamentalist preacher (Scott Memorial Baptist Church), Tim LaHaye, said that
evolution definitely conflicts the truth o f the Bible and that this teaching should be
expelled from the schools even blaming the evolutionary theory for the “political, moral
and social chaos” o f the 60’s, a liberal Presbyterian preacher (First Presbyterian), Bill
Nebo, explained that he had no problem with evolution and the scientific facts involved
in its explanation. He supported his claim with an idea that evolutionary theory also
cannot explain every possible change in the development of species. For Nebo, this very
fact means that even in scientific evolution a true Christian can find space to integrate a
thought o f the higher being that acts with the higher purpose through nature. In his
opinion evolution is not in opposition to the Christian belief and its canonical
compendium. He also said that he understands the Bible stories in a metaphorical sense
and not strictly literal, so for him, it is not necessary that science proves the story of the
Genesis. This way o f opening religious paradigm to the facts o f science can be consider
as an example o f the secularization o f religious ideas.
In analyzing this case study, it seems that religion appears in modem society as
the most controversial psycho-social, cultural, and ideological construct in the world of
Modernity. Religious responses to modernity fluctuate from the open dialogs o f religious
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specialists, theologians, and believers with the representatives o f the secular ideas (the
liberal paradigm) to the denial and challenge (the fundamentalism) o f the same.
This situation with the religion and secularization processes is the number one
topic in modem scholarship in philosophy, comparative religion, ethics, aesthetics, and
sociology. The goal o f this doctoral dissertation is to concentrate on the research o f how
belief(s) and religion(s) are explained in the context o f modernity taking into
consideration semiotics o f Charles Sanders Peirce, which is differently applied in the
theory o f religion by J. Habermas and U. Eco. It is interesting that both scholars,
Habermas and Eco, have analyzed the functioning o f religious consciousness in
modernity; have involved themselves into the public dialogs with the representatives of
the Christian theology; and adopted Peirce’s semiotics as a relevant frame o f reference by
which they can explain the processes o f the secularization o f religious ideas in modern
society.

3f) Peirce and the Model of Scientific Revolution
According to Peirce, beliefs hold one’s worldview as long as they are fixed and
do not clash under the weight o f any doubt. As soon as doubt appears, beliefs are
challenged. For Peirce the scientific statements are also beliefs (habits), but with a more
secure methodology than pure beliefs, because the hypotheses on which the research is
processed is proven and supported through the material facts.
Pure beliefs have no secure methodology in acquiring the knowledge o f nature,
but they open a search for the self through the conceptions of the superhuman being.
According to Peirce, the very idea o f nature appears to a human mind as the
representation o f the unity that stands separate from the self. The feeling o f finitude and
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Ill
helplessness appears before the sign which stands wide open to a self. Human
consciousness creates a further conception o f the dynamic object, and it appears in the
form o f a superhuman being or God. Consciousness that understands itself in its finite
position, through religion now, is forced to interpret its existence by referring to the
dynamic object.
Peirce understands belief as a rule for action, because it establishes a claim, a
proposition, a fixed knowledge, from which the practical action is possible. To Peirce,
religion is a special type o f a belief that acts to the human mind as a key for
understanding humanity and its possibilities. According to Peirce, the source o f all
possible beliefs is in the primary religious experience when a mind acknowledges the
idea of the infinite, omni-powerful (God, creator), and absolute God, who then stands to a
human mind as the sign for the unity and order o f all things in the universe. God is the
most exhaustive sign that is progressed into a mirror-symbol through which we are able
to see ourselves and open up the mind for communication with the world by which every
possible object that mind can grasp becomes a sign. To Peirce, humans are not any longer
animal rationale as it is presented in philosophy from Aristotle to Descartes, Kant, and
Hegel; but rather interpreters that are deciphering the world through the very fact o f their
freedom. Peirce defines a sign (representamen) as “something which stands to somebody
form something in some respect o f capacity.” The object o f knowledge is not any longer
reduced to the things that consciousness is able to produce from the transcendental
conditions o f time and space as described in Kant, but it can be a concept, a feeling, and
an action, anything that the consciousness can grasp in some respect. In this sense,
consciousness appears to be an interpretant o f signs in an indefinite way and the
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“religious science” helps a consciousness to understand itself in the deepest way. To
Peirce, religion is a science o f communication in which God appears as a regulative idea
(almost in a Kantian sense), in a way that a person exists as communion with another
being that represents itself through the unity with the dynamic object. Religion is the only
science which opens objects (interpreted signs) as the modus o f the self to the public
sphere.

In Peirce’s philosophy, religion is the only science that anticipates the

transcendental and transcendent truth o f the self. Religion represents the communicative
ability o f the human mind that is able to unfold to a person meaning that one can find in
the act o f love.126
Referring again to the case study at the beginning of the text we can find an
amazing resemblance between the reasoning o f the liberal preacher Bill Nebo and
Charles S. Peirce’s understanding o f religion. Although Peirce was also a great
mathematician, logician, and scientist in physics, he opposed the radical skepticism of
Hume and tried to find some space in which he could preserve religion as an important
psychological, phenomenological, rational, and developmental fact for humanity. Peirce
really gave a convincing answer for public like Bill Nebo - it is possible to be a scientist
and to be religious; while evolutionary theory cannot answer to the highest questions of
humanity because o f the reduced scientific hypothesis that in its answer cannot break
from the conditions o f its scientific method - proving the logic o f natural selection and
survival of the species--, religion can be understood as additional science that explains
the growth and functioning of the self which is able to explain the meaning behind the
highest human doubts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

While the discourse o f meaning for religious person answers the question o f what
life is and gives guidelines o f how to achieve good, valuable way o f living through the set
of rules that frames morality, ethics, human relationships, and the self, the secular or lay
individuals search for new answers that appear as the substitution for an old paradigm in
which religion is not enough a satisfactory level o f consciousness for the secular
rationalism.

3g) Habermas; Methodological Atheism and Rationality as a Solution
J. Habermas defines him self as a methodological atheists i.e., he preserves the
right to understand the importance o f the religious highest values and their truth claims,
but he needs to reject, in the name of rationality, the old paradigm where religion
involves the authority o f a superhuman being as the transcendent sublimation o f the
absolute as well as the mythological aspects o f religion. This methodological atheism is a
comprehensive tool o f the critical evaluation o f religion that at the same time rejects,
transforms, translates, and finally sublates religious truth into the domain of social reality.
In his debate with modern theologians Johann Baptist Metz, Francis Schussler Fiorenza,
Hugo Ball, Helmut Puekert and Jens Glebe-Moller, Habermas tried to explain in detail
what methodological atheism is.127
The negative character o f religion Habermas sees in mythological forms and
reification processes by which religion is alienated from its substance by formalization of
behavior in the ritual (symbolic acts as referents to the objects o f religion) and cubic
(worshiping) acts. Habermas thinks that the cult and ritual stand as the obstacle for
understanding o f religious semantic potentials. He says that in rituals religion is
“protected against a radical problematization by its being rooted in cult.”

128
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sees the “radical problematization” o f religion in the theodicy and salvation theory. He
thinks that only theology tries to explain the most difficult religious questions such as
humans suffering (theodicy), freedom and emancipation (salvation theory) focusing on
the truth claim of religion which aims the most inspiring part o f religion and that is the
growth o f consciousness in a moral sense what humans should (oath) to do in regard to
the others.
Habermas also thinks that those who accepted the symbolic interpretation of
religious potentials miss the main challenge that religion offers to believers, but also to
the whole community. Interpretation o f the Bible in a symbolic sense represents the
aesthetization process in which the real truth claim is omitted from the consideration. In
this sense, the symbolic interpretation o f religion appears then as a pure language game.
Habermas says that the modem theologians deal with extremely complex
problems as to maintaining the sense o f religion in correlation to the reality in which the
lifeworld is complexly encaged by the instrumental rationality o f the political, economic,
and social subsystems o f the modem democratic institutionalized world. In his interview
with Eduardo Mendieta, Habermas states that the churches in modem societies face
unavoidable competition with “other forms of faith” and “other claims to truth.”

129

It is

time to remember again the example from the beginning o f the text that described the
liberal preacher’s approach to evolution and the fundamentalist one. While Bill Nebo, the
Presbyterian preacher, sees the Genesis story as the symbolic representation o f the
omniscient God, which acts in the world in a way that everything is put together in a
complex way, so, to him evolution can be the way how God in its freedom acts in nature;
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for the fundamentalist preacher evolution is the insult to God’s omniscience and
omnipotence.
According to Habermas, the liberal side o f the Christian theology tries to explain
that Christianity has a value in offering to the modem world the principles o f solidarity,
emancipation, autonomous conduct in life, universalistic egalitarianism, individual
morality that is directed under the consciousness o f universal justice.130 To Habermas,
competition with other forms o f faiths and beliefs—which is the case from the very
moment when Christianity was formed as the splinter movement o f the Jewish faith in the
1st century C.E. in Galilee up to the contemporary denominational paradigm—forced
Christianity to continuously opt in its theological, political, and social debates for more
universalistic ideas than any other religion in the world. Habermas thinks that the
semantic potentials o f religion preserved in the basic canon, theology, practice,
symbolism, and rituals in competition with modem secularism and other religions on the
market have to be enough universal, but also have to be exemplary in a sense o f giving
directions to the autonomous personality o f how to live alone and as a member o f a
community o f the church. The potentials o f the semantic material o f religion can be
found in the dimension o f ethics and morality— religions definitively outline what
humans ought to do in order to achieve their true humanity.
Also, Habermas thinks that in the situation where the personal autonomy is
recognized as the normative character o f society some o f religious semantic materials
become inaccessible and they are then forgotten, some o f them are redefined in a more
universalistic sense. Some of them are viable enough to be transferred in the secular
domain. For instance, if we read Chapter 21 from the Book o f Exodus there are different
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norms o f how one should behave regarding laws to slaves, personal injury, and property
damage. It is written in Exodus 21: 28-29: “When an ox gores a man or a woman to
death, the ox must be stoned; its flesh may not be eaten. The owner o f the ox, however,
shall go unpunished.” Definitely this is an example o f the social norm presented in the
Bible compendium, but no common Jewish or Christian believer refers any longer to this
norm as relevant for their faith. When it is written in the same chapter —“When men
have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers a miscarriage, but no further
injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much as the woman’s husband demands of him,
and he shall pay in the presence o f the judges. But if injury ensues, you shall give life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for
wound, stripe for stripe.” - conflicting views might appear in liberal and fundamentalist
Christians, or the orthodox and liberal Jews on the issue o f the tallion principle as
acceptable social norm. In this sense, the semantic potentials o f the Old Testament still
have relevance for the religious consciousness o f the believers. Finally, if we read in the
Chapter 22:20-22 from the Book o f Exodus the following excerpts, “You shall not molest
or oppress an alien, for you were once aliens yourselves in the land Egypt. You shall not
wrong any widow or orphan.”— they might seem to the majority o f believers, but also to
common sense people, as rules that should be preserved in the attitudes o f human conduct
today and even transformed in the positive laws that the whole society follows.
In this dissertation it was already discussed in the first chapter the value of
Habermas’ communicative praxis. Habermas reconstructs the importance o f Durkheim’s
theory o f religion. Analyzing the outcome o f Durkheim’s point o f view in which the
collective consciousness is the conditio sine qua non o f the private affairs and is derived
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from the religious consciousness that relate itself to the sacred. For Durkheim the sacred
is “set apart” from everyday life and is par excellence (the thing that the profane should
not touch) in the world order, unifying the whole community together in one single body
of the church.131 Habermas accepts Durkheim’s view that religion in its primer form is
the most important institution that forms the identity o f the collective. In the experience
of the sacred the whole community becomes aware o f itself as one, using the analogous
symbols such as totem as the means of representation in which the beliefs are expressed
through the cult and rituals o f the community that perceives itself as one. Although,
Durkheim gives a good interpretation as to how religion functions in its primer stage,
Habermas thinks that believers themselves in the primer societies are not able to
rationally understand the meaning o f the communal unity achieved through the
relationship to the sacred even when they refer to it through the cultic and ritual
observances. He thinks that the linguification o f the sacred is important and it means the
transformation of the religious transcendent abilities into the profane sphere or the
migration of religious ideas into the secular sphere.
The demythologization processes Habermas sees in the ontology and metaphysics
of the West: from the Ancient Greek philosophy, through the metaphysics o f the
Enlightenment (Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Hobbes) and
the philosophy of German Idealism. The philosophy o f the West throughout its history
has expressed the compulsive wish to outline the totality of reality in a rational way, but
always gives the possibility for the transcendent residue to have some impact on the
rational systemic thinking. This transcendent residue is defined in Kantian philosophy of
antinomies in which rational reasoning is trapped without a final resolution for the
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highest inspiring human truth claims—immortality, existence o f God, human freedom,
and the first cause o f the world. Impossibility for reason to resolve the final metaphysical
questions left philosophy open for serious critique o f traditional metaphysics. With
Kantian Critique o f Pure Reason (1871), first time reason itself became a problem and
philosophy found itself in a deep crisis floating on the open sea o f ideas like the cursed
Flying Dutchman which is not able to find any safe land. Kant tried to resolve this
problem by giving the primacy o f the practical reason. Kant is the first philosopher who
acknowledged that the metaphysics couldn’t fulfill any longer its assignment, supplying
the rational worldview as the totality o f systematic relationships. Science definitely
endangered security o f any mythological, religious, and then metaphysical worldviews.
The common thing for all three types o f the worldviews is possibility for one integrative
reality to which human subject gives inputs and directs it.
In this sense the discussion about rationality in primal/native/basic or closed
societies and scientifically advanced Western societies can be a good way o f sharpening
the views, in his first volume book Theory o f Communicative Action (1981) Habermas
states that modem society would not be able to understand either the mythology of the
Azande, their concepts of the witchcraft and spirituality (Kwoth), or even the crucifixion
of Jesus, unless these concepts are transformed and reconstructed through the learning
process in which is then explained the transition from the mythological thinking to the
more abstract theological concepts in a rational way.

132

The way o f how the modern

anthropologist Evans-Pritchard presented the Azande can be taken as a good example.
Proving that the Azande logical thinking is not different than the one in the West, but also
presenting in what way the Azande would have a different worldview and religious
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content than the Western societies give modem anthropological research a clue why and
how modem societies might be different than the traditional, pre-modem one. Habermas
thinks that the main characteristic o f the pre-modem societies is blending between the
cultural spheres with the natural surroundings. It seems, as he states, that some sort of
confusion between culture and nature occurs, and that the social world is crucial for
explaining the natural world.
Very often this discussion would produce sharp arguments about rationality,
because cultural explanations for the natural occurrences seem to Westerners as irrational
explanations. For instance, in the Nuer tribe Twins are not understood as twins, but as
birds that are sings o f the spirits. In many African tribes any sickness is perceived as the
result o f the witchcraft. Habermas accepts partly the position o f Winch. The same logic is
present in the Western world as well as it is in pre-modem societies o f the basic cultures:
they both use the same logical apparatus— the premises from which is drawn inferences
and applied on the world, but there is only one difference. In the primal societies the
premises are not questioned are they true or not true, they are basically the statements of
belief, while in the science o f the West one can draw the validity claims about the
objective reality only and only if drawn inferences from the premises can prove the
truthfulness o f these premises. According to Winch, it is possible to talk about logical
unscientific and the scientific way o f thinking. Both are substantially equal because they
express the worldview through language, which maintains the cognitive adequacy
between the signifier and signified.
What Habermas sees as the substantially different between these two worldviews
is a lack of any alternative interpretations. The normativity o f one interpretation comes
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from social unity that is maintained through the taboo as the institution that protects “the
categorical foundations” o f that one worldview. The scientific rationality is basically
“instrumental” in a sense that has to prove the hypothesis, and is cognitively rational in a
sense that does not need a cultural foundation to prove its methodology or reflect to a
specific case out o f the foundation system. Science goes beyond the cultural differences.
The pre-modem societies function on the system that has only one set o f rules and
they are interpreted as they do not contradict each other, the main authority for this set of
rules is envisioned in the authority o f the sacred. M odem society is a comprehensive in
its structure because it reflects different “objectified” worlds as the sub-systems that are
hypostased as one form o f reality. The same object o f knowledge can have its religious,
scientific, cultural, economic, or social interpretation. This net o f different codes through
which the reality can be explained is not available in the pre-modem societies.
In this sense, the methodological atheism is the only solution in studying modern
lifeworld and its objectified subsystems that represent possibilities for the normative
interpretations. Religion passed its path from being the absolute source o f authority in
primer societies to being the last resource o f human salvage. Rescuing religious
potentials after a moment when is clear that the whole religion sublimated and transcend
the deepest anthropomorphic ideals o f ethics and humanity itself is crucial to Habermas.
He thinks that these ideals should be transferred into the legal, social, aesthetical, and
political spheres o f modern society and a sense o f transcendence into the lifeworld. The
transformation o f these religious potentials into the secular sphere calls everyone to
participate in a discourse: what is really the future o f humanity in the modem
instrumentalized world?
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3h) Eco: Natural/Lav Religiosity
In the prestige Italian daily national newspaper La Correra de la Serra was
published Umberto Eco’s discussion with Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, in which both
scholars open the line o f appealing questions about ethics, women in the Catholic
Church, abortion, beginning o f the human life, and apocalypse. The newspaper editors
had an idea to show a vivid polemics to the public between the two different sides; one
religious and the other secular, i.e., the atheistic. Eco/Martini discourse reached the high
intellectual level. They offered to the public a sophisticated dialogue with an intension to
open a room for mutual understanding, rather than the sharp polemic. The interesting
point was that both scholars masterfully referred to the theological and philosophical
tradition maintaining the interpretation faithful to their different worldviews— the
religious and the secular.
During their public discourse the audience began to comment it and via the
readers’ letters they demanded o f Eco and Martini to be more straightforward and less
intellectually comprehensive in their explications. It seems that the Italian public didn’t
share the same feelings that the religious and the secular views on everyday problems
could be disputed with such level o f recognition from both sides, as did Eco and Martini.
In any rate, the expectations o f the great “sour” polemic between the atheist, ex-Catholic,
Eco and the high Catholic official— the bishop o f Milan, a great Jesuit scholar, and the
Cardinal—failed in eyes o f the ordinary people, but the discourse has left amazing feeling
that religious and the secular worldviews although juxtaposed are ready to listen each
other taking into consideration their arguments with the great respect. However, the
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sophistication in the discussion and mutual intellectual recognition couldn’t cover their
obvious differences.
Especially in the last discussion Martini and Eco tried to sharpen the difference
between the secular and the religious, so they touched the question about the personal
foundations that are important for creating moral and ethical reasoning. Martini asked in
his letter a question how it is possible a secular ethics in the postmodern time, when there
is no any longer available strong foundation for it. He, then, referred to the crises of
philosophy, so, as he said, a person cannot call on the metaphysical principles, the
categorical imperative, God, Absolute, or even a personal god. Martini stated that he had
a hard time to understand why would be a secular person able to sacrifice itself for
anything greater in this world than the self if there is no, at least, present the idea of a
personal god. He also stressed that he cannot see modern positive laws being the source
of inspiration for the great moral or ethical challenges and deeds.
Finally, this M artini’s point provoked Eco to explain in a substantial sense the
position o f a secular person in contemporary world and pushed him to justify existence of
the secular ethics. Eco made the following exposition in his response to Martini:
Can you, Carlo Maria Martini, for the sake o f our discussion and the
confrontation in which you believe, try to think for a moment that there is
no God: that man appeared on Earth through a clumsy accident, consigned
to mortality but also condemned to be aware o f this, and that therefore he
is the most imperfect among all the animals (an permit me my gloomy
Leopardian tone for this hypothesis). This man, to find the courage to face
death, would out o f necessity become a religious creature and aspire to
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construct narratives capable o f providing an explanation and a model, an
exemplary image. And o f those that can dream up - some illuminating,
some terrible, some pathetically self-consolatory - in the fullness o f time,
he has at a given moment the religious and moral and poetic strength to
conceive the model o f Christ, o f universal love, o f forgiveness o f one’s
enemies, o f life offered in terrible sacrifice for the salvation o f the other. If
I were a traveler from a distant galaxy and found m yself before a species
that knew how to construct such a model, I would be captivated, I would
admire all this wicked theogonic energy, and I would judge this wicked
and miserable species, this species that committed so many horrors,
redeemed solely because it had succeeded in desiring and believing that all
of it was the truth. (Umberto Eco & Cardinal Martini, B elief or Nonbelief:
A Confrontation, (Translation from the Italin by Minna Proctor), Arcade
Publishing: New York, 1997., pp. 101-102)
Eco, unlike Martini, perceives religion as the cultural and man made construct
that underlies the desire for truth and opens sense for transcendence. Something greater
than sole individuality exists even for a person that is not religious. It is the desire for
truth that tries to outline some absolutes that are result o f human longings for better
future and improvement o f human relationships. For Eco, the great ethical ideas of
humility, solidarity, emancipation, recognition o f others have a root in human natural
potentials and cognitive abilities.
Eco explains that the great “golden rule” is not only the privilege o f the religious
people, but is a common shared experience o f all humanity. It is not needed to obey the
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golden rule because it is believed that an absolute being, God, commanded this to the
people, but the functional naturalness o f our body and consciousness gives us this great
experience, which then becomes knowledge o f the norm directing human actions in the
future. For Eco, a “universal semantic” exists, a shared body o f conceptions that can be
expressed in all languages o f the world. These general conceptions refer to the “position
o f our bodies in space.” The experience o f pain in our body or a wound gives us a notion
of what it is to hurt and this experience can be projected to any other being that is in the
same situation.
Eco also stresses that no human likes to be absolutely controlled in a sense that
cannot freely talk, express what it sees, sleep when it wants, go where it wants, etc. The
notion o f constrains is also one o f the notions that is so natural and common to all people.
Also, Eco gives an example that every person that would experience a total isolation by
society would eventually die, so the notion o f human relationships and further social and
communal identification is also common to all cultures and all people.
Eco also points out that these simple conceptions could be much more
comprehensive when comes to the parental love, the great loss o f the child or anyone
close to the person, and experiences o f pleasure. In this sense, ethics is the result o f the
human constant growth o f awareness that the “physical rights o f others, including the
right to speak and think” should be reciprocated to everybody. This ethics comes from
bellow, out of experience, reflection, and interpretation o f it, all at the same time. For
Eco, the same is with religion. Religious consciousness imprints these ethical conceptions
as sort o f commandments, but when these conceptions become to someone a reality it is
always the result o f the human growth in consciousness itself.
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A believer or an atheist are in the same position when comes to the test of
morality and humanity. Eco asks, how would one explain all kinds o f crimes against
humanity such as “the Massacre o f the Innocents, Christians fed to the lions, the Night of
St. Bartholomew, the burning o f heretics, extermination camps, censorship, children
working in the mines, atrocities in Bosnia,” if a religion is enough strong and secure
guarantee for the righteous and ethical conduct?
For instance, in James Sterba’s book Three Challenges to Ethics:
Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism (2001) the author investigates an
American Holocaust in association with the domination o f Western ethics in the USA. It
seems that Western local and state rulers couldn’t accept the multicultural challenges
given by the Native American ways o f living, believing, and autochthon observances. In
connection Sterba has also stated that that only chance for modem ethics is to develop a
solid secular ethics and to broaden its horizons taking into consideration the multicultural
challenges such as the ecological ideas, and breaking with masculine and strictly Western
bias in ethics. The idea o f veneration o f nature, protection o f natural resources, the idea
that nothing should be vested, understanding land as sacred and not and only as a
resource for humans was genuinely different from the Western point o f view where
nature is perceived as given on governance to people. In the Book o f Genesis 1: 28 is
stated that humans have domination over the Earth, and this idea has affected Western
perception o f nature, where nature has became a pure object and people appear as its
masters.

133

One o f the most impressive speeches ever written in modem American history
that described the clash o f two civilizations and their ethics can be found in Chief
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Seattle’s reply to US Government proposal by which the Suquamish and Duwamish
tribes are ordered to leave the traditional lands o f their ancestors. The C hief Seattle’s
respond to this proposal analysis the differences in beliefs between Western and his
people, also he insists on giving the insight what land means and meant to the native
people and their ancestors. Here is the excerpt from his speech:
To us the ashes o f our ancestors are sacred and their resting place
is hallowed ground. You wander far from the graves o f your ancestors and
seemingly without regret. Your religion was written upon tables o f stone
by the iron finger o f your God so that you could not forget. The Red Man
could never comprehend nor remember it. Our religion is the traditions of
our ancestors - the dreams o f our old men, given them in solemn hours of
night by the Great Sprit: and the visions o f our sachems; and it is written
in the hearts o f our people.

Your dead cease to love you and the land o f their nativity as soon
as they pass the portals o f the tomb and wander way beyond the stars.
They are soon forgotten and never return. Our dead never forget the
beautiful world that gave them being. ( . . . )
But should we accept it (the proposal), I here and now make this
condition that we will not be denied the privilege without molestation of
visiting at any time the tombs o f our ancestors, friends and children. Every
part o f this soil is sacred in the estimation o f my people. Every hillside,
every valley, every plain and grove, has been hallowed by some sad or
happy event in days long vanished . . . The very dust upon which you now
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stand responds more lovingly to their footsteps than to yours, because it is
rich with the blood o f our ancestors and our bare feet are conscious o f the
sympathetic touch. . . Even the little children who lived here and rejoiced
there for a brief season will love these somber solitudes and at eventide
they greet shadowy returning spirits. And when the last Red Man shall
have perished, and the memory o f my tribe shall have become a myth
among the White Men, these shores will swarm with the invisible dead of
my tribe, and when your children’s children think themselves alone in the
field, the store, the shop, upon the highway, or in the silence o f the
pathless woods, they will not be alone. . . At night when the streets o f your
cities and villages are silent and you think them deserted, they will throng
with the returning hosts that once filled and still love this beautiful land.
The White Man will never be alone.” 134
According to Sterba, only secularized ethics has a chance to overcome huge
ethical differences that come from various religious exegeses. In all religions there are
sources worth o f preserving and transferring them into the secular sphere. The Western
ethics and ethics in America should be less and less biased by Christianity and more and
I i f

more open to the corrections that come from multicultural experience.
Peoples and nations o f the Native Americans have been very often displaced from
their original lands, destroyed, or even extinct from Columbus’ discovery to the
beginning o f 19th century. Sterba’s research sources showed that when Columbus entered
in the American Continent approximately 100 million people were living, and at that time
15 million lived north o f the Rio Grande.136 He also gave a comparative analysis of
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population at that time and in Europe lived cca 70 million people, in Africa 72 million,
and in Russia 28 million people. From 1492 to 1535, 8 million Taino people (who came
in the contact with Columbus and his mission) were extinct. In central Mexico population
was 25 million people at the beginning when Cortes arrived, by 1595, 95% people died or
were extinct, and was left cca 1, 300,000.137 At the beginning o f the conquest o f the
North America lived cca. 450 different tribes, today we were talking about cca 200 tribes.
One cannot only accept these numbers and not ask why and how was possible that such
holocaust o f native peoples really happened?
We know that the Northern America was inherited by pious, religious people that
joined missions in the new part o f the world and that they all escaped from the terror of
the religious wars in Europe in 17 and 18 centuries. Who would ever guess that these
people would today be considered the cause o f terrible tragedy and involve in the
political atrocity that happened to the Native Americans? For Eco religion is not enough
secure guarantee for the human ethical conduct and for this very reason religious
consciousness is in the serious crisis.
Even if a religion offers ways o f correcting human vices through conversion,
redemption, and forgiveness, and is successful in the intent to change people’s
conceptions that led someone to commit the crime doesn’t necessarily mean that “god” or
the “Holy Spirit” arranged and made these changes. As Eco stated, our experiential
knowledge tells us that those who killed, raped, robed, and violated basic human rights
didn’t do such things out o f their common standards o f behavior, but did this out of
insanity, fear, misperception, greed, jealousy, and they usually saw such atrocities as the
exceptional moments in their life. At the moments when a person understands
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wrongdoing it desperately needs to redeem and submit itself to the higher authority and
power, and receive some sort o f relief. The experience that one passes when committed
the crime and comes to the revelation o f what has been done, a terrible turmoil captures
one’s consciousness. As Dostoyevsky, described in his The Crime and the Punishment,
there is no peace within it, only redemption and confession can help. To Eco, crimes such
as genocide, humiliation o f others, and mutilation o f others’ bodies are the result of
closing one’s identity and reducing it to the point that others do not really exist. He says:
Why then is it that certain cultures condone, or have condoned in the past,
murder, cannibalism, the humiliation o f another human body? Simply because
those cultures restrict their concept o f the “other” to those within their own tribal
community (or ethnicity) and think o f the “barbarians” (the outsider) as inhuman.
Not even Crusaders thought o f the infidels as brethren to love beyond measure.
The recognition o f the role the other plays, the necessity to respect in him those
very needs we could not ourselves live without fulfilling, is the fruit o f millennial
progress. Even the Christian commandment to love was enunciated, and accepted
with difficulty, only when the time was ripe. Umberto Eco & Cardinal Martini,
B elief or Nonbelief, (Trans. Minna Proctor, Arcade Publishing: New York, 1997),
pp. 94-95.
True ethics begins with understanding and recognition o f others. If we assign to
the other the same properties as we do to ourselves, then is less likely that people would
direct the act o f violence to them. The picture o f Jesus in the W est who is able to
willingly sacrifice him self for humanity, or the Buddha in the East, who teaches that
through transformation o f its consciousness the whole world can be reconciliated can
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definitely help people in a specific culture to accept the high ethical ideals as something
that is worth living for. What is then worth o f studying in religion are the high ethical and
humanistic conceptions that denote what is extraordinary in humanity that transcend a
message o f possible submission o f the self to something that is expressed as the faith to
the higher being, or mysterious self-generating energy. What we find in religion is the
reflection o f the valuable experience o f the great conversion to the spiritual forces that
become one’s inner center. The true religion is not in one’s acceptance o f formality of
beliefs and practices, or in the simple act o f belonging to one religious community, but it
is in the extraordinarity o f religious experience and maze o f codes that religion offers
available as the access to the transcendence that can be the higher being, alternative
reality, superhuman being, or simply mysterious self-generating energy. In this sense
religion always deals with the dynamic object and unlimited semiosis.

3i) Unlimited Semiosis in the Concents of Being and God: Production of the Signs

Eco states in the introduction to his Kant and the Platypus (2000) that the limits
o f interpretation appears as a true quandary for the semiotic dynamic object that appears
1-10

to an interpreter as an unlimited semiosis.

This kind o f object can be only understood

through the interplay between openness o f the abstract signs that are in continuous
progress in association with the limits o f interpretation. A curious question here is: are
these limits coming directly from the cultural code and language or are they associated
with the logic of the object itself (Being)?

When we presume a subject that tries to understand what it experiences (and the
object - that is to say, the Thing-in-Itself—becomes the terminus a quo), then,
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even before the formation o f the chain o f interpretants, there comes into play a
process o f interpreting the world that, especially in the case o f novel or unknown
objects (such as the platypus at the end o f the eight an “auroral” form, made up
through trial and error; but this is already semiosis in progress, which calls preestablished cultural systems into question. ( . . . ) I try to temper an eminently the
weight o f our cultural systems, there is something in continuum o f experience that
sets a limit on our interpretations . . . (Eco, 2000, pp. 4,5)
Eco thinks that traditional ontological and metaphysical modeling o f Being in
Western philosophy shows a good example o f a theory that actually was referring to the
make up o f the dynamic object as an unlimited semiosis.139 Furthermore, Eco also thinks
that every general or main religious concept o f god or ultimate reality expresses the logic
o f the dynamic object as an unlimited semiosis. Religion, though, uses metaphorical,
allegorical, or mythical language, and very often a hermetic drift to come close to the
problem o f Being and its meaning that was posited by rational and logical thought in the
traditional Western ontology or, later, metaphysics.
At the very beginning o f its development Western philosophy has established the
ontological differentiation between a being as an entity (to on) and Being as the
substantive o f every existent being (in Parmenides and Plato ousia; in Aristotle to ti en
einai). Expressing the world around us in a comprehensible way, for every thing that
exists there is a pre-linguistic condition and its correlate “is.” As Eco pointed out; in any
rate, alluding on Heidegger’s reconstruction o f time and being in the horizon o f an
existence that comprehends its finitude; we do not thing about the meaning o f Being as
such, but we simply assume it as a natural or pre-conditioned linguistic act. As Peirce has

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

defined, Being is an abstract concept; it belongs to all objects that we perceive as entities,
and because o f this in a logical sense has an unlimited extension and null
intension/comprehension.140
To Peirce, this acknowledgment o f the subject o f cognition who comprehends the
condition o f Being as unlimited and dynamic also reflects itself as a continuous
representamen (an immediate object). This representamen can be defined as an active
conscious that produces a secure belief in “I” as a continuum o f the self.141 This
reflective (transcendental) part o f consciousness acts in a sense o f becoming the active
interpreter o f the sign that appears as an object o f cognition. This “I” that is constituted
through experiencing the condition between the ontic and ontological spheres appears as
the norm of the experiential and intelligible world. Consciousness that reflects itself as
the norm (“I”), but as well as the sign o f the interpreter o f the world is the most secure
belief as a habit that human knowledge can really produce and rely on it.
Albeit, this substrate o f consciousness as the sign o f continuity o f the self in
Peircean tradition is different than in traditional Descartian metaphysics, where it is
perceived as the pure res cogitans and the result o f an innate idea o f God. According to
Descartes, the existence o f God can be proven only by m ind’s ability to detect the logical
connections in natural world using mathematical abstract ratios that are able to decode
the “secret” o f the coded creation. Peirce thinks that continuity o f consciousness is the
result neither o f an innate idea o f God like in Descartes, or Kantian necessary condition
o f the cognition that comes from the nature o f the human reasoning that is not only
theoretical, but as well practical and through the perception o f the world alters nature as
well; but it is a habit or a strong belief that reflects in its constitutive element a communal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

133

code - the self, the human condition, and the cultural code imprinted in language and
horizon o f understanding. Again, this main representamen is a part o f a sign, because it
appropriates its conditions to the object, and the object cannot be absolutely resolved as a
simple thing, but only as a sign.
Eco has stressed that in traditional Western philosophy the most important
question about Being was, as Leibnitz put it, “Why is there something, rather than
nothing,” or as Heidegger formulated, “Was its das Seinde, das Seinde in seinen Sein?”
which translates in English: “What is being, what is beingness, in its Being?” That a
being is something in a sense o f being existent and its entity implies that “is,” and that an
entity has a substrate o f Being, which is also given to all other existent entities, it also
means that its condition opposes to the condition o f not being existent or being
nothing.142 Being can be comprehended only and only by having set limits of
interpretation as its negativity, or lack o f any Being as nothing (me on). At the same time,
“is” means something put in the perspective o f everything existent. If something “is” the
limit of philosophical interpretation for the existent thing is in the opposition of
nothingness, but also, that “is” requires a progress o f thought and logic in a sense that
every entity requires some sort o f categorization in perspective o f all existent things. In
this sense, the question o f what is definition o f a thing, or what is a meaning of a being,
plays a crucial role. Looking at this philosophical universe a being (any entity) is
associated with Being in its crucial logical way and it unfolds a meaning, but it is
questionable are the limits o f Being set by the real ontological conditions, or simply by
the limits o f our mind?
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Peirce is skeptical to human possibility to resolve this problem. As Aristotle
stated in his Metaphysics, to on leghetai men pollahos or being can be said in many ways
and in several senses (Met. 1001a 33). This means that the final resolution o f a being and
Being is not possible and always opens a fundamental chasm (aporein): what is
perception o f a being is not o f Being, and what is first question for a being is not relevant
for Being.
Peirce in this sense states that being is not anything that is ontologically
established, but is “anything that we can spoke of.” To talk about anything requires a
mental representation, code o f language, culture, and specific species acquisitions
through which representations are formed. Entity or a being can be equally a material
thing as well as entities o f reason, laws o f mathematics, and thoughts. When one sees the
chair and associates with a chair the proper word that denotes the substance o f the chair,
the chair doesn’t appear as a simple material thing, but was transformed through the
reasoning, mental representation, and language into an appropriate category. The chair is
a coded sign that will fulfill its mission by the proper interpretation through its
interpretant.
To Peirce, the idea o f Being is not particularly philosophical but is, in its main
endeavor, religious and the matter o f faith. The question o f Being cannot escape from the
problem o f alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the reason why is something
rather anything than nothing and the question of meaning. But the answers on these
comprehensive insights are not only logical or philosophical and only individually or
culturally postulated— they are formed in the transcendent community o f unlimited
communication, that is to Peirce similar to the Church. In every religion, especially in
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Christian tradition, the existence o f church underlies two main spiritual aspects: the
community unified in their hopes toward a transcendent being (God, or ultimate reality,
gods), and community that exists in order to expresses closeness between the public and
the private spheres. To illustrate this Peircian obsession with religion we can read the
point where he acknowledges that religion, not philosophy, deals with the final cut edge
question such as the one o f the absolute beginning and end:

And what is religion? In each individual it is a sort of sentiment, or obscure
perception, a deep recognition o f something in the circumambient. All, which, if
he strives to express it, will clothe itself in forms more or less extravagant, more
or less accidental, but ever acknowledging the first and the last, the A and G, as
well as a relation to that Absolute o f the individual’s self, as a relative being. But
religion cannot reside in its totality in a single individual. Like every species of
reality, it is essentially a social, a public affair. It is the idea o f a whole Church,
welding all its members together in one organic, systemic perception o f the Glory
o f the Highest— an idea having a growth from generation to generation and
claiming supremacy in the determination o f all conduct, private and public. CP 6.
429
It seems that Eco has never acknowledged Peircean strong theory o f religion that
acts in his semiotics as the important part o f support theory for the human growth of
knowledge, morality, and love. A true progression o f the human knowledge (evolution)
can be found in an idea o f humanity as solidarity, moral sensibility, and legacy o f love.
To Peirce the example of these highest human ideals is present in the message o f true
Christianity. Peirce was using extensively a Christian experience in which he was
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brought, including the ideas o f Unitarian theology, to oppose to one-dimensional
scientific theory o f evolution. Also, he needed his Christian knowledge to explain what is
actually the meaning o f the unlimited community o f communication, one o f the focal
points o f his semiotics. Although in a quite different way than Hegel, Peirce brought one
more time a strong connection between his philosophy o f general semiotics and religion.
A simple human religion as faith exists in every conception o f the wholeness o f the
world. The world is overwhelming, it appears as the contrary to the finite and relative
self, it appears only as a sign that is often presented in human concepts as God— the
ultimate creator, the beginning and the end.
The problem with Peircean theory o f religion is in a strong association o f his
theory with religious symbols and assumption o f exclusivity o f Christianity. Peirce never
talks about any other religion, or any other religious symbolism. Peirce also thinks that
the connection between Western Philosophy and Christianity is legitimate and he is not
concern with this attitude at all. To Peirce a philosophical Being is the same as the
concept o f God in Christianity: Being develops via basic human concept o f awareness of
the self, its fmitude and relativity in association o f powerfulness o f something higher than
all particular beings:

The universe is a book written for man’s reading. If it were destitute o f strict
logical connection, it would fail o f its purpose and be unintelligible. The luminous
order o f the pages and the successive introduction of strange and new truths are
adapted to the development and expansion o f the created intellect. It is a glorious
manifestation o f the all pervading affection and the fostering care o f divine
wisdom. (CP 5.119)
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Eco accepts Peirce’s idea o f unlimited semiosis, although stays away of
association o f Peircean general semiotics with Christianity as exclusive religiosity. He
thinks that Peirce actually achieves through his concept o f unlimited semiosis, the first
theory o f deconstruction. The main assumption o f Peirce’s philosophy Eco summarized
in three points: all knowledge about the self, inward, and our consciousness is developed
through the hypothetical reasoning and abduction; every knowledge relays on previous
knowledge, every cognition is in association with previous cognition; and there is no
absolute concepts or knowledge, human knowledge needs signs. In the process of
deciphering signs, human conscious appears as the interpreter and a sign o f a continuum
consciousness, representing the core o f the self as quality that is determinate. Continuity
is an assumption o f a quality that can be determinate, but Peirce states, and Eco accepts,
reality is indeterminate, and continuity is the main source o f fallibility. Assuming that for
many of our knowledge we have to correlate appropriation of the transcendental
community o f unlimited communication in order to reflect knowledge o f the self and the
world, it seems that our substance acts actually as we are infinite and undetermined
individuals. Reducing the self on something determinate, the possibility o f error is
present. The very fact that our knowledge is indeterminate because it operates in
indeterminate world interpreting signs, but still produces the determinate conceptions,
proves actually that all our knowledge and conceptions are fallible. Every judgment, idea,
or knowledge is conjectural in nature, while emotions, common sense, and experience are
vague.
This leads toward an idea that all knowledge is a habit, a disposition to act upon
the world, which legacy comes from the community as the transcendental principle.
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Whenever knowledge appears as a habit, it assumes the question what would any person
generally think about this idea? If knowledge survives the appropriation o f the
transcendental community it establishes itself as a habit. Peirce’s idea o f the ideal Church
corresponds with an idea o f transcendental community o f unlimited communication. The
world, Being or consciousness is unlimited, open, vague, and undetermined. This very
assumption o f the world that is different o f all possible knowledge and acts almost as it is
Deus Absconditus because it is infinite, undetermined, and free o f any notions, categories,
or ideas is one o f the main points o f post-modern deconstructionist. How does this
deconstructionist universe really function?
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CHAPTER IV

UNIVERSE AS SEMIOSPHERE

4a) Yuri Lotman’s Concept of the Semiosphere
Semiosphere is a term developed by Yuri Lotman in his motivating study on the
semiotics o f culture. Umberto Eco has written an inspiriting introduction to this study,
explaining the development o f Lotman’s semiotics from the structurlist inspiration by de
Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Prop, Shlovski, and Tomashevsky to his later acceptance of
general semiotics stimulated by C.S. Peirce and C. M orris.143 The central concept o f the
semiosphere in Lotman’s study, Eco indicates, is now developed in accordance to the
ideas of general semiotics and becomes crucial for explaining the functioning o f all
different cultures o f humanity as well as the great epochal changes within each culture.
What is the semiosphere? To develop this term, Lotman was inspired with the
concept o f the biosphere in biology. As Verdansky has defined, the biosphere, it is the
necessary universal ecological system o f the Earth. It is understood as a condition for the
development of all living beings on Earth whether they are the simplest or the most
advanced biological organisms, but also the biosphere means that all life on Earth is
interconnected. Inspired by Verdansky’s holistic approach, Lotman has tried to find a
holistic answer for the existence o f different cultural forms. He invents the semiosphere,
defining it as the cluster relevant for all different cultures on the Earth. To him, the
semiosopehre is the universal system o f basic codes and modeling subsystems that
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express the human condition, which are then crucial for every living human being; his/her
language, and all social or cultural forms. In explaining what the biosphere is, Verdansky
also uses an idea o f cluster (the atmosphere) under which all life is developed, but also,
he stresses that created life forms effects equally the biosphere and its eco system. The
changes in the biosphere are indicated by evolutionary changes. For instance, from the
right combination o f the atmospheric chemical substances were developed proteins and
acids which in combination led to the revolutionary replication o f the genetic code. From
the first simple form o f life, genetic recapitulation and replication continued initiating the
emergence o f the new system o f living forms among which the photosynthetic processes
positively effected the biosphere and triggered further development o f complex life forms
as species. Finally, the humanization of nature represents the last great change and
challenge to the biospheric eco-system.
Taking into consideration the point that the biosphere interconnects all life on
Earth, Lotman thinks that there must exist such a thing under which all human social,
cultural, psychological, spiritual, religious, and creative developments are interconnected
and explained not only as particular developments o f specific cultures in specific times or
spaces, but as an universal development o f humanity. The semiosphere is perceived as
the coded matrix o f humanity. The human condition alters the natural environment
through perception, reasoning, and behavioral patterns. The semiosphere appears as the
coded memory o f humanity. In this sense there can be enormous amounts o f authentic
cultural identities, but they all are interconnected in the semiosphere.

Imagine a museum hall where exhibits from different periods are on
display, along with inscriptions in known and unknown languages, and
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instructions for decoding them; there are also the explanations composed
by the museum staff, plans for tours and rules for the behavior o f the
visitors. Imagine also in this hall tour-leaders and visitor and imagine all
this as a single mechanism. This is an image o f the semiosphere. Then we
have to remember that all elements o f the semiosphere are in dynamic, not
static, correlations whose terms are constantly changing. We notice this
especially at traditional moments that which have come down to us from
the past. Lotman, 1990, pp. 126-127.

One of the proofs for the semiosphere can be found in the ability o f translating one
language into another. There is no language o f any culture that cannot be translated into
others. This translatability shows that the main human concepts, ideas, relationships,
perceptions, and reasoning are universally-culturally domesticated.
Lotman’s concept takes into consideration the semiotic concept o f the umwelt,
which is defined as the “subjective universe” emerged through one’s perception, but also
relies on the limits imposed by the environment. Jakob von Uexkull and Thomas A.
Sebeok uses the umwelt as the signification process, where the human stands in the
middle o f the world that is consciously constructed through communication with the
environment, self, perception, social relationships, and other culturally imposed structural
elements o f society. The basis o f one’s umwelt is socio-biological input which is able to
open uniqueness o f the single organism. When this single organism communicates and
realizes itself through interactions, it creates a semiosphere through which is possible
development and projection o f the future acts.144
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From the structuralist point o f view, language is perceived as a primary modeling
system, while symbols, myth, cultural patterns, religion, art, literature, or science
represent the secondary modeling systems, but both are equally important. Lotman stays
on the structuralist side, accepting the idea o f modeling systems in one culture as crucial
for his semiotics.145 For him, culture appears as a code-system which can be changed
through the communication processes. Accordingly, everything that builds a cultural code
and system o f rules can be understood as a pre-fixed make-up in which different types of
communication can initiate inventions, which effects can go so far as to modify the state
o f consciousness or, even sometimes, social codes, and religious beliefs.
In his introduction, Eco gives the example o f the great paradigmatic epochal
changes that have affected Western Culture, changing radically the theocentric Middle
Age paradigm into the secular Enlightenment period. The great medieval culture that
represents an unified epoch from the 4th to late 16th centuries can be defined, as Eco puts
it, from the semiotic point of view in the following way: “Everything (not merely words
but also things) signifies a higher reality and objects themselves are important not for
their physical nature or their function, but rather in so much as they signify something
else.” 146 The best example o f the Middle Age semiotic modeling typology can be found
in the onto-theological argument for the existence o f God developed by Anselm (10331109).
He philosophizes that from the essence o f God one can conclude to its existence.
The essence o f God Anselm defined as that, than which no-greater-can-be-thought, so, if
anyone would say that this thought does not imply existence o f such thing would fall into
an absurd contradiction by the reference to the meaning o f the notion “grater” in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

statement that, than which no greater can be thought (N.G.T). The greatest thing one can
think implies perfections similar to the one that faith implies to the God, such as
omnipotence (to be the cause o f all things as absolute creator) and omniscience (to
embrace everything in its knowledge as providence). If N.G.T. is only in the mind, and is
not as well in the reality, then, is not greater than a pure thought or a finite mind, which
implies that the statement N.G.T. by the logical implication involves resolution by which
such thing is greater than a thought because it exists, but at the same time in reality does
not.147
Anselm’s point was the following: although, the human mind cannot transparently
grasp the existence o f God because it is believed that God transcends a finite being
abilities, its existence can be derived from the analogy to all other beings by which it is a
logical necessity that every being or entity has existence as its evident modus.
Accordingly, the greatest thing, which contains in itself the cause o f everything and
embraces everything with its knowledge, logically has to have its existence, but this
existence is not evident to humans. In this sense then, in every being or entity their
properties are in the function o f building the great chain o f beings or a metaphysical
system that will in its final account express the great existence o f God, as it is presented
in the improved argument for the existence o f God from design (the argument from the
governance o f the world) by Thomas Aquinas. The finite being lacks in knowledge, that
this being would achieve its end and meaning is governed toward it by the higher
intelligence that he believed is God.

148

Unlike the medieval analogia entis, the Enlightenment period appears with a
rationalistic philosophy, scientific reasoning, and secularism as it is a different cultural
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system o f the Middle Age. Eco describes the Enlightenment semiotic system in the
following way: “we have a cultural system where the world o f objects is real, while
words and signs in general are conventional constructions and vehicles o f falsehood, and
where only the “noble savage,” who is not aware o f the constructions o f culture, can
understand reality.” 149
The best expression o f the Enlightenment spirit one can find in Immanuel Kant’s
antinomies o f reason presented in his famous Critique o f Pure Reason. Kant’s antinomies
of reason can be understood as there is the irreconcilable difference between the
statements o f metaphysics and science. It is a very narrow line between skepticism and
dogmatism when we are talking about the world beyond our limits o f experience. As
Kant states, any knowledge that goes beyond the experiential discourse depends on the
ideas, assumptions, or hypotheses, but not facts. Even if the facts are used to prove the
hypothesis, assumption, or idea, it is questionable if that would be the only satisfying
conceptual model that would explain general questions about the world.
Kant points out on four different questions as those which over and over appear in
the main scientific and metaphysical discourses: Is it (1) the world limited in time and
space or is it infinite?; (2) what is the substance o f the world— is it one, as Spinoza
thought, is it dualistic in a sense o f being res extensa and res cogitans as it is suggested
by Descartes, or is it, perhaps pluralistic, made o f many particles, as suggested in
Leibnitz’ philosophy?; (3) does freedom exist, because humans experience their actions
as independent o f any force or it doesn’t, because everything acts in accordance with the
natural laws?; (4) and finally, does there exist an absolutely necessary being, which cause
is in itself and by this acts as the cause o f the world, or such being (God) doesn’t exist?
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According to Kant there is no final answer to these antinomies. Any final answer
about the antinomies can be understood as the dogmatic, because humans have no ability
to experience what really the world is or is not. Though, he thinks that freedom can be
experienced, because humans have an ability to act according to their own decisions that
are independent o f any natural laws, but are in accordance to the highest moral demand,
i.e., categorical imperative. Finally, although Kant thinks that an atheist cannot ever
accept an idea o f an absolute being (God) as the cause o f the world, the atheists are not
deprived o f an attempt to find unified knowledge which outlines the wholeness of the
world. There are two different basic world-views that answer differently on the question
of the fourth antinomy: the atheistic world-view tries to describe the world in terms of
time and space physicality, while theism tries to give the advantage to the noumenal
world. In the impossibility to resolve the antinomies, Kant accepts God, human freedom,
and the idea o f the immortality o f the soul as the regulative ideas (they act as it is)
important for the practical and moral actions in the world.
Through these two examples it can be seen that the semiotic codes of two
different epochs have been radically changed. Lotman’s semiotics o f culture concentrates
on the alternative communication styles that stand often as altering examples o f code
changes and usually are not recognized within the culture as turning points, while they
are actually salient for the change from one epoch to the other. We can all easily notice
that the Renaissance codex in art, philosophy, and literature is different than the Baroque
style or later Classicism which was dominant through the age o f Reason and the
Enlightenment period. The question is how is it noticed that the shift or change has taken
place? One o f the exemplary works about the “silent” changes from one epoch to the
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other can be found in Gustav Rene Hocke’s book Der welt als Labyrinth (1957). 150
Hocke investigates the period in European art between 1520 - 1650, for which he
believes is bursting with changes that can be already interpreted in terms o f modernity.
Hocke was a student o f Ernst Robert Curtius who made a breakthrough in the
research o f Latin Antiquity correlating it to European literature as its main source
book.151 His very point was that the European highest literature achievements such as
works o f Shakespeare in England, Dante in Italy, or Goethe in Germany, understood as
the classical code from the modern point o f view, were basically the ingenious stylistic
recapitulations and innovations to what had already existed in the works o f the Late
Antiquity. Analyzing through the works o f the Greek and Roman classics and comparing
them with the Latin literature, Curtius focuses on the power o f mannerism in Late
Antiquity as the constant which should be analyzed more specifically. He sees that every
classical period is challenged with new mannerism; its main purpose is to invert, criticize,
or have ironical implications to the dominant classical style. In this approach, every
mannerism is an expression o f the departure from the dominant or classical style and it
represents something new that is an innovative move from the former point.
The way in which Curtius and Hocke have analyzed mannerism can be defined as
a, sort of, “deconstruction” o f the classical or dominant style. For instance, Hocke
stresses that in 1639 was published Tractate o f the Rhetoric Figures, where Peregrini
defined concetto as a very fashionable modern figure, which is used to express
“impossible, ambiguous, contradictory, and which implies the usage o f allusions, dark
metaphors, extravagance, sophism, and shrewd observations.” 152 This use o f the stylistic
forms like concetto obviously was ment to challenge or invert the primer message.
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Concetto can be understood as one o f the alternative, hidden styles o f communication at
that time, and finally it has become the strong fulcrum o f change.
One o f the best examples given in Hocke’s book is the analysis o f II
Parmiganino’s self portrait (Fancesco Mazzola from Parma) with the image as though in
a convex mirror. The hand o f Parmiganino appears as a giant object in comparison to his
enigmatic smile and distant face. The inverted hierarchy o f presentation is applied in his
painting. Instead o f a classical presentation where the face is the focus o f the portrait,
Parmiganino inverted the classical image and shocked the public with the new
perspective. This small insertion into the dominant style o f the Renaissance, inverting the
expected hierarchy within the common presentation represents the alternative style of
communication and is the announcement o f the upcoming change. The dominant style of
the Renaissance in painting was all about achieving the perfectionism in proportions,
giving the sense o f the perfect harmony, rest, and focus on the middle. Leonardo’s Mona
Lisa reaches the perfection of harmony and rest, while the middle radiates her enigmatic
smile. Parmiganino’s self portrait opposes and demolishes traditional proportions
between the parts and the whole, seeking for the shock and wonder from the viewer.
Also, he leaves the picture without a clear center, expressing the pressure o f vertigo
empowered by the convex deformation.
The friend and contemporary o f Parmiganino, Jacopo da Pontormo, expressed, in
his work, the same sensibility o f a revolutionary challenge to the classical composition.
His picture Taking Jesus from the Cross (1518) underlies the point o f the lost center.
Instead of Jesus in the middle and the concentration o f other participants around his body,
we find an empty center where the dead hand o f Jesus hangs lifelessly, while hands of
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other participants in the sorrow serve to potentate the round space and dynamics o f the
composition. This empty space is not only a tactic to enforce the round composition, but
is a metaphor of “emptiness and soulless.” 153 Every participant o f this event faces
different direction away from Jesus. Has this Pantormo’s painting already anticipated the
Nietzschean idea o f the death o f God where the “whole horizon” is wiped out and the
whole culture faces the loss o f meaning? The avant-garde model had already begun its
development in the Renaissance period, but as a “rebellious fringe” as Lotman
described.154
When the avant-garde achieved its prime in the first half o f the 20th century, it
became “a phenomenon o f the centre,” changing the semiosphere in the direction of
secularism, experimentalism, and free critical thought where it built the “metacultural”
level in “intense theorizing.” 155 This “intense theorizing,” as Lotman calls it, put the
whole art as one o f the most important Western modeling system into the dynamic self
questioning. The avant-garde finally put into the question the validity o f an artistic code
where the artistic artifact appears as the object and has challenged the semiospheric code
of all socio-economic, political, and religious power-relationships.
The whole prefix o f one epochal cultural code is changed when one historical
epoch or style is replaced with the other, but this change happens slowly and comes
usually unknowingly to its prime. Lotman thinks that besides the synchronic analysis (the
historical knowledge that led toward the great changes), also the diachronic analysis (the
study o f alternative communication styles) should be applied in this research. The
research o f alternative types o f communication can bring some clues why and how have
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changes occurred, and bring some new information about a web type o f connections that
influenced and modeled a new approach.
One o f the most dramatic examples given in his book was an analysis o f The
Kievan Chronicles written during the conversion time o f indigenous Slavs and other
tribes to Christianity in Russia in the 10th century. At that time the process o f conversion
from native beliefs to Christianity was brutally enforced and many tribal religious
authorities were tortured and publicly executed as heretics. Their ideas and beliefs were
pronounced as heresy and sacrilege. Their style o f life was interpreted as wild, barbaric,
and savagery. Slavic tribes that were still not Christianized usually were called “devil
worshipers,” “savages,” and “animals,” and were deprived of their human status.156 With
this degradation they experienced the loss o f their own semiotic space and ability to
maintain their cultural identity.
Lotman says, the simple logic is applied to ensure the semiotic space: the
Christian semiotic space was presented as “ours, my own, cultured, safe, harmoniously
organized,” while the space o f native peoples became “their space, hostile, dangerous,
chaotic, evil, barbaric.” Lotman calls the logic o f ensuring the semiotic space and making
i

clear the semiotic boundaries, bynarism.

en

Every culture demands the formation of its

strong identity by making sure that it is distinct from the other competing culture.
Multiplying its linguistic reality through the secondary modeling systems which pillars
are beliefs, religious system, literature, art, and the way o f life the semiosphere is
becoming outlined and defined. If the way o f life and the multiplying o f linguistic reality
are challenged with the strong counter-culture that offers as a solution the different
system o f values, then bynarism grows to the possibilities of destroying the “other” side.
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For example, the U.S., mid and late 19th century was marked by the terrible crisis
between the U.S. government and Native Americans. In November, 1864 was committed
one of the most gruesome crimes against humanity against the Native Americans which
is known as the Sand Creek massacre where Cheyenne and Arapahos people were
attacked by a 700-man and 5-battalion army group. Colonel John Chivington was in
charge for this atrocity, and Theodore Roosevelt commanded the action.158
After the massacre was done, a government investigation was ordered. Collecting
the evidence for the case against colonel Chivington and his action the following was
recorded by the soldiers engaged in the battle: “Women and children were mutilated in
the most horrible manner. All cut to pieces. Nearly all, men, women, and children were
scalped.” In March 1863, before the Sand Creek massacre took place, the Rocky
Mountain News editorial published: “They (natives) are a dissolute, vagabondish, brutal,
and ungrateful race ought to be wiped from the face o f the earth.” This local newspaper
definitely played an important role in promoting the negative emotions toward Native
Americans. After the official investigation was ordered, again published in the Rocky
Mountain News, colonel Chivington, who, in the mean time, became also the Colorado
Governor, reacted angrily to the accusations before the Colorado senate. Finally, to prove
his point he asked people o f Denver to support him. In the senate he asked the invited
public: “Would it be best henceforward, to try to “civilize” the Indians or simply
exterminate them?,” according to the newspaper report, the mass responded “Exterminate
them! Exterminate them!” The congressional investigation didn’t accomplish anything
and Chivington was never charged with any crime.159
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Four years later, after the Sand Creek massacre took place, a new investigation
was ordered by the Congress involving the U.S. Army officials. Their reported on the
action by Chivington and they stated: “It scarcely has its parallel in the records o f Indian
barbarity— men, women and infants were tortured and mutilated in a way which would
put to shame the savages o f interior Africa.” Although officially condemned, Theodore
Roosevelt spoke on the Sand Creek massacre, saying “a righteous and beneficial a deed
as ever took place on the frontier.,” and later, “I don’t go so far as to think that the only
good Indians are dead Indians, but I believe 9 out o f 10 are, and shouldn’t like to inquire
too closely into the case o f the tents.” 160 In more recent research Hans Koning noted in
his text:

From the beginning, the Spaniards saw the native Americans as natural
slaves, beasts o f burden, part o f the loot. When working them to death was
more economical than treating them somewhat humanely, they did work
them to death. The English, on the other hand, had no use for native
peoples. They saw them as devil worshippers, savages who were beyond
salvation by the church, and exterminating them increasingly became
accepted policy. (Hans Koning, “The conquest o f America: How the
Indian nations lost their Continent, ” Monthly Review Press, 1993)

The story behind the conquest o f Northern American lands gives an astonishing example
of how Western civilization supremacy in an economic and military sense utilized among
the pious Christian population o f the U.S. a myth by which American Indians were not
defined as humans, but savages whose only chance to become truly human is in accepting
Christianity and Western cultural life-style. The Native American boarding schools
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invented by different Christian denominations in the 18th century expressed this attitude
very openly in their known slogan “Kill the Indian, save the man.” This myth about
Native Americans as savages lasted successfully for three centuries under the cover o f
utilized Christianity. The purpose o f this “bad mythology” was in taking away more and
more of the original American Indian cultural space.
It is interesting that Lotman defines myth as “a central text-forming mechanism”
which purpose is “to create a picture o f the world and establish identity between distant
spheres.” Also, he identifies myths as text-mechanisms necessary to develop whenever
one semiotic space faces the critical moments that could endanger the survival o f the
cultural identity. For Lotman, myths are not only archaisms derived from the historical
past like the symbols, which he defines, are necessary archaics because they are derived
from the “mnemonic programmes” preserved in the community’s oral mem ory.161 Myths
are similar to symbols in a sense that both are the diachronic devices o f the semiosphere,
always coming from the past but linger to the future. Accordingly, the myths can form
the new text as a response to the new reality, but will always reflect the system of
symbols that substantiate the cultural identity.
Definitely the Native American life-style was substantially different than the new
settlers’ prudishness and their complex social, educational, and political bourgeois
stratification, and the obsession with the hierarchy, so important for 18th century Western
culture. The American Indians enjoyed their innocence and simplicity in worshiping
Mother Earth and the veneration o f natural forces. The diversity o f belief-frameworks
expressing the awe toward the God o f the high (the Creator, or Great Spirit) was
confusing to Westerners. The plurality o f ritual practices such as magic, healing,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

divination ceremonies, and simplicity in understanding death as a natural fact, and a
change o f different worlds, appeared scary and confusing. The most troubling fact
Westerners found in the existence o f so many different Native tribes where each o f them
had had the “natural” sovereignty over the lands. All these factors appeared to the young
American nation, the majority o f which were Christian believers, and the American
government as challenging “distant spheres” that were seriously endangering the
preservation o f the cultural identity o f the West.
In order to preserve their identity, the new world o f the West found itself fighting
these “distant spheres.” The American Indian cultures appeared to the Western system as
a chaotic world in a political, religious, social, and ethical sense. The American Indian
cultures had no notion of the unity o f the one semiotic space between themselves, and
their single tribal territory was much smaller than the unity o f all American territory
perceived from the West. To organize and put in order the territory perceived, the new
American government had to make distant spheres marginalized, diminishing their true
and powerful significance.
The marginalization o f Native Americans was finally realized by the strong
political action o f the U.S. government creating a new map for America and putting
American Indians into the reservation lands, where their sovereignty was minimal and
supervised by the government. To each tribe was ascribed a small, very often, not
substantial for existence, land in remote areas. Often parts o f the tribes were removed far
from the original lands and were placed in much smaller territories where one tribe had to
adjust on living with another American Indian tribe. These lands were placed often in
wilderness where agriculture or business could not be successfully developed. All better
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parts of the Indian lands were taken by the Westerners, so the economic integration with
the New American mainland could not happen even over a long period o f time.
The other aspect o f the marginalizing strategy was to convert American Indians to
the Western life-style and Christian religion. As briefly noted earlier in the text, at the
late 18th and the beginning o f 19th century boarding schools were organized by different
Christian denominations. In these schools Native American children were forced to forget
their language, culture, and identity because they were told in the schools that their native
culture was shameful along with their traditional heritage and that was not worth
preserving.
From the Western point o f view, the purpose o f these schools was to teach boys
how to become farmers and girls housewives. Female students were taught how to sew,
clean, cook, nurse, and childcare. The school curriculum consisted o f the religious classes
covering the Christian Catechism, study o f the Bible, and Christian morality, but also a
few general education classes were offered such as arithmetic, history, and geography.

162

O f course, not all American Indian children were recruited to these schools
forcefully. Some children, whose families had already adjusted to modem living in the
single family houses, sometimes chose to attend the boarding schools. There is an
interesting example o f the first Cherokee convert to Christianity, Catherine Brown, who
voluntarily signed up for the attendance at the Brainerd boarding school organized by
New England Protestants. The story tells us that even when her parents decided to move
to the West lands, Catherine didn’t want to leave the Brainerd boarding school. She was
very determined to convert to the Western style o f life and Christianity. When eighteen
years old Catherine arrived in the recruiting center for the school, the minister C.
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Kingsbury thought that this girl which expressed such self-confidence in her cultural
background and was attached to the self-made beautiful jewelry consisted o f earrings,
pins, rings, a large necklace, and a stunning traditional colorful design on her dress,
would never experience a true Christian conversion. He was wrong.
Surprisingly, after two weeks o f the school attendance, Catherine decided to give
up her traditional jew elry and she touched the hearts o f her host family and missionaries
by giving each a peace o f her valuable belongings. She was willing to talk and share her
dreams with other missionary women, and they seemed to respect and care about
Catherine’s dreams, of which one had even triggered the experience o f conversion. Soon,
after the altering dream occurred, Catherine amazed the school officials by
acknowledging publicly before her host family that she was a sinner. In 1818 Catherine
was baptized and in 1820 she organized her own school for the Cherokee girls that
followed the principle o f children and parents voluntarily deciding to sign up for the
school. Although Catherine’s school was known by the excellence in treatment o f the
young American Indian children, unfortunately, the school didn’t last too long because o f
Catherine’s early death caused by tuberculosis in 1823.163
On the contrary to the carrying and gentle experiences associated with Catherine
Brown’s school, the boarding school project was often harsh and highly supported by the
U.S. government. Often, the government agents were involved in recruiting the American
Indian children to such programs, and in the majority o f cases this was done against the
wishes o f children’s parents. Joel W. Martin in his book The Land Look After Us (2001)
documented a case from 1879. The federal agent took the Sioux boys and girls from
South Dakota and sent them to the Indian school in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Upon the
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arrival to the school, the government officials stripped off the children’s Native clothes,
cut their hair, and forbade them to speak in their mother tongue. Soon these children
found themselves in Western clothes, alienated from their culture, family and their life
style. If these children would speak in their Native language, they would be severely
punished and beaten.164 Martin also quotes the words o f a Navajo writer Luci
Tapanhonso, who remembered at one occasion an experience from boarding school:

Sometimes late at night or toward morning when the sun hadn’t come up
completely, everything was quiet and the room filled with the soft, even
breathing o f the children; one o f them might stand at the window facing
east and think of home far away, tears streaming down her face. Late in
the night, someone always cried, and if the others heard her, they
pretended not to notice. They understood how it was with all o f them -if
only they could go to public school and eat at home everyday. Joel W.
Martin, A History o f Native American Religion, (Oxford University Press:
Oxford, New York, 2001), p. 81.
Today the words o f L. Tapanhonso haunt, weigh upon, and the modem person
with great sorrow, but also challenge our society to critically think about what was done
in the past that would not be repeated any longer in the future. The boarding schools hurt
the hearts o f Native peoples and made young people o f that time “culturally sick,”
teaching them to feel guilty and humiliated, often worthless just because their tradition
appears to Westerners as ignorant and distant.
The interesting point here is that the globalization tendencies in Western
civilization are associated with the experience o f domination over the smaller cultures
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and is deeply rooted in the interpretation o f the righteousness o f the Christian faith. From
the moment when the Christianity becomes a dominant religion in a large region, one can
soon witness the decay and break up o f the native and basic cultures. What has Lotman
found in reading the Kievan Chronicles about the behavior and attitude o f the Christian
authorities toward the Slavic tribes, it was repeated almost in a same manner centuries
later during the conquest o f the Northern American lands. This mistreatment o f the
smaller and self-sufficient cultures is rooted in the absoluteness o f the Christian faith. The
most important demand o f Christians is in understanding o f the creator God through the
profession o f the Christian faith: there is only one and true God, and worshiping spirits of
nature or even the Great Spirit or Creator that is named differently or associated with
different cultural ideals appears to Christians as an anathema. This Christian attitude is
monopolistic and imperialistic, where everything what is different appears as too
exclusive, distant, and unacceptable to the Christian concepts.
Following this path, Native Americans soon became “the boundary” o f the
predominantly Christian, Western culture. As Lotman defined, in the semiosophere “the
boundary is a mechanism for translating texts o f an alien semiotics into our language, it
is the place where what is external is transformed into what is internal.” 165
The struggle for the United States as a nation and as a territory was finally
achieved, defined and then stabilized with putting the Native Americans into a position of
minority that lives on the outskirts o f the mainstream culture, but also alienating them
from their own tradition. According to the statistical data’s from 1990, taken among the
high school senior year population, 46.4 percent o f American Indians perceive
themselves as Protestant Christians and 21.4 as Catholic Christians.166 Alienation from
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their own tradition has a great impact on American Indians and their vital survival. In his
study on modem ethical challenges in the U.S. James P. Sterba has discussed the long
term effect o f the atrocities committed to the Native Americans. According to his analysis
based on the sources provided by Sharon O ’Brien and David Stannard, given
compensations from the U.S. Government (from 1934 up to present time) to American
Indians still didn’t open enough opportunities for them to successfully integrate with
American society.167 Sterba writes:

Currently, the poverty rate on American Indian reservations in the United
States is almost four times the national average, and on some reservations,
such as Pine Ridge in South Dakota and Tohomo O ’Odham in Arizona
(where more than 60 percent o f homes are without adequate plumbing,
compared with 2 percent for the nation at large), the poverty rate is nearly
five times the national average. As late as 1969, the average life
expectancy for an Indian was forty-four years, compared to sixty-five for a
non-Indian. The suicide rate among young Indians aged fifteen to twentyfour years is also around 200 percent above the national average for the
same age group, and the rate for alcohol-caused mortality is more than 900
percent higher than the national average. The destitution and ill health
that prevails on many reservations today is similar to conditions in the
third world. American Indians today suffer not only from alienation by
from extreme social and economic injustice as well. James Sterba, Three
Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism,
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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The bynarism and asymmetry are only two aspects o f the semiosphere through
which is ensured for one culture its domination to maintain its identity. Bynarim can be
defined as the necessary understanding o f one semiosphere as unique semiotic structure
through an idea o f what is ours and familiar in opposition to what is theirs and distant.
The asymmetry means the creation o f the semiotic space through the language o f culture
that reflects its boundaries on the time and space levels. If two different cultures, or
more, are involved in the interaction and are substantially different in their practices,
beliefs, and socio-economic structures, the side that is stronger in use o f technology,
mobile ability, and social dynamism will probably establish the domination over others.
Besides the bynarism and asymmetry as two important mechanisms o f connecting culture
and space in the semiosphere, Lotman finds amazing the importance o f the geographical
symbolism— establishing the connection between the symbolic, utopian, or spiritual
places with the real geographical sites.
For instance, to Native Americans who are greatly associated with their natural
surroundings every mountain, river, lake, or any landscape significance represents the
sacred space. Through these sacred spaces people are in connection with the great spirits
and powers. The “codes” (meaning) of the powers is preserved in myths, which purpose
is to re-in-act the sacred time o f creation with the present time. The spirits are great
symbols o f formidable powers relevant for nature and the humankind; they exist to
explain this curious connection. The purpose o f myths preserved in oral traditions, as
Lotman stresses, is to transform the world o f “anomalies and surprises” to “norm and
orderliness.” 168
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According to Lotman, myths always function in circling life insisting on points of
radical natural changes and expressing the sense o f the cyclical time. The symbolic
expression o f the cyclical time can bi found in the stories that explain the existence of
days and nights, deaths and births, natural exchange o f the seasons. Myths ensure “the
continuity o f the flow o f cyclical processes in nature itself.” The characteristics o f the
mythical stories maintained in the oral tradition are usually told from any point. Myths
are texts without the certain beginning and end. Myths are structured through sequences
in which the hero enters in the closed space and exit from it, and this pattern can be
“endlessly multiplied.” In all traditional and basic societies myths also give the
significance to the surroundings.
Lotman thinks that for each culture develops a certain “symbolic spaces or
cultural geography,” by giving to specific spaces access to the sacred or supernatural.
Describing the spaces in the medieval times, Lotman points known symbolic spaces such
as paradise, hell, or purgatory are derived from the Christian distinction between the
earthly and heavenly realms. Hell and paradise are just two main comer stones o f the
medieval geography. It was a common thing for the medieval mind to divide countries on
pagan and Christian, while pagan were perceived as sinful and earthly. Now, this
distinction is interesting because the earthly, pagan, and sinful is unified in opposition to
Christian, heavenly, and moral. Association o f the geographical space with the moral
significance was the base o f the medieval geography that functioned in support to
Christian ideology. In support to his topic o f the geographical moral spaces in the Middle
Ages, Lotman has analyzed interesting theological discussions in Russia in which was
argued that Garden o f Eden really exists in a true geographical sense and is placed in East
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o f India. To a true geographical place was added the association with the mild climate,
abundance o f fresh waters, and everlasting spring. The theological discussion and
presentations can be found not only in the Orthodox Christianity o f Russia, but also these
concepts were discussed in the West, o f which the most known is the obsession with the
distant country o f Prester John, several time described as the real geographical place
close to the Garden o f Eden where one can find along with the normal animal world the
mythical creatures. In opposition to the places close to Eden, the hell was usually
presented as a place that involves fire and ice and unpleasant surrounding for living.169
In the Renaissance time the idealistic and utopist geography became a common
reference for free thinkers who dreamed about the radical and true reforms o f the
medieval feudal society. Lotman points, we can see a continuous inspiration with the
intellectually created ideal political spaces such as a city, state, or more just, socially
engineered, reality, as we can find in T. Campanello’s City o f Sun, C. Stiblin’s Island o f
the Land o f the Blessed, F. Bacon’s New Atlantis, or T. M oore’s Utopia.™
All o f these non-existent, but symbolically important places o f which some of
them are associated even with the real geographical places by which they became
culturally significant, Lotman says, are semiotic meta-structures. These meta-structures
are created as the fusion between the experiential world that is realized through the
knowledge derived from categorized objects and imagination that has a significance o f
the collective unconsciousness. The significance o f religion and art is to “replicate
reality” and to transform “the world o f objects into the world o f signs.”
One o f the best examples, which can be used to describe how the semiosphere can
be recreated is found in Daniel Defoe’s novel Robinson Crusoe. Defoe is concentrated on
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the main character’s ability to re-create his lost world by isolating objects and projecting
them into a general modeling system. The story o f Robinson Crusoe can be interpreted in
a way that the main character recreates from the memories, artifacts, and personal
tenacity his lost semiosphere.
Here is a hint how this works in Defoe’s adventure novel. After the second
shipwreck, Robinson finds him self in a position similar to biblical Noah— the lost island
appears to him as the new world and the things that have survived the shipwreck on his
destroyed ship are substantial for starting and rebuilding a new life. But one slight
difference between Noah and Robinson is present from the beginning. To Noah, the new
world emerged as the result o f the new hope and new covenant, which God had given to
the humankind. Noah was aware from the beginning that he was chosen by God, and that
he was the one who represented the rope between the humanity and God, beginning the
new world from scratch from the old one. He knew that he was going to strengthen the
covenant between the God and the humanity. The new land has a meaning from the
beginning o f the story.
The purposive actions and faith in providence are not the main characteristics of
Robinson’s character. At first, to Robinson, a new world appears as the result o f the
meaningless adventure. The island appears as the new reality that is created by
misfortune and absurd. Robinson faces the place that is not even marked in the
geographical map, so it is a symbol o f no-place or being nowhere. This little island is the
place of a geographical insignificance and mistake and to Robinson it appears to be a
place of misfortune and contingency. This insignificant place becomes now a place o f a
great existential challenge, because Robinson is eager to struggle for life and feels every

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

day greater and greater reverence to God, because he is the only survivor o f the
shipwreck. As the place is becoming more and more familiar and livable, it is becoming
more and more morally significant to Robinson. Finally, it becomes the place o f the test
of true Robinson’s faith and humanity.
How did Defoe transform the island from the symbol o f absurd to the symbol of
faith and God’s providence? Robinson’s faith in which he was brought up is not only a
simple Christian faith based on piety, obedience to the Bible, reverence in worship and
love of God. It is a faith that reflects the social hierarchy, excludes any radical challenges,
change of place and status, and settles within the person when one achieves the happiness
of the middle bourgeois class. At the beginning, the father proposes to him “nice and
calm life” possible to achieve in the middle class British society. Father opposes to
Robinson’s wish to become a sailor telling him that “the calamities o f life were shared
among the upper and lower part o f mankind, but that the middle station had the fewest
disasters, and was not exposed to so many vicissitudes as the higher or lower part of
mankind” and that “the middle station o f life was calculated for all kinds o f virtues and
all kinds o f enjoyments where peace and plenty were the handmaids o f a middle
fortune.” 171 It is a faith that supportsl8th century British structured bourgeois society in
which the position on the social scale denotes the worth o f a person in the ethical or
moral sense, whether the person’s autonomous norms are morally significant or not.
Robinson’s story begins with the escape from this ordered hierarchical society
that is empty in its content. It is better to have a pure adventure and insecurity of
contingency than to live predestined life that is socially engineered by the family, church,
schools, and social status. Immediately after escaping, Robinson faces the wilderness of
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adventure on the lost island. Similar to Noah, the remains of the boat maintain enough
artifacts for Robinson that he can begin reconstructing the lost life. First, Robinson gives
the objective significance to every new day by continuing the calendar, than he gives
some deeper meaning to his misfortune deciding that God’s will in the form o f a
providence acted upon him, so he was saved. He finally turns his long search into the
play between being homo faber— changing the world o f natural objects into the
humanized world, and homo religiosus, writing every day a journal o f what was done,
giving to the world he created, a general order, perspective, and seeking for a higher
meaning by reading the Bible and being religiously dedicated to God. At one point
Robinson is happy because he interprets his two built shelters as a home and a vacation
house -so in an ironical sense, the ideal o f the British high bourgeois class to have two
homes is now realized in a new form, and although there is no other being who can
acknowledge this progress, Robinson feels as he returns back home.
Robinson is able to recover his lost meaning by slowly recovering his former
world and transforming it into the new world. There is no doubt that his true faith
emerges from fear and loneliness, but it makes him work every day to overcome a deep
existential crisis and results in the happiness o f reproducing the artifacts and changing
the island into the humanized place. Everything is a challenge on the island. At one point,
Robinson sees the native cannibals, which he at first plans to kill them, but than he thinks
that this act would not be righteous, because they didn’t harm him. At one occasion, he is
able to free the prisoner from the cannibal tribesmen, and he names the native man
Friday, who converts to Christianity, becoming his long life companion. Modeling
another person, he feels satisfied, and fulfilled in the mission to “civilize” Friday. His
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former culture is fully re-created now, and the semiosphere is finally reconstructed when
Robinson is able to transfer the meaning and the system o f existence from his former life
into the new one. Robinson marks the geography o f the island giving the significance to
every place he relates to. The message o f the story is, o f course, that the adventure
denotes discovery o f the self and underlying meaning o f the life. Reconstructing the
meaning o f life means the growth o f the self and circling in one point everything that one
knows. The center o f the self is open when mirroring the whole semiosphere.
Lotman’s main idea is that the cultural semiotic systems emerge from the
collective memory, going back to the roots from which one understands it-self. Culture is
the pre-structured modeling system which exists along within the person. It is also the
encoded system that grows along within the person’s organism, which can be understood
only through the interplay between the language and memory. Lotman summarizes how
he understands the collective memory in the following way:

The individual human intellect does not have a monopoly in the work of
thinking. Semiotic systems, both separately and together as the integrated
unity o f the semiosphere, both synchronically and in all the depths of
historical memory, carry out intellectual operations, preserve, and work to
increase the store o f information. Thought is within us, but we are within
thought just as language is something engendered by our minds and
directly dependent on the mechanisms o f the brain, and we are with
language. (Juri Lotman, Semiosfera, St. Petersburg: Iskusstvo, 2000, p.
273.)
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Lotman understands the semiosphere as the semiotic space that is necessary for
the existence o f language, but also a generator o f information. Every language has to
secure its space, thinks Lotman, so the boundary (rpamma) o f the semiotic space
provides the communication potential and possibility o f building a new information
system, which changes with the generation and generational challenges.172 The most
interesting part of Lotman’s semiotics is the explanation o f cultural dynamics, which
shows that the culture is at the same time very propulsive, taking other influences into the
system, but also very stiffly, trying to preserve the cultural code as the multifaceted
continuum. Culture is heterogenetic in its attempt to preserve its boundaries in which the
code is translatable into the surrounding space, but is also asymmetric.
This asymmetry comes from internal structure where sometimes the center
redefines the periphery or reverse, but also it comes from diversity o f metalinguistic
structures coming into the contact with diverse semiotic spaces. Also, the semiotic
boundaries creates the individuation o f one semiotic space, through which is defined the
essence o f the semiotic process, which includes the binarity o f the culture as the
distinction between the internal semiotic vs. external space.173
This doctoral thesis takes Lotman’s concept o f the semiosphere as a very
important for the comparative study o f religion. The concept o f the semiospehre is
definitely applicable on the diverse diachronic processes in the mainstream religions. The
religious syncretism, appearance o f new Gods and Goddesses within the mainstream
religion, new religious movements that try to expand through the audience interest for
new spiritual ideas that are reconstructed from the past such as the Wicca movement, the
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blending o f the native traditions with the mainstream religions, which one can see in the
tantric Vajrayana Buddhism.
The semiosphere describes the cultural space as the changing organism that
functions so comprehensively in a cognitive, political, and aesthetical sense that is similar
to the little brain. The connection between language and meta-language, between the
cultural code and external spaces that might even appear within the culture are of
amazing importance to understand diachronical and synchronic or continuous and
discontinuous processes in religion. The most interesting examples in presenting the
comprehensiveness of the semiosphere one could find in the work o f writer and
semiotician Umberto Eco. His novels The Faucault's Pendulum and Baudolino open for
a reader the maze o f semiotic spaces directly connected with religious consciousness, and
religious meta-semiotic spaces that are derived in Eco’s novels from the real religious
history and aspect o f the religious existent practices.

4b) On the Edge of the Paranoid Semiosphere: Religious Syncretism in Faucault’s
Pendulum
The main topic o f Eco’s mystery story Foucault’s Pendulum is a religious
syncretism, which is displayed throughout the form and content o f this post-modern
structured novel. Perhaps, the idea that someone uses an actual literary work for the
explication o f religious syncretism instead of a concrete ethnographic or anthropological
case study seems, at first, too interpretative and theoretically loose. The eminence and
quality o f the post-modern novel shows the complex structure in which the genre’s
fictional plot is melded with the author’s theories and the critical analysis o f diverse
social and cultural phenomena, which in this case is the religious syncretism o f Western
mystical traditions.
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Eco, as a recognized scholar in semiotics and communication, critic, and writer,
incorporates his main philosophical, semiotic, and post-modern theories o f traditional and
modem Western mystical syncretism into the structure o f his novel Faucault’s Pendulum.
Consequently, elements o f Eco’s novel can be isolated, reconstructed, and explained as a
specific theory o f modern culture, mystical symbolism, and religious syncretism.
Mystical syncretism can be interpreted through the three hegemonic structural elements:
a rhizomatic makeup as the encoded connections o f symbols between different religious
traditions; the diffusive framework as elitistically dispersive societies based on secret
knowledge and “underground” social connections; and a symbiotic condition as the
exclusion o f the dominant religious tradition and a fixing o f the “hybrid” quazy-religious
position in the society.

4c) Crossing the Semiotic Boundaries: Connecting Science, Religion, and Culture
In one o f the best literary analysis o f Eco’s Foucault’s Pendulum, P. Bondanella
uses the term “paranoid interpretation” as the best expression for the complex plot of this
novel. Namely, the whole plot is built around one publishing house, which tries to sale
the most profitable books on the Italian market. According to the publishing houses’
owner (Guaramond), the best selling books would be those that deal with the mystical
side of history such as the history o f the Templars, Teutonics, alchemy, or anything
mysterious, but which are enough scientific so that it can catch the reader’s attention. As
Eco presents, the modem reader doesn’t want science fiction any more, but rather
fictional science. In the late 70s and early 80s o f the twentieth century these types of
writing overwhelmed publishing houses— books such as the history o f the Pyramids and
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their mystical and religious connotations, the new Gothic movements, the Templars, the
Holy Grail, Picknett and Prince, etc.
As the beginning o f each chapter, Eco uses quotations from various popular books
that can be interpreted as being on the edge o f pseudo-history and are related to
interpretation o f mystical traditions. Some o f the books that Eco mentions in the novel
are: M. Barber, The Trial o f the Templars (London, 1978), M. Baigent & R. Leigh, The
Temple and the Lodge, Max Heindel, The Rosicrucian Cosmo-Conception or Mystic
Christianity (London, 1973), Dion Fortune, The Mystical Quahalah (London, 1957). It
seems that Eco’s inspiration for his novel came from these popular-pseudo-historical
books, but none can compare with the content o f the disputable book written by Michele
Baigent, Richrad Leigh, and Henry Lincoln Holy Blood, Holy Grail (London, 1981),
which probably induced Eco to write this novel.
At first sight, the plot o f Eco’s novel in many details corresponds with the factual
work of the three authors o f the book Holy Blood, Holy Grail, where the factual historical
data are put into a new contextualization process forming a new semiotic space for
interpretation. Eco’s book, begins as a mystery story. The main characters o f the story,
Casaubon, Diotallevi, and Belbo presuppose that an old text given by Ardente represents
a “coded” message relevant for deciphering the “secret” history o f the Templars.
Casaubon searches with his two friends on how to decode the message, which in their
opinion represents the code o f the secret communication between diverse Templars’
groups around Europe.
In their progressive decoding job they begin to connect the text with mystical
stories o f the Holy Grail. The context of the message becomes larger and larger, and even

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170

connects with secret societies such as the Rosicrucians and the Masons. Finally, they
think that the coded message is the key for the interpretation o f the “secret knowledge” of
the Templars, but this message is so complexly encoded that it can be interpreted as the
“mystical science.”
Here, the artifact, Faucault’s pendulum, becomes a crucial point. Casaubon finds
that the Templars invented an earlier machine similar to the later Faucault’s pendulum
(17th century)—the machine which proves the rotation o f the Earth. He tries to answer
some questions: why is Foucault’s pendulum so important for the Templars’ tradition and
why are the “Diabolics” so interested to know the secret behind the pendulum? Casaubon
finds that the earlier type o f Faucault’s pendulum probably corresponds with the ancient
map of the Earth that was used by the Templars. They used the pendulum and the map to
provide the means for the “secret” communication between the forbidden Templars’
organizations spread out throughout Europe and the Middle East. He thinks, if someone
would be lucky to find the old map, probably he/she would be able to know the details of
the lost and secret Templars’ history. As he presupposed, the Templars had an annual
meeting every year at a specific place. They used the map and the pendulum on a specific
day each year (at the solstice on June 24th, Saint John’s day) to determine which place
would be the next gathering o f their annual meeting. At the end o f the mystery story,
Casaubon is convinced that the map is forever lost, and that he hasn’t got any definite
solution for the whole problem. Ironically, Casabuon’s wife discovers that the piece of
paper with the enigmatic text is nothing more than a “shopping list” o f a trader o f fabrics
from a small French town.
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Eco’s Foucault’s Pendulum represents the novel that represents the semiosis
process o f the personal mystical experience in conjunction with “secret knowledge” and
science. These quotations from the book show how Eco presents this unification of
mysticism and science:
I knew— but anyone could have sensed in the magic o f that serene breathing—
that the period was governed by the square root o f the length o f the wire and by n,
that number which, however irrational to sub lunar minds, through a higher
rationality binds the circumference and diameter o f all possible circles. The time
it took the sphere to swing from end to end was determined by an arcane
conspiracy between the most timeless o f measures: the singularity of the point of
suspension, the duality o f the plane’s dimensions, the triadic beginning o f n, the
secret quadratic nature o f the root, and the unnumbered perfection o f the circle
itself. (...) What would its rotation have been had it hung instead from the dome
o f Solomon’s Temple? Perhaps the Knights had tried it there, too. Perhaps the
solution the final meaning would have been no different. Perhaps the abbey
church o f Saint-Martin-des-Champs was the true Temple. (...) I knew the earth
was rotating, and I with it, and Saint-Martin-des-Champs and all Paris with me,
and that together we were rotating beneath the Pendulum, whose own plane never
changed direction, because up there, along the infinite extrapolation o f its wire
beyond the choir ceiling, up toward the most distant galaxies, lay the Only Fixed
Point in the universe, eternally unmoving. U. Eco, Faucault’s Pendulum, 1989,
pp. 3, 4, 5.
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The point that Eco makes with Foucault’s Pendulum is that in the present
“globalized world,” everything is connected with everything, and the synoptic whole is so
complex that it simulates the “mystical whole” known from Kabalistic Gnosticism or
medieval Neo-Platonism.
However, people today do not live in the peaceful practice o f meditation which is
connected with the religious experience; they want to materialize their ideas as much as
they can. That is exactly Eco’s point: religious mysticism no longer serves the purposes
of either making human knowledge broader about one religious tradition or to open the
human mind for the psychological transformation o f consciousness into the experience of
the mystical union, but it does the opposite.
One can interpret Eco’s novel as the critique o f today mysticism, which wants to
become the hidden governor o f the real human historical practice and to be an active tool
for further social stratification o f society. Because o f that, modern mysticism needs new
ways of interpretation that bind with the so-called “scientific” worldview, rather than
with only the theological one. It seems that Eco recognized the problem o f modern
“enigmatic syncretism” which in the circumstances o f dispersive modem culture cannot
exist without the connection between religion, science, and culture, where the semiosis
crosses its boundaries and creates the meta-semiotic spaces.
When scholars publish a book about the Rosicrucians, for whose existence no one
is really sure about, they tend to explain their esoteric Christianity (M. Heindel, The
Rosicrucian Cosmo-Conception, London, 1973), as the long lasting intellectual journey
into the theosophical spheres. M. Heindel writes that the receiver must take courses in
Greek philosophy, world religions, Middle Age’s Ars Combinatoria, Jewish mysticism of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173

the Cabbala, alchemy, and astrology to understand truly the new spiritual call. Also, to
become a Rosicrucian the prospective member must be chosen by the Rosicrucians.
Sometimes a person is not even aware o f the membership while passing the time required
for the initiation process. Usually, members are chosen by their superior education,
devotion to esoteric studies and sciences. Also, sometimes religious piety can play an
important role, but it is not a necessary requirement.
In Eco’s novel, the character o f young Casaubon, who wrote a thesis on the
Templars and is deeply involved in the study o f the Middle Age illuminations,
symbolism, aesthetics, and history, is created as the character who represents the person
to became an initiate for the membership in one o f the “Diabolic” associations. Casaubon
seems suspicious that he became a candidate and he doesn’t want to become a part of a
secret society, but he is not sure anymore if he is already “in” the group or “out” o f the
group. In chapter 118 Eco presents Casaubon when he retrospectively thinks about his
connection with the “Diabolics”:
A plot, if there is to be one, must be a secret. A secret that, if we only
knew it, would dispel our frustration, lead us to salvation; or else the
knowing o f it in itself would be salvation. Does such a luminous secret
exist? Yes, provided it is never known. Known, it will only disappoint us.
(...) But everything is not a bigger secret. There are no “bigger secrets,”
because the moment a secret is reveled, it seems little. There is only an
empty secret. A secret that keeps slipping through your fingers. (...)
Initiation is learning never to stop. The universe is peeled like an onion,
and an onion is all peel. Let us imagine an infinite onion, which has its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174

center everywhere and its circumference nowhere. Initiation travels an
endless Mobious strip. (U. Eco, Faucault’s Pendulum, 1989, p. 514.)
Although, he knows that he should stop the investigation o f the mysterious
connections between the pro-scientific artifact Faucault’s pendulum, the map, and the
encoded text, he goes deeper and deeper into the mystery, which makes him more and
more “in” the group of the “Diabolocics” than “out.”

4d)Rhizomatic Labyrinth of Knowledge
At the beginning o f the closing chapter o f Foucault‘s Pendulum, Eco uses a
quotation from the modem philosopher o f science K. R. Popper: “The conspiracy theory
of society (. . .) comes from abandoning God and then asking: Who is in his place?”174
Popper’s quotation summarizes in the best way, the central questions o f Foucalt’s
Pendulum: What if the idea o f God and the religious type of social control are secularized
in the way that is substituted by diverse secret societies, which initiate and control all
contemporary historical events? Are we all a part o f the syncretic whole in which our
existences are manipulated by the higher political power or the whole o f the modem
culture which can be interpreted only through the unique parts that can be scientifically
explained, but they are basically autonomous and disconnected? If we claim that modem
Western culture is globalized through economical, political, and technological socially
rationalized forms, where are the borders o f that rationalized system? Is the organized
“underground” really exist? Or, are we living in the nicely organized chaos in which
things do coincidentally happen?
At first sight, it seems strange that Eco, known for introducing the open forms of
modern literature and interpretation, would reduce his understanding o f modern
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mysticism as to the simple mode o f social control. But, looking back at his theoretical
works, it is interesting that he has represented medieval Western mysticism as the vivid
cultural struggle between the “open” interpretation o f the Scripture and the “closed”
interpretation. In his book Semiotics and Philosophy o f Language, Bloomington, 1984,
Eco opposes the allegory (a “nonsecular” symbol) to the open symbol as a “nebula”
(making it possible for many interpretations). He still thinks that mystical interpretations
are controlled by the higher authority o f religious institutions, cannons, and dogmas:
In the mystical experience, symbol must be tamed exactly because they are
exaggeratedly “open”— and their force must be controlled. (...) the mystic is the
“detonator” o f the symbol, but immediately afterward a public “elaborator” who
establishes certain collective and understandable meanings o f the original
expression. U. Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy o f Language, (Indiana:
University Press, 1984), p. 75.
As Eco presents, the position o f modem intellectuals in which they either
scientifically and historically reconstruct (a positive theoretical formation), or esthetically
deconstruct (a probable critical analysis) the religious mystical traditions or their
syncretic forms invented by the mixing of different culturally postulated beliefs and
rituals— is almost unbearable. In the post-modem context, the modern globalized culture
represents the “rhizomatic” web o f connections between the whole human history and the
present time in which “everything is connected with everything else.” For this reason, the
position o f the modern intellectual resembles the position of mystics throughout history.
For modem intellectuals the universe does not represent only the real physical
object of knowledge necessarily explained rationally through theological, philosophical,
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or natural scientific theories, but it represents the object as a contextual interpretative
encoded message and symbol.
Modem knowledge is basically encyclopedic— each object o f knowledge refers to
the labyrinth o f different contextual meanings. Water can be equally understood as a
metaphysical object which initiates the question— what is really water?— and can it be
explained by the H 2 0 chemical compounds definition; or can water be understood as an
archetypal symbol o f unconsciousness in the Jungian theory, etc.
As Eco states in his works o f the 80s, our knowledge functions through three
different types o f methodological mechanisms, which he compares with three different
types o f labyrinths. The first one is the classical labyrinth—the “Minotaur” (as the
symbol o f the center o f knowledge) and the “Ariadne’s thread” (as the symbol o f linear
methodology). The classical labyrinth represents the vertical, hierarchical, and
taxonomical model o f the arborescence knowledge and can be compared with the
“Porphyries tree.”
The second type o f knowledge is probable, founded on experimental
methodology. Eco compares this knowledge with the maze and meander types of
labyrinths— knowledge achieved by trials and errors. Intuitive abduction (intuition
accompanied with deductive reasoning) is an important logical characteristic o f that
methodological mechanism.
The third type o f knowledge is encyclopedic, and it corresponds with the
vegetable metaphor o f the rhizome explained by post-modern structuralists Deluze and
Guattari (1976). For Eco, rhizome can be presented as the modem labyrinth or “inter-net”
type of knowledge which maps and computes everything that comes into account.
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A rhizome is a tangle o f bulbs and tubers appearing like “rats squirming one on
top o f the other.” The characteristics o f a rhizomatic structure are the following:
(a) Every point o f the rhizome can and must be connected with every other point.
(b) There are no points or positions in a rhizome; there are only lines (intersecting
lines make points), (c) A rhizome can be broken off at any point and reconnected
following one o f its own outside with which it makes another rhizome; therefore,
a rhizomatic whole has neither outside nor inside, (f) A rhizome is not a claque
but an open chart which can be connected with something else in all o f its
dimensions; it is it is dismountable, reversible, and susceptible to continual
modifications, (g) A network o f trees which open in every direction can create a
rhizome (which seems to us equivalent to saying that a network o f partial trees
can be cut out artificially in every rhizome), (h) No one can provide a global
description o f the whole rhizome; not only because the rhizome is multi
dimensionally complicated, but also because its structure changes through the
time, moreover, in a structure in which every node can be connected with every
other node, there is also the possibility o f contradictory inferences. U. Eco,
Semiotics and Philosophy o f Language, (Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 8182.
The rizomatic knowledge develops the post-modern condition for all people that
find themselves caught in the web o f global inter-connections. Rhizomatic knowledge
tends to be by itself syncretic and eclectic. Deleuze and Guattary, for instance, define a
“rhizomatic structure” as a connection o f concepts in which some concepts can contradict
others, but still can function as the relevant parts in the “endless” whole. Though, every
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object of knowledge in the context o f the rhizomatic web connections must become a
symbol— something that represents (or stands for) something else. Units o f rhizome are
not only things as such, but rather contextual signs in which is imprinted the concept that
can become relevant only and only if the interpretation o f it is chosen by the subject of
cognition, or its participant.
For example, in D. Hick’s book Ritual and B elief /Reading in the Anthropology o f
Religion (McGraw Hill, 2000), in the chapter about death the case o f the “Voodoo” death
is discussed (article written by W. Cannon) and the main question is: Can we accept that
a death was really caused by a Voodoo spell? Can we scientifically prove it? The author
of the text describes the circumstances o f the person before death: the person is totally
isolated from the community, the person feels the absolute existential insecurity, because
the world around is seen through the spell and everything that one sees in that state is
interpreted as something else. Furthermore, even when other people around
communicate, each expression, sentence, or sign is interpreted as the connection with the
original spell. In these circumstances the person is under terrible stress an enormous
amount of time, and the rise of adrenaline is so high that it can produce death. Now, is the
Voodoo death possible or not? How can we interpret this case?
In Eco’s rhizomatic, combinatory, and alternative knowledge the Voodoo death
is, of course, possible. It is possible, not because someone really believes that the cause
of the death is a spell, rather one can explain it through the combination o f several
different framed concepts: the real functioning o f the Voodoo religion; an impact of the
spell in their religion; scientific interpretation o f the fear, and the final impact o f the fear
on the person’s organism.
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The position o f the modem intellectual is basically aesthetic— the object of
knowledge can be only interpreted through the contextual labyrinth o f the already
established set o f theories and concepts.
In the modem aesthetic experience, the possible contents are
suggested by the co-text and by the intertextual tradition: the
interpreter knows that he is not discovering an external truth but
that, rather, he makes the encyclopedia work at its best. Modem
poetic symbolism is a secularized symbolism where languages
speak about their possibilities. (U. Eco, Semiotics and the
Philosophy o f Language, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1984, p. 163.)
If the object o f our research is a mystical tradition, then it represents not only the
historical event with its specific cultural context which can be described with a set of
chosen scientific methods, but it also requires interpretation.

4e) Rhizomatic Syncretism
It is presented for example that the Rosicrucians equally believed in the Christian
Trinity, explained through the alchemical transformation o f metals and the Kabalistic
understanding of the seven spirits and the unveiled spheres before the throne, and in re
incarnation, which is actually the mystical path o f the Holy Spirit.175
O f course, according to Christian dogma, the Trinity should, at least, exclude
belief in reincarnation. To understand the Holy Trinity according to Rosicrusians, one
should know very well Neo-Platonism, mystical Kabalistic Gnosticism, the theory of
reincarnation in theology o f Buddhism, alchemy, astronomy, etc.
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The Rosicrucians also developed diverse forms o f pantheism, which can be
explained through the Kabalistic understanding o f “Adam Kadmon” and the
interpretation o f the Sefirot, which is another, later paradigm o f Jewish mysticism o f the
Gnostic Kabbala.
Historically, the pantheism assigned to supposable existent Rosicrucians was
culminated in the 15th and 16th centuries. Many authors who researched more closely the
Rosicrucians claimed that, for instance, F. Bacon and B. Spinoza belonged to their
circles. F. Bacon was known in philosophy as one o f the first thinkers who invented the
methodology o f modem sciences and posited its autonomous status. He interpreted nature
within natural laws as an encoded “blueprint” o f God’s will, while he thought that the
authority o f Scripture is only the symbol for the “real” creation. Spinoza made a
pantheistic concept o f nature— Deus sive naturae— in which creation is a continuous
process (natura naturans as a creative nature) unlike created nature, which is fixed in a
meaning as being separated from the reason and appears as the object.
The point for using these two philosophers’ concepts is to present how
comprehensive the structure o f the Rosicrucian belief system is desirable to be, and is the
probably result o f the vivid imagination o f the various writers. A person who would
follow this comprehensive spiritual quest could spend an entire lifetime wondering how
to connect all the possible sources o f the eclectic whole that the Rosicmcians presume as
the frame o f references for their belief. It seems that a Rosicrucian may never achieve the
whole picture o f his/her own religion.
In the sense o f the synchronic analysis, Rosicrucians blended several different
religious traditions. Namely, throughout time (centuries o f the Middle Ages) they came
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into contact with the contents o f many religions, and they absorbed and melded their
theological concepts. Throughout time, these concepts were left open for the influences
of modem science too. For example, they incorporate the evolutionary ideas into their
religious concepts, although they presume that inorganic matter is animate and that God
can be found in all things. Diachronic analysis can show that they didn’t blend
theological concepts, but they bred the representative symbolic units o f diverse religions
and their own, and incorporated them into their teachings.
In order to preserve their own religious teaching, which is the compilation o f all
possible ideas that can create their diffusive universe; they needed to encode their
spiritual identity. The encoding process can be explained as the formation o f the
hierarchy and linearity o f their secretive practices among them. Obviously, what had
happened through time, the Rosicrucians developed diverse types o f interpretation of
their mystical religiosity such as the theosophy developed by R. Steiner. Actually, every
person has to interpret differently that mystical religiosity, but everybody refers to the
same set o f symbols. The problem, now, is that for the Rosicrucians exists the infinite
numbers of symbols, which one can refer to, so the net or the web o f symbols is more
important than any kind o f canon. The system o f connections is more important than the
fixed set o f symbols, which would be necessary for the common religious community. In
that sense, the biggest problem o f their social organizing is that no one can be secure that
he is already in the group if he/she matches one o f their symbolical concepts from the
open system o f connections.
It was all this and more. And had I had the sixth sense o f the Masters of
the World, now that I stood within its bundle o f vocal cords encrusted with
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rivet polyps, I would have heard the Tower hoarsely whisper the music of
the spheres as it sucked waves from the heart o f our hollow planed and
transmitted them to all the menhirs o f the world. Rhizome o f junctures,
cervical arthrosis, prosthesis o f prostheses. The horror o f it! To dash my
brains out, from where I was, they would have to launch me toward the
peak. U. Eco, Foucalt’s Pendulum, p. 503.
The rhizomatic makeup is only one aspect o f modem mystical syncretism and it
answers questions as to why and how different beliefs that traditionally exclude each
other are interconnected. The next interesting question is why and how this rhizomatic
makeup became a part o f Western culture and its cultural heritage?

4f) The Diffusive, Elitistic. and Symbiotic Framework of Western Syncretism
A good example for the explanation o f syncretic framework o f the mystical
traditions in Western society can be seen in the historical plot o f the Knights o f Templar.
They were formed as a “secular” and “monastic” order at the same time. It is very
difficult to historically reconstmct the ways o f their inner organization, because they
were a combination o f laymen and educated monks. This order was established to
protect the territories that were conquered during the First Crusade (1095-1099), and the
main task was to protect the Christian pilgrims from Muslim attacks.
Their dual identity formation warriors and a religious community became a
problem for the official church authorities. Furthermore, the persecution o f the Templar
began with the accusations that they did not believe in Jesus and that they were involved
in many obscene cult practices, including the worship o f Baphomet. In France (1307) the
Templars were arrested and put on trail. The “holy warriors” overnight turned into
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criminals. This dramatic trial in France culminated with Squint de Florian, who had been
condemned to death, but begging for his life by promising to reveal to the king o f France
the secret in exchange for his life. He confessed that the Templars denied Jesus Christ
and spit thrice on the Cross when they were received into the order. Very soon, Jacques
de Molay, the leader o f the order o f that time, was arrested as well as other Templars,
knights o f France. The knights had an opportunity either to confess their sins, or they
were tortured and burned at the stake. One hundred and forty members o f the Templars
gave their confessions, but all documents with the initiation rites disappeared and they
were never found. Later, there were many assumptions, speculations, but also relevant
historical facts that supported the thesis that the Templars continued their order in secret
formations, even though they, as refuges, were spread across a wide area and had joined
diverse monasteries o f different monastic orders.
After that Clement V definitely dismissed the order; all Templars were officially
transmitted to the Hospitallers, and later they became a part o f the Teutonic order in
Germany.
The situation with the Templars is very interesting for the micro-study o f religious
syncretism. The Templars invented a specific type o f their inner order which functioned
independently. Through the time o f their independent functioning they became exposed
to other religious influences, primarily Jewish, Muslim, and other religious movements in
the Middle East.
The Templars, developed their own rhizomatic symbolism that became
incompatible in some parts with the official dogmas. They also developed their own
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symbolic emblem, which was denied and forbidden by the church authorities. As M.
Magre states in analyzing deeply the Templar’s persecutions and their later destiny:
In reality, Baphomet was a symbol o f Gnostic origin, intended to embody
the doctrine o f the Temple and to recall its aim. It was neither the figure of
Jupiter nor that o f Mohammed

that was worshipped in it; it was power

that was worshipped, power directed by

intelligence, which was the

ideal o f the Temple and which was always represented in ancient
symbolism by a bearded man wearing a crown. This bearded man is found
on the seals and medallions belonging to the Templars. It was for them
what the rose in the middle o f the cross was for the Rosicrucians, the
symbol o f the sublime ideal to with they had

dedicated their lives. M.

Magre, 1932, p. 95.
The church authorities excluded the Templars from any further participation in
social life, but more than this, they rejected the Templars’ sacred symbol which they
presented as the incarnation o f evil and heresy. This case can be interpreted in the
following way: in one moment a very important social and religious group was oppressed
which resulted in their denial, and definite exclusion. If the Templars was only a secular
organization, they probably would not have been able to survive, but the value o f their
religious status before the persecutions helped to continue their order. The result o f the
oppression partially excluded the Templars from the community and made them
transform their order in a diffusive way throughout society. The content o f their beliefs
became richer and the web o f symbols continued to grow within the new ways o f secret
practice. The diffusion framework was totally fulfilled: from the Templars’ pouring out
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from the society to be dispersed to the periphery o f society and then finally to return and
infiltrate all spheres o f society, but in another form, namely, as secret organizations.
In Eco’s novel he exemplifies this diffusive framework o f syncretism through the
character Casaubon. At the beginning o f the story Casaubon is a student o f history who is
writing a thesis on the Templars. Very soon he becomes an employee in the publishing
house and he then is accepted by the public as an expert o f the rhizomatic symbolic
structure connected with the Middle Ages and the Templars, a structure comprises of
such disciplines as alchemy, astronomy, Middle Ages Ars Combinatorica, etc. His
involvement with the mystery o f colonel Ardente and his encoded text from the 17th
century causes him to become the main player— the master “crypto” analyst o f the real
and historical mysteries, which bind together the past and the present. Instead o f finding
the history o f one lost tradition, the Templars, he actually found a live tradition that has
already become the tradition o f many others, and the story continues paranoidly on that,
even though he is no longer sure whether he is “in” a secret tradition or “out.”
How is it possible that the Templars developed a whole tradition which survived
for centuries in the periphery o f the public sphere? How did the process of
transformation go on— from the Templars to a variety o f other secret orders? The
symbiotic structure is the best explanation for this. Although, the dominant religion
excluded the Templars from the public sphere, the order continued to live in silent exile
from which they evolved their extremely complex encoded communication within
symbolism, which formed different satellite micro-traditions. Each unit o f that new order
preserved the substantive system o f the common practice, but also invented new forms of
interpretation o f the original movement.
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Therefore it seems that the variety o f secret societies develop a specific encoded
language o f communication which ensures them an elitistic position in modern,
globalized and secular society. This communication developed a specific tradition, which
stands with many aspects o f secret organizing in opposition to modem ways of
communication and modem integrity. As Eco wanted to show, everyone is caught in the
rhizomatic mode where everything is connected with everything else, there is no center
and the circumference is everywhere.

4g) Eco’s Synchronic and Diachronic Perspectivism
Religious syncretism can be defined as the continuous dynamic process of
mixing, exchanging, borrowing and translating different religious symbols and ideas
between two or more religious orthodox traditions in comprehensive political, historical,
and cultural circumstances. The problem is how to define and understand this dynamic
process. If we are going to analyze any syncretic form o f religion, then we need to
research the historical and political circumstances in which the specific case took place.
For instance, if one wants to distinguish the Santeria religion among Caribbean and South
America’s black people, he/she has to know that this religion was developed as the
adapted of Christianity from the African slaves and their priests o f the Yoruba who were
deported from African areas o f present Nigeria and Benin. The political circumstances in
this case can be defined as the oppression o f black slaves produced by the dominant race
(white conquers) in connection with their usage o f Christian dogmatized ideology.
Historical circumstances can be understood as the domination by the advanced
technologically developed Western Civilization over the indigenous tribal communities
who were less technically developed. Also, the process o f cultural and identity
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transformation o f the slaves can be defined as the conversion evolved through power
domination. The Santeria emerged as a result o f the mixing o f the Orixa religion o f the
Yoruba and Catholicism, where became a new religious movement. This process of
syncretism includes that the Orixa believers extracted, compared, and translated the main
spirits o f their religion (Agayu, Babaluaye, Elleggua, Ibeji) into the names o f the saints
from the Catholicism (Agayu as Christopher; Babaluaye as Lazarus; Eleggua as Anthony
o f Padua; Ibeji as Cosumus & Damien, etc.). The historical and political analysis o f the
Santeria represents the synchronic interpretation o f that specific syncretism.
Another approach to the Santeria religion would be a deep micro-analysis of their
identity formation and their “hybrid” existence on the periphery o f Christianity, including
the analysis of the diverse agents o f changes in the larger context o f a new maze-way
reformulation o f their belief system. The explanation o f the “mechanical” religious
mixing (blending, translation and borrowing o f religious symbols, ideas, rituals, and
ideologies) in the political and historical circumstances represents the basic synchronic
approach to syncretism.
In many ways syncretism can be understood as the revitalization movement and
the diachronic “event” in the dominant religious systems. The diachronic analysis o f the
revitalization movements such as syncretism, cargo cults, charismatic movements,
messianic movements, nativity movements was discussed in contemporary behavioral
(post-structural anthropological) science, especially in the works o f Anthony F.C.
Wallace, Julian Steward, Margaret Mead, Mooney James, Peter M. Worsley, and Alice
Beck Kehoe.176 Worsley explains the “diachronic event” as the formation o f diverse
“hybrid” religious movements and practices through their unique structure. Such a
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movement begins with the steady state explained as the chronic stress within the system
and the participant’s individual stress. The stress produces cultural distortion and the
change o f behavioral patterns, and finally eventuates with the revitalization processes
such as maze-way reformulation, communication, and an organizational adaptation o f the
traditional or orthodox religious system. This maze-way reformulation o f the orthodox
religious system builds the rhizomatic makeup o f the new movement. When this makeup
is finally formulated the “diachronic event” is fixed and it achieves the new steady state
as a viable organization.177 According to Worsley, “hybrid” types o f religious
movements consistently deal with several problems: these groups would have several
choices for their identification, they usually mix the secular and religious means, they
have their original ways of practices (nativism), and finally, they either succeed or they
are aborted.
The application o f W orsley’s model on Santeria, works perfectly: it is true that at
the beginning of the Santeria movement their participants were exposed to long stressful
state (slavery), they changed their behavioral patterns and built a rhizomatic makeup of
communication between two orthodox belief systems. Finally, they mixed the secular and
religious means through the way o f their organization o f “ile” and they are considered
today as the original movement, culminating with their “hybrid” religious formation.
It seems that Eco is completely aware o f this synchronic and diachronic
perspectivism o f syncretic religious movements and forms exemplifies in his book. One,
the book’s episodes in the “Hesed” part (chapters 27, 28) took place in Brazil. Casaubon
has an opportunity to participate in several different rituals of the Candomble and the
Orixas. Also, he is involved in a relationship with the beautiful women Amparo, whose

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189

heritage is Orixas, but she changed and replaced the Orixas’ belief with the revolutionary
Marxist ideology, which can be a good example o f the mixing o f secular and religious
means among believers of the Orixas. Also, the friend, Aglie, who is a “M aster”of a
secret societies, is present in Brazil and he researches these syncretistic religious
movements. Aglie introduces these movements to Casaubon and gives a short synchronic
analysis o f their establishment and growth:

Infinite are the powers o f syncretism, my dear. Shall I tell you a political version of this
whole story? Legally, the slaves were freed in the nineteenth century, but all the archives
o f the slave trade were burned in an effort to wipe out the stigmata o f slavery. Formally,
slaves were free, but their past was gone. In the absence o f any family identity, they tried
to reconstruct a collective past. It was their way o f opposing what your people call the
Establishment. (...) The original African cults possessed the weakness o f all religions:
they were local, ethnic, and shortsighted. But when they met the myths o f the conquerors,
they reproduced an ancient miracle, breathing new life into the mystery cults that arose
around the Mediterranean during the second and third centuries o f our era, when Rome in
decline was exposed to ferment that had originated in Persia, Egypt, and pre-Judaic
Palestine. U. Eco, F oucault’s Pendulum, pp. 154-155. Also, in the same chapter Aglie
discusses syncretism as the “diachronic event”— he explains how difficult the process of
religious identification is for such groups as the Umbanda or the Condomble in Brazil:

178

Syncretism, however, is a very subtle process. Did you notice, outside,
near the comidas de santo, a little iron statue, a feet? That’s Exu, very
powerful in the Umbanda, but not in the Candomble. Still the Candomble
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also honors him as a kind o f degenerate Mercury. In the Umbanda, they
are possessed by Exu, but not here. However, he’s treated affectionately.
But you never can tell. You see that wall over there?” He was pointing at
the polychrome statues o f a naked Indio and an old black slave, seated,
dressed in white, and smoking a pipe. ‘They are a caboclo a preto velho,
spirits of the departed. Very important in the Umbanda rites.’ ‘What are
they doing here?’ ‘Receiving homage. They are not used, because the
Candomble entertains relation only with the African Orixas, but they are
not cast out on that account.’‘What do all these churches have in common,
then?’Well, during the rite in all Afro-Brazilian cults the initiates go into a
trance and are possessed by higher beings. In the Candomble these beings
are the Orixas; in the Umbanda they are spirits o f the departed. U. Eco,
F oucault’s Pendulum, p. 154.

As Eco states, syncretism is a subtle process and it needs analysis and interpretation not
only through the universal knowledge about religions which will produce specific forms
of their mixing, but also a micro-analysis o f multi-cultural connections and social
circumstances which produce these syncretistic forms. These syncretic forms usually
develop a very complex “maze-way” o f reinterpretation o f the dominant religion and
through that reinterpretation they encode the communication o f their own sect or cult that
is embodied in their religious symbols and rituals.
Through the whole o f Foucault’s Pendulum, the tension between the synchronic
and diachronic interpretations o f syncretism is present. For example, in chapter 75,
Casaubon gives a three-page long list o f the chronological development o f Western secret
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societies. He begins the chronology with the Ashmole Invisible College established by
the Rosicrucians in London, and then continues with the College o f the Royal Society
from which the Masons are formed, and other Paris diverse associations, which he
finishes with the movement o f theosophy (Madame Blavatsky, Henry Steel Olcott) and
other modern secret and mystical groups. Also, at the beginning o f the novel Casaubon
tries to present the chronological development o f the Templars and to historically
evaluate the persecutions o f the Templars. This, linear, rational, categorical explanation
for syncretism and its forms are not enough. He finds that each o f these traditions
developed this "maze-way" and rhizomatic encoded systems. The message of his analysis
is that syncretism can be only interpreted and not definitely explained. The interpretation
of syncretic forms o f Western mystical traditions is similar to the deconstruction-process
of forming a post-modern novel. A normal expected chronological structure o f Foucault’s
Pendulum is however, deconstructed: the novel begins in the middle, the moment when
Casaubon researches the importance o f the pendulum for the Templars, but also interprets
the “pendulum” as the symbol o f the mystical experience as such. He explains that the
pendulum represents the proof o f the existing, geometrical (invisible) point from which
you can see that the Earth is spinning on its axis. The Foucault’s pendulum in the Paris
Observatorie can be placed everywhere, but it would always prove that the center exists
and the Earth is moving. In Eco’s interpretation, the Foucault’s pendulum is not only the
scientific invention and the instrument which proves human rational and scientific
knowledge o f the Earth’s movement; it can also become a symbol for the interpretation of
mystical experience, a symbol o f mystical tradition, and a symbol o f inner human
experience. It represents the center o f the world and the center o f the universe can be
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found everywhere. From that middle, where Eco begins the story, he gives the reader the
task to find other parts o f the story and to construct them into a synchronic progression.
But even when the full understanding o f the plot-progression is achieved, it still seems
that the “riddle” o f the Templars and their connections with modem “Synarchy” (the
name for modem secret associations in the novel) is not solved.
Syncretism as the development o f the “hybrid” religious forms embodied in their
rhizomatic makeup, and realized in their diffusive, elitistic, and symbiotic framework
resemble the deconstruction process in post-modern aesthetics. M odem syncretism is not
only present in the cults and groups that can either survive and be successful, or disappear
and be aborted (the Jim Jones case in California), but it is present in our cultural post
modern condition in which every concept can be challenged, and which can be the
connection for something that seems impossible.
Today, someone can choose and become the convert to Buddhism, Taoism or any
other religious tradition and live the way o f life that is totally incompatible with those
religious practices. Syncretism is a symbol o f our post-modern era and Eco’s novel
Foucalt ’s Pendulum is an excellent example o f how we are able to create “open forms”
of reality, beliefs, and sophisticated types o f human practices by the complex webbing of
our knowledge and experience through the rhizomatic labyrinths o f the connections that
open the sense o f the eclectic whole and the self.

4h) Baudolino: Rethinking Fake, Lie, and Falsity in the Discourse of the Religious
Semiosphere
In the ninth chapter o f Aristotle’s Poetics is given a very important differentiation
of the poetics (poesis) to the historiography (historical chronicles). Aristotle states that
poises in tragedy, comedy, or poetry relates to “what is possible to happen according to
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the law o f probability or necessity,” unlike history that always relates only to what has
happened. In this sense, he stresses, historiography, even when written in the form of
verse, is particular and more reduced than the work o f art which relates to what may
happen, giving by this virtue to the readers a universal, philosophical insight and open
1 *7 Q

worldview.
This important differentiation between poetics (poiesis) and history is applicable
as one o f the key interpretations to U. Eco’s novel Baudolino because the whole novel
can be understood as the dialog between the poetical and historical types o f
consciousness that can stand in the discourse o f Eco’s semiotic research as an open
interpretation o f the historical semiosphere to the traditional interpretation based on the
rational reconstruction o f the object. While the poetical consciousness is free in
connecting real with imaginative, fantastic, mythological, visionary, and religious entities
or ideas without any concern for the final closures as to the objective truth, on the
contrary, the historical consciousness tries to separate each of these two poles in order to
offer some rational explanations and add meanings to the story categorizing the
difference between the “fake” and the true.
In the novel Eco tells the story about the maverick character o f Baudolino who
evolves from a little peasant from Northern Italy to the adopted son o f Fredrick I
(Barbarossa). In the Pigmalion fashion it is presented how the great Roman ruler
transforms this illiterate and cunning boy into a young, noble, and smart scholar who
attends the best European schools, graduates from the University o f Paris, and becomes
one of the leading persons in Frederick’s diplomacy. Although Baudolino experiences his
“second birth” by becoming a part o f the ruling class and the son o f the great ruler, he
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doesn’t lose his essential characteristic o f being inspired and entertained with his own
imagination.
Baudolino as a boy impressed villagers with his visionary stories, telling them
how St. Baudolino, a local saint, revealed to him future events. While his biological
father hates his stories, the adopted (Frederick) father enjoys them and makes o f them
public sensations. Experiencing the power o f his fake stories, soon, one thing has become
obvious to Baudolino; he can use his imagination in a way to persuade people to believe
in surreal, imaginative, impossible and miraculous things. Baudolino at the same time
feels amusement, but also a shocking surprise of how it is easy to convince so many
people in obvious lies.
As a young adult, Baoudlino faces a crisis. His Descartian doubt goes so deep in
his consciousness that at one moment he is not sure any longer whether any moral value
is left in him or is he simply a worthless liar whose only job is to manipulate people’s
minds in order to achieve his goals. His doubt is present even when he uses manipulation
powers to achieve the final deed that is o f common good; good for everybody involved in
a specific situation.
Eco puts the culmination of Baudolino’s middle age crises at the beginning o f his
novel, in the moment when Baudolino meets with Niketas Choinates in the dramatic
circumstances o f the sucking of Constantinople by the Crusaders. In this scene we find
this famous historian of the Byzantine world who is assaulted by the Western Crusaders
and Baudolino who appears out o f nowhere, as a noble knight, saves the historian’s life.
When the immediate danger has passed, Baudolino spends some longer time with Niketas
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Choinates in his summer house. There Baudolino wants to confess to Niketas Choinates
his biggest sin and that is the one o f him being a pathological lair.
From that moment on, there is a great logical question imposed to the reader: Is
the confession story o f Baudolino true or fake especially if we take into consideration the
fact that he perceives him self as a lair. Niketas Choinates in Eco’ story presents the
consciousness o f a traditional reader who tries to reconstruct the truth content and to give
some final interpretations that can bring a fixed meaning to the story.
On the contrary, Baudolino stands in the novel, as an open sign for the poetic
understanding o f reality. The poetic interpretation opens the range o f possible truths on
what had happened, which historiography as the strict, one dimensional, and rational
reconstruction o f the temporal past events cannot accept it. Baudolino represents such a
poetic consciousness that develops a rhizomatic mapping o f the main cultural codes such
as myths, supernatural agencies, Middle Age utopian geographical places accounted as
real, existing spaces (the search for the paradise or the country o f Preseter John), human
beliefs (from animism or simple devotions to theology and philosophy o f religion),
literature, science, and history.
To give example o f Eco’s methodology o f poetisation o f the history it would be
interesting to use the most dramatic example from the book which reveals the truth about
the mystery regarding the death o f Frederick I, who died on his way to the Third
Crusades but drowns in the river while swimming. The great mystery is underlined by
Baudolino’s main question: Who killed Frederick I? Niketas is surprised that this would
be a question, because it is a known historical fact that Frederick simply drowned.
Baudolino gives some new knowledge to Niketas saying that the night before he was
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drowned in the river, he slept alone in the tower o f his friend’s castle and no one was
around Frederick except him and his friends. In the morning, said Baudolino, they found
Frederick dead, and they threw him into the river so his death would appear as an
accident. Niketas Choinates asks the Byzantine scientist to help solve the mystery and to
try to reconstruct the real cause o f the Frederick’s death. The scientist said that Frederick
was poisoned by carbon monoxide, happenstancially, because he was locked in the round
room placed in the middle o f the tower with the fire place and without any windows.
Baudolino then faces a great shock because he understands that he killed his adopted and
beloved father out o f ignorance, throwing him, who was still alive but poisoned, into the
cold river. Consequently, Frederick I, o f course, drowned.
During the investigation o f Frederick’s death Niketas Choinates represents the
consciousness o f inquiry while being eager to find the truth behind the great mystery. But
as a historian, Niketas is in a difficult situation facing a great doubt: can he, as a good
historian, change the known historical facts? If he changes the historical records, what
impact will this have on the world? He debates with him self and his close intellectual
friends should he write in his chronicles the whole truth about Frederick and uses
Baudolino’s story as a relevant source. Facing these doubts, Niketas finally decides not to
change the history, because then he might change the effects o f history on the future.
The very fact that Niketas has to decide is he going to change the historical
records o f Frederick underlies the point that Niketas cannot be any longer a historian who
is telling a simple historical truth. Niketas’ profession is deeply challenged. Desperate, he
asks his companion, a rational philosopher and scientists Paphnutius, what to do: to
include as a writer o f history Baudolino’s testimony, or simply to disregard it? Niketas
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Choinates posits to his friend the line of questions: Can he present the historical events in
a way that they are sometimes contingent? Does the contingency challenge the idea of
Christian God and its omniscience? How to justify God and the prime example of
suffering o f Jesus if history is just a “bunk”? Furthermore, if Baudolino says that he is a
pathological liar, is his story anyway totally a fake?
His companion Papnutius responds to Niketas’ doubts by suggesting to him to
take some parts while to disregard others from Baudolino’s story. He tells Niketas to say
that some Venetians told him the story about Frederick’s death, and he continuous:
‘Yes, I know it’s not the truth, but in a great history little truths can be altered so that
the greater truth emerges. You must tell the true story o f the empire o f the Romans,
not a little adventure that was bom in a far-off swamp, in barbarian lands, among
barbarian peoples. And, further, would you like to put into the heads o f your future
readers the notion that a Grasal exists, up there amid the snow and ice, and the
kingdom o f Prester John in the remote lands? Who knows how many lunatics would
start wandering endlessly, for centuries and centuries?’
‘It was a beautiful story. Too bad no one will find out about it.’
‘You surely don’t believe you’re the only writer o f stories in this world. Sooner or
later, someone— a greater liar than Baudolino— will tell it.’ Umberto Eco, 2002, p.
521.
Analyzing the m otif o f the lie that is the main comer stone o f the novel we can
nicely demonstrates Eco’s favorite methodology. It is an example o f the post-modem
poetics of a deconstruction. A known historical fact is put in the maze o f new
circumstances, which can then give various abilities for the final interpretation. The
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presented unit in the novel now becomes a semiosis, an open sign that requires o f the
reader to choose sides and argumentations given by the characters in the novel. Eco’s
experimental methodology can be defined in the following way: Instead that the reader
conforms to the content o f the novel presented in its story line, actually the story line
conforms to the readers’ interpretation. The characters o f the novel, in this sense, present
the possible optional arguments that reader can follow as a thread in the labyrinth of
possibilities. This labyrinth o f possibilities is given to the reader by an enormous amount
of the independent (essayistic) units which make the discourse encyclopedically complex
and open for further connections that might appear from the reader itself.

4i) The Position of the Lie and Fake in the Semiosophere
In the beginning o f the novel, Baudolino began to unfold his adventures
presenting a line o f picturesque episodes as a confession o f his life-story to Niketas of
being a “pathological” liar. At the end o f the novel it is really questionable to a reader
who is actually a liar: Baudolino, whose confession seems truthful even when talking
honestly to Niketas about the lies he used to create in order to achieve some good deed or
motivate people to achieve some positive political solutions; Or is a liar Niketas, who
cannot re-write the history when a new fact comes to play because it opposes to the very
ideology o f that time established by the Christian orthodoxy. For instance, in the novel it
is given the list o f new historical discoveries that Niketas decides to omit from the
historical records:
1. Trade o f the fake saints’ relics including the “heads” o f St. John the
Baptist;
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2. The context o f Frederick’s death by which the great emperor died as the
result o f the confusion and contingency;
3. Frederick’s m otif to organize the Third Crusades; he believed that some
Muslim areas could be reintegrated in the Christendom if he would be able
to make an alliance with the Christian kingdom o f Prester John. The
problem was that Prester John’s kingdom didn’t exist. It was an
imaginative place described as the country that is neighboring the
paradise;
4.

People should not know that Frederic never believed in the visions of
Baudolino, but he used them as the marvelous tactic to push the masses in
his direction.

As usual, Eco the writer is as well Eco the theoretician, and Eco the post-modern
thinker who accepts the aesthetics o f the “open” work. He has not written a book for a
reader to listen and follow the story line o f the omniscient narrator, but he has prepared
the line o f underlying questions and problems for the reader forcing him to actively
participate in the interpretation o f the story. The reader finds him/her self in a role o f a
post-modern deconstructionist who is co-creator with the author. Eco’s text is a
combination o f larger units (chapters) as the main architectonic basis o f the work,
sequences (independent episodes), and discursive parts (theoretical, ethical, and moral
questions) that are interconnected by the story line and characters. It seems that Eco
writes his novels acquiring the perfect ratio o f the architectonic parts and sequences with
the discursive open questions. This methodology o f building the open work puts the
reader into a peculiar position in which the reader has to move through the semantic
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spaces of the novel and to interpret discursive parts in order to achieve cumulative
understanding to move on to the next part. The communicative value o f the text is the
dominant requirement. This makes the work infinite and open for new possibilities,
interpretations, and focuses on different aspects o f the w ork.180
Expressing the ironic view o f the omniscient narrator, Paphnutius, a character that
represents a rational philosopher in the novel, suggests that ones, this story will be written
by a greater liar than Baudolino. The point that Eco has made at the end o f his fascinating
novel is that there is no time in the human history when the decisions were created as the
result o f the exclusively historical rational reasoning. Eco’s main point is that legends,
the power o f myth and religion, the beliefs in the imaginative characters, or fake places is
equally present in the historical motivation as the power o f the politically, legally, or
military rationalized reasoning. It is a fact that modern historians and scholars still find
fascinating stories about the Holy Grail, history o f the Templars, and other popular
legends that become the part of Western cultural heritage. The question here is how to
interpret these popular legends, myths, and stories? Is a Grasal a big lie as a legend, or the
story o f Grasal had some real influence on the Medieval English worldview and even
reflections to the historical development o f English aristocracy?
To make the point more plausible it is possible to find the examples from the
present time. For instance, is the appearance o f the Virgin Mary in Medjugorje only a lie
of bunch o f little children who witnessed Virgin Mary (described at first by local children
as a beautiful lady with “red cheeks” and long dark hair, talking in native language) in
1982, or a fact, which in few further years became a relevant accepted cultural fact for the
depressive area o f Hercegovina (99.9% o f people never heard o f Hercegovina, let alone
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Medjugorje before this event), that in many o f ways altered the social, political, and
economic structure o f this hillbilly area? How should this event be framed in historical
books? Is it common for the areas that are far from the main religious, political, and
economic centers—where history happens every day,—to use another methodology to
became recognizable as a micro-center that can offer something different and alternative
view to the world? Finally, how can these events, based on the “mythological reasoning,”
really happen today when the technology, scientific methodology, and rationalism is
dominant global cultural mainstream?
Some o f the answers can be, perhaps, offer via the semiotic theory o f culture by
Yuri Lotman and Umberto Eco, that was developed on the basis o f a long tradition of
structural semiotics o f language and literature, and then grasped on the cultural research
between minorities and the mainstream culture adding the elements o f nonstructural
semiotics such as Peirce’s pragmati(ci)sm. One o f the main points o f this approach is that
every single event, religious movement, beliefs, scientific discovery, political system, or
any literary realm are equally important and interconnected by the same frame of
reference, which is called the semiosphere. In his book Universe o f the Mind: The
Semiotic Theory o f Culture (1990), Yuri M. Lotman gave the description and definition
o f the semiosphere:
“Imagine a museum hall where exhibits from different periods are on
display, along with inscriptions in known and unknown languages, and
instructions for decoding them; there are also the explanations composed
by the museum staff, plans for tours and rules for the behavior o f the
visitors.
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Imagine also in this hall tour-leaders and visitor and imagine all this as a
single mechanism. This is an image o f the semiosphere. Then we have to
remember that all elements o f the semiosphere are in dynamic, not static,
correlations whose terms are constantly changing. We notice this
especially at traditional moments which have come down to us from the
past.” (Lotman, 1990, pp. 126, 127)

First o f all, the semiosphere takes into the consideration all periods o f time, all
disciplines developed in the course o f time (history, literature, science, ethics,
philosophy, etc.), and all events known as relevant for the culture which denotes all
humanized nature. Semiotics does not propose the hierarchy o f cultural spheres, do not
theorized, or discriminate by the virtue o f rationality, common sense, ideology, theology
or any other mental devices.
Every discipline whether religion, science, or philosophy, represents one set of
rules with “pre-fixed” socialized codes that members o f culture follow, but even if one
would have the knowledge o f all codes o f rules in one culture, it would not mean that this
person would achieve infallible or absolute knowledge. According to Lotman and Eco
everybody can experience “a semiotic position” in which they are aware that one cultural
reality is relative to the other or that chosen set o f rules would work only for one system
o f knowledge, but not for another. The best example is, perhaps, Hum e’s skepticism
expressed by the opposing the scientific and common sense knowledge as to the path of
sun: according to common sense knowledge sun always rises on the East, and declines on
the West; but according to scientific knowledge that is not true at all. Common sense
knowledge is only a habitual knowledge evolved on the base o f our perceptive ability.
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Hume had a hard time to reconcile these two oppositions in our mind, while Lotman or
Eco would not have this problem at all. For semiotics, both o f systems— the scientific,
and the common sense knowledge—exist as two separate codes o f rules that a person
would alternate according to the intent o f him being a referent. To present how the new
sphere o f different, culturally postulated, codes o f rule co-exist, Lotman compares the
semiosphere to the role o f the biosphere to all living beings defined by Verdansky as “all
life-clusters are intimately bound to each other.”
Using the analogy between the semiosphere and biosphere Lotman stresses that
cultures develop their own spaces and boundaries under the same condition o f the
“semiosphere i.e., humanized nature” that are then surrounded by the language, cultural
history, religion, literature, art and identity, but also they are in constant interaction
because they make the comparison between different semiotic spaces (read cultures) via
binary and asymmetrical references to their boundaries.
Eco and Lotman agree that every possible thing, being, system, or thought in the
semiosphere is a sign that stands open for interpretation to any possible codes o f rules,
which then condition every possible entity to be framed in a specific interpretation. In
this type o f the rhyzomatic maze everything is connected with everything— a religion
equally with science, and science equally with literature if the referent makes these
connections. In the semiosphere there is no center, only one semiotic space can make
them through the available codes or systems o f rules.
Semiotic as a discipline that refers to the semiosphere is a “reconstruction of
reality,” but not reality that is perceived as an independent object o f cognition as it was in
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a traditional Western rational and idealistic philosophy. The reality is conditioned by the
set o f rules chosen for its construct.
Semiotics in many o f ways represents the reconstruction o f the traditional object
of cognition in a sense to overcome the Kantian antinomy/chasm. For Kant, the object of
cognition is on a one hand “humanized’ as the result o f time-space framework relevant as
the a-priori conditions for the human existence, on the other hand, as a total independent
object (object as such), it is an X about which we do not know anything. Lotman’s
concept o f the semiosphere reduces the object only on the humanized nature conditions
and makes it possible to be interpreted through available systems o f codes. Every object
can become the representant of the multiple worlds existing in the semiosphere, and for
this reason, every object o f knowledge is equally tentative as well as fallible, and further
on, it is not the expression o f the one truth, but the expression o f the possible truths,
possible realities, which makes that object poetical (in Aristotelian sense) or dynamic (in
Peirce’s sense) rather than objective and final. This object than is a sign or a symbol that
stands conditioned by its very nature o f interpretation intensions.

4j) Why Religion is Not a Lie
The final question is: what is a lie in the semiosphere and does it exist at all? O f
course, lie exists, but only and only, as the boundary fringe element or discourse o f the
code system that is used for the interpretation. Religion is the best example we can use to
explain the point. Does the God exist? Does the Virgin Mary exist? Did Judeo-Christian
God create Earth in 7 days? O f course that exists for the believers and doesn’t for
atheists, for atheists the existence o f God, Virgin Mary or seven days creation represent
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obvious lies, but for believers these are statements o f belief that has deep meaning for
them.
There is a more comprehensive question: if for the Christian a God, the Virgin
Mary, and the Holy Ghost do exist, then can they also accept that the unicorn exists, or
can they accept that any deceased ancestor is a spirit which comes back and cause the
problems for leaving people o f that family; or for instance can all Christians accept that
the Holy Grail exist? It is obvious that at one point every Christian, especially the
fundamentalist, will not accept the possibilities that for him all superhuman agencies
really exist.
Further implications o f this discussion can be drawn in two separate questions:

1. Does it mean for the Christians, for instance, that the Yoruba woman who
beliefs in ancestral spirits, is actually a liar?
and
2. Does the semiosphere concept o f reality simply justify every lie, even
when someone lies to your face?

The first discourse: Both, Eco, and Lotman would disagree with the underlying
implications posed in these two questions. First o f all modem Christians do not really
believe that a Yoruba woman is a liar because she has a different belief system. It is OK
that she thinks that her ancestors are spirits who can cause some misfortunes in everyday
life if they are not treated properly via the strict observances, but as well they cannot
accept to believe in the same thing as she does. This point, one more time stresses, that
people today are in some extent aware o f the presence o f the semiosphere and they would

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

say: “I have my religion, she has her religion!” We do not interfere with each other as far
as we have our cultural identity as the cultural space that doesn’t overlap. But in the case
of the Voodoo, where the cultural spaces overlap, we might find a person who is a
Christian, but also beliefs in ancestral spirits in a way the Yoruba woman does.
The second discourse: Laying to someone’s’ face that you didn’t steal the money
but you did is still a lie as omission o f the truth, diversion o f the truth, or escape from the
truth simply because both parties refer to the same code o f rules in which human
relationships are based on honesty and mutual respect so, stealing is a bad human deed. A
lie here is simply defined as the bad morality in human relationships. In this sense the
Aristotelian inference o f “historical consciousness”— it important what really has
happened—is required as the main rule in such situation, and a poetical inference is
dismissed.
An interesting question related to problem o f lying would definitely be one of the
most interesting questions related to religion. How to take someone who tells you that
he/she has visions? Talk with a saint? What is someone tells you to talk directly to God?
Or the one who tells you that God talks to him/her? These kinds o f statements are very
fringe, because it is not clear to which o f the code o f references (rules) they belong to. It
seems that each o f these statements can become a simple lie and can be morally banished,
or it can become more than a lie— a material from which the new sub-structure in the
code rule o f religion will be developed. Sounds odd, but very true.
Let’s take one more time the example from U. Eco’s Baudolino. When Baudolino
begins his story o f his childhood, the first thing he confesses is that the reverence o f
being alone in the woods that tricked his imagination because he felt free from any

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

207

bounds and rules at that moment. He imagined talking with St. Baudolino, seeing the
unicorn, but then, he talked about these imaginative impressions as they were part o f him
and he presented them as true. He said at home that he spoke to St. Baudolino, and
community o f people in his house became necessary the interpretants: while mother
accepted Baudolino’s confession as true and really believed that something o f this story
is true, the father complaint:
O Lord this had to happen to me, a son who sees things and cant even
milk a cow either I bust his head with my stick or I give him to one of
those men who visit the fairs making an African monky dance and my
sainted mother shouted at me Goodfomothing you’re the worst all what
have I done to make the Lord give me a son who sees saints and my father
Galiaudo said its not true he sees saints hes a wors liar than Judass and he
makes things up to get out o f working.’ U. Eco, Baudolino. 2002, p. 5.

181

Baudolino continued to tell lies, because people sometimes liked it to hear. One
foggy night he met a stranger, some “Alman” noble, and told him that he has visions as
well as gift o f tongues like Apostles. The stranger lost in the woods asked him what did
St. Baudolino say about Terdona, and offers him two coins for his prediction. A boy, tells
to a stranger that a king Frederick with a red beard is going to conquer Terdona, not
knowing that this is Frederick 1. King itself likes little Baudolino’s imagination and way
or reasoning, so finally he adopts him as a son. Finally, in Baudolino’s story confession
we learn that Frederick I didn’t believe that little boy really spoke with St. Baudolino, but
recognized that other people would like these stories which eventually would help him in
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conquering Italian cities, so Baudolino became Frederick’s “footman” and “vox populi,”
as Niketas put it.
The problem o f religious imagination is the main light-motif o f Eco’s novel.
Baudolino is the representant o f the Medieval culture and the semiotic space o f that
culture could be described, as Eco put it in the Introduction to Lotman’s Universe o f
M ind as follows: “Everything signifies a higher reality and objects themselves are
important not for their physical nature or their function, but rather in so much as they
signify something else.” (Lotman, 1990, p. xi) Baudolino is presented as a person who
learned how to use in the best way his religious imagination. In one o f his episodes,
Baudolino wanted to save a Civitas Nouva, a New City (which became later Allessandria,
where his friends and family lived) from the furious destruction o f Frederick I by staging
a person who is to appear on the horse in front o f Allessandrians and Frederick’s army as
St. Peter, thinking that Frederick’s soldiers would interpret what they see as a miracle and
coming o f St. Peter. Unfortunately, the miracle didn’t work, because Frederick’s soldiers
didn’t believe that this is St. Peter and he can be on the horse, while Allessandrians
perceived the staging person on the horse as a savior. This episode from the novel
Baudolino shows that Eco sees religious statements as those which are always at the stake
o f probation and on disposition o f community o f believers to decide to accept them or
not.

4k) Peirce’s Semiotics: The Key Interpretation for “Religious Lies”
Let us go to real life and take some historical cases while leaving for a moment
the vast o f Eco’s fiction. Can the same rule be applied for the religious imagination
(visions, talking to Gods, Gods talking to a person, seeing superhuman agencies and
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spirits)— that can be put to the test, and by the community, either aborted or adopted—as
it is presented in Eco’s Baudolino? The first historical example can be the case o f the
Witches o f Salem, the other the Virgin Mary o f Medjugorje.
In both cases, the marginal representatives o f the society have visions: in the case
of Witches o f Salem two young girls, Betty Parris & Abigail Williams, fell into trances
where they pronounced it as witchcraft and accused other members o f the community as
witches in Salem Village, Massachusetts, where soon nineteen people had been hanged
(Albanese, 1999, p. 260).182
In this case it is obvious, the community o f believers had to deal with the fringe boundary
element o f visions o f girls and their “unconscious” trances. The test o f time was needed
for the community o f believers to decide whether these visions are “true” or a “Lie.”
Finally, a community o f believers decided that the girls’ trances were not authentic voice
of God. and therefore a lie.
On the contrary, the Medjugorje case showed that people accepted and adopted
the fringe element o f children’s (five to nine years old) testimony o f seeing the Virgin
Mary, but also the community o f believers needed some critical time for testing and
evaluating the authenticity o f the visions. According to a good research o f Dr. Ljudevit
Rupcic, a local Franciscan priest fra Jozo Zovko made at the very beginning o f the case a
recorded investigation with six children in which he asked each o f them to describe what
i 0 -5

they had seen when they said the Virgin Mary appeared first time.

Rupcic then used

these sources to continue the investigation in which he presented how children in the
course o f time changed the testimonies and from visual representations went on
presenting vision as the mental state and mental space. Rupcic also stressed that he
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thought that, perhaps, fra Jozo Zovko as a local priest was a suggestive person who might
made an enormous influence on the children. This argument failed, because fra Jozo
Zovko had just become recently a priest in this area, and after few weeks the Communist
authorities began an investigation and imprisoned him for three and half years. The
Communist authorities at that time were very harsh to Catholic priests and they were
trying to convince the children that they had rather some imaginary visions, then the real
experiences of the Virgin M ary’s presence. More than this, children’s parents and close
family didn’t believe the children for a long time, and they were making jokes o f their
testimonies. It seems that the persistence o f the children to continue almost every day and
later every week with the same story moved more and more children o f this area to
believe in it, and soon the little witnesses also had great support among the local nuns.
The priesthood and the official authorities o f the Catholic Church in Croatia as
well as the Franciscan authorities had been very reserved throughout the whole early
stage o f the development o f this case. The two priests, fra Tomislav Pervan and fra
Tomislav Vlasic, also documented throughout o f this case diverse conversations with the
children, trying to convince them that they had not really see the Virgin Mary. Although
the all church and politico-social establishment made everything to oppose to the reality
o f children’s visions, believers itself (children, women, and old persons) accepted it as
the authentic case, today the whole area has been changed with the popularity o f the place
where the Virgin Mary was believed to have appeared.
It is obvious that Peirce’s semiotic theory is applicable to these cases more than
any other theory. Eco, who analyzed diverse aspects o f Peirce’s semiotic theory, and then
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accepted it to develop his moderate position as to the radical postmodern theory o f
deconstruction offered by Derrida and Rorty would agree with this choice.
Eco explains in his book The Limits o f Interpretation (1986) that Derrida
challenges the texts because they present “the idea o f a definite, final, and authorized
meaning.” Derrida also stresses that the text cannot “incorporate an absolute univocal
meaning,” because there is no “transcendental signified, and the signifier is not co
present with a signified,” so signified is continually deferred and delayed in ad infinitum
position.
Eco stays that Derrida’s position is the one that would lead toward the absolute
deconstruction o f authority, but it would definitely stand on a side o f absolute relativism.
Eco opposes to the concept of the absolute relativism, and accepts the moderate position
as to deconstruction accepting Peirce’s pragmaticism.
For Peirce, any object o f knowledge denotes the semiotic experience— “a sign is
anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which
itself refers in the same way, this interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad
infinitum.”— obviously Peirces’ statement can be compared in line with the
deconstruction methodology. If we apply Peirce’s idea o f unlimited semiosis to our two
cases, the vision as a sign o f a new event in the religious semiosphere (in this case
religious system o f Christianity) can be perceived as the dynamic object (dynamic object
is for Peirce any mental construct) and not as a truth or a lie, but as the interpretants
possibility to pursue some investigations, rejections, acceptance, comments, etc. He
would also say that all knowledge is fallible because human beings, according to their
perceptive abilities build the sense o f continuity and determination, which is not the mode
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of absolute/whole reality. The necessity for the semiotic experience comes from the
illusion that there are possible only a definite number o f solutions as the answer to the
world, while there is actually always the indefinite numbers o f solutions as well as
perceptants and their interpretations. Knowledge than needs contextual reference, and
finally is created as a habit. Habit as knowledge has correlates in modem semiotic theory
the term “code o f rules,” that is often used by semioticians.
For Peirce, whenever we have a situation that some unlimited semiosis is socially,
scientifically, politically, or religiously interpreted and translated as a code or mode in
society is a proof that a community o f interpreters adopted and accepted a
“transcendental” idea o f that community, which then becomes a higher instance of
transcendental authority. A habit, as a knowledge is a “disposition to act upon the world,”
and its “transcendental instance” that the inter subjective meaning is “spelled out” as the
agreement o f community.
In that sense, the cases such as the Witches from Salem, or the Virigin Mary of
Medjugorje for Derrida or Rorty are still relative to the possibility to be truth or lie, while
for Peirce, Eco, or Habermas these cases are solved either as a truth or as a lie as to the
community o f believers who intersubjectivelly brought up the meaning o f how they
communicate the ideas o f superhuman agencies. Even if we talk about unbelievers who
refer to the two cases (Salem, Medjugorje), it is impossible that they would or could
dismiss the meaning and opinion of that community.
Eco, in his Baudolino, refers to the semantic dimension o f the story: should story
simply be told as it is or should be modified in order to reach a valuable and rich meaning
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that can act out o f its illocutionary framework in the future? At one point Baudolino, who
tells his life story to Niketas Choinates says:
“But maybe my story has no meaning.”— alluding to the problem that parts of
his story are going to present imaginative experiences, utopian places, and
superhuman agencies.
Niketeas responds:
‘There are no stories without a meaning. And I am one o f those men who can
find it even where other fail to see it. Afterwards the story becomes the book
o f the living, like a blaring trumpet that raises from the tomb those who have
been dust for centuries.... Still it takes time, you have to consider the events,
arrange them in order, find the connections, even the least visible ones.’ Eco,
Baudolino, 2002, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The semiosphere can be defined as the cultural organism which resembles to the
continuous thought process that creates the spheres by generating the experiences and
individual lives o f people, and than translating them into the semiotic and semantic meta
linguistic spaces. The reality that exists in one’s culture is not static and is in continuous
process o f testing and redefining its own borders. This semiotic space with its borderline
resembles more to the membrane, than to the definite line o f division.
Religion is the one o f the most important meta-linguistic structures o f the semiotic
space. Religion is a system of beliefs and practices, where every person is engaged in the
semiotic process— transformation o f the ideas into the practical symbolic actions, and
further, the transformation o f the semantic potentials into the complex space o f the
semiosphere to which a person relates to.
In the modern semiosphere o f the Western civilization, the private with the
subjectivism and the public with the instrumental objectivism tend to be more radicalized
than ever. Modern semiospheric space o f the Western civilization is predominantly
transformed into the secular. Religion seems to be a relic from the past, an interesting
personal journey and search, and so the semantic materials o f religion are today
transferred from the collective consciousness o f the group to the private actions o f the
personal faith. That religion is a personal choice creates in the West religious pluralism—
from religious traditionalism, orthodoxy, rigorism (obedience cults) and fundamentalism,
to new religious movements, modem religious syncretism, or new spirituality.
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The religious revivalism puts the question mark on the secularization processes.
This appears in a form of the dialectics between a new religiosity and spirituality and
rising fundamentalism with the tendency to enchant again what was once disenchanted.
The concept o f the semiosphere is important to open enough room for the interpretation
o f religious processes that are distinct and different from the mainstream, but also to
cross-culturally explain and compare possibilities o f overlapping between different
traditions.
This dissertation has given the main outline o f the concepts and ideas existent in
the modern semiotic theory o f C. S. Peirce, U. Eco, J. Habermas, and Y. Lotman and to
apply those concepts building at the same time a new methodology o f semiotic theory of
religion in the modem study o f comparative religion. This dissertation project is the
foundation of the semiotic theory o f religion which will bring enrichment in the research
with the application o f the concepts such as dynamic religious signs, unlimited semiosis,
and putting religion in the contextualization o f the semiosphere.
Also, this dissertation sees an enormous value o f J. Habermas’ work which
concentrates on the rescuing semantic religious potentials and transforming them into the
secular sphere. The second great value o f the semiotic theory o f religion is that it is
necessary to understand the functioning o f the contemporary semiosphere in which we
live and interact today. There is a substantial differentiation o f the semiotic space that is
secularized and functions in a way to offer a person the alternative competing
worldviews, and the semiotic space that is enclosed in the unified system, without
alternative worldviews and different “truths” about reality. The semiotic theory offers a
way to understand the connection between nature, culture, religion, science, and complex
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socio-political reality in a new way, offering the methodology o f semiotic and semantic
analyses o f modernity and critically investigating the functioning and destiny o f the post
secular society, which has brought a surprising wave o f new religious revivalism.
It is almost impossible to simply interpret religion in one-dimension, as only
cultural, social, political, historical, or theological event. The semiotic theory o f religion
offers a new definition o f religion, where religion acts as the most important meta
linguistic structure o f the semiotic space. Religion is a system o f the conceptual ideas that
involve the natural ability o f the human mind to engage itself into the process of
unlimited semiosis that is transformed into the semiotic space by symbolic signification
processes that are developed within in-group community, which maintain its important
meta-linguistic and semiotic space through the authority o f the religious institutions,
exegesis, and the canon as long as it is possible to maintain the communicative praxis that
re-in-acts the collective consciousness and the strength o f the semantic, religious and
symbolic, potentials.
To understand and interpret today’s modem religious pluralism and multifaceted
forms o f religious consciousness and practices there is also a need for a proper cultural
theory that is not based only on the slippery ground o f cultural relativism, but rather one
that is systematic, functional, and critical in explaining the changes that occurred within
the world-religions. Yuri Lotman’s concept o f the semiosphere seems to be functional in
the application to religious pluralism, but also critical when explaining the roots of the
conversion processes throughout the diachronic time-line. Lotman shows that there is a
vicious struggle for the dominance and preservation o f the semiotic/linguistic space,
which emerges as the dominant in competition to the other linguistic and cultural reality.
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Also, Lotman concentrates with the great precision on the diverse synchronic
developments in the culture that explain at the same time the shifting o f the religious
consciousness into the aesthetical subjectivism and freedom o f expression.
Concentrating often on the analysis o f C. S. Peirce’s production process of
unlimited semiosis, and investigating with the curiosity the new interpretation o f U. Eco’s
dynamic sings and unlimited semiosis it seems that nothing is more amazing to a mind
than going back to the sources o f cognitive and aesthetic abilities o f the human mind,
where often resides the source o f the religious itself. This dissertation in its final instance,
wants to open this awareness for a reader and to go in this investigation even beyond the
expected, into the post-modern realm, where the limits o f knowledge expands with the
surprising flexibility, openness, and maze o f connections which may bring together
worlds o f imagination and reality together.
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END NOTES

1 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, (Trans. Wade Baskin, London:
Fontana/Collins, 1974.) pp. 15-16. “It is possible to conceive o f a science which studies the role o f signs as
part o f social life. It would form part o f social psychology, and hence o f general psychology. We shall call
it semiology (from the Greek semeion, ’sign'). It would investigate the nature o f signs and the laws
governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to
exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch o f this general science. The laws which
semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a
clearly defined place in the field o f human knowledge.”

2 Ibid. p. 68. For Saussure, language as a system o f signs outlines “anthropoSemiotics” i.e.,
predominantly a Semiotics o f culture. Unlike Morris or Peirce, Saussure takes out comparison with the
human and animal worlds o f communication, and he is not concern with a sign as a phenomena in the
epistemological sense as it is Peirce. The arbitrariness o f the sign is explained as the result o f convention:
“Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal o f the semiological process.”
3 Ibid. That a sign is a mental space is one o f the most important ideas in Semiotics. Saussure
explains a linguistic sign in the following way: “A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name,
but between a concept (signified) and a sound pattern (signifier). The sound patter is not actually a sound;
for a sound is something physical. A sound patter is the hearer’s psychological impression o f a sound, as
given to him by the evidence o f his senses. This sound pattern may be called a “material” element only in
that is the representation o f our sensory impressions. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the
other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally o f a more abstract kind:
the concept.
4 J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1991).
5 Winfried Noth, H andbook o f Semiotics, (Bloomingon & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1995.) “Peirce defended a pansemiotic view o f the universe. In his view, signs are not a class o f phenomena
besides other nonsemiotic objects: ‘The entire universe is perfused with signs, it is not composed,
exclusively o f signs (Ph. 5.448, fn.). Smiotics in this interpretation turns out to be a universal science....’
6 Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy o f Language, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1986), p. 148.
7 Ibid. pp. 10, 11, 12.
8 Ibid. The fourth chapter called Symbols is the best part where Eco gives the differentiation of
symbols on one that are metaphors or are engaged in the allegory.
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9 In the book by E. Thomas Lawson & Robert N. McCauley, Rethinking Religion: Connecting
Cognition and Culture, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Lawson defines religion in
the following way: “For the purposes o f theorizing we construe a religious system as a symbolic-cultural
system o f ritual acts accompanied by an extensive and largely shared conceptual scheme that includes
culturally postulated superhuman agents. (....) That conceptual scheme can be exemplified in oral
traditions, sacred texts, devotional materials, theological essays etc.” p. 5. Also, Pascal Boyer inspired by
Lawson’s cognitive theory o f religion discusses a problem o f highly theological ideas that are often in
opposition to the religious conceptual spontaneity in his book The Naturalness o f Religious Ideas: A
Cognitive Theory o f Religion, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University o f California Press, 1994).
10 For the interpretation o f the story check Caroline W alker Bynum, Metamorphosis and Identity,
(New York: Zone Book, 2005), pp. 15-36.
11 The consequences o f the Nag Hammadi discovery at the Jabal al-Tarif mountain where
Muhammand Ali al-Samman discovered a ja r filled with papyrus (scholars were able to identify more than
fifty-two texts) and texts such as Gospel o f Thomas, Gospel o f Philip definitely changed the views on Early
Christianity. The consequences o f this discovery were described in details in Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic
Gospels, Vintage Books: A Division o f Random House, INC., New York, 1989. In association with this
discovery another problems are discussed such as the true biography and identity o f Jesus. John Dominic
Crossan in his two books Jesus: A Revolution y Biography, Harper Collins Publisher, San Francisco, 1994.,
and Who Killed Jesus Harper Collins Publisher, San Francisco ,1995., argues that Jesus presented in the
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conspicuous element o f a public sphere dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market
and opinion research, and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and advertising o f political
parties and groups.” J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
2001.

89 Immanuel Kant, Grounding fo r the Metaphysics o f Morals, (trans. Hames W. Elingotn,
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 59.
90 Jurgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality, (ed. Eduardo Mendieta, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 67-95.
91 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, (Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press, 1937) pp. 195-195: “There is no incentive to agnosticism. All their beliefs hang together,
and were a Zande to give up faith in witch-dcotorhood, he would have to surrender equally his faith in
witchcraft and oracles (...) In this web o f belief, every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande
cannot get out o f its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external structure in
which he is enclosed. It is the texture o f his thought and he cannot think that his thought is wrong.” ( . . . )
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members o f the institutional Church; collectively the Church was Europe’s biggest landowner. The clergy
played a vital role in the lives o f all late medieval communities, as dispensers o f sacraments, managers o f
hospitals and schools and providers o f vital services such as writing and literacy. N o European rulers could
ignore the Church in their political calculations: the Pope was a major political force in his won right and a
constant fixture in the strategic alliances o f the day. No one could have anticipated that the Church was
about to be faced by a challenge which would shake it to its foundations, and leave it, two centuries later,
permanently divided.”
102Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity: Twelve Lectures, (trans.
Frederick G. Lawrence, The M IT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000), p. 7. “A present that
understands itself from the horizon o f the modem age as the actuality o f the most recent period has to
recapitulate the break brought about with the past as a continuous renewal. The dynamic concepts that
either emerged together with the expression “modem age” or “new age” in the eighteen century or acquired
then a new meaning that remains valid down to our day are adapted to this - words such as revolution,
progress, emancipation, development, crisis, and Zeitgeist.”
103 In his The Philosophy o f History, (trans. J. Sabree, New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp.
3-4, G.W.F. Hegel says that “Passion is regarded as a thing o f sinister aspect, as more or less immoral. Man
is required to have no passions. Passion, it is true is not quite the suitable word for what I wish to express. I
mean here nothing more than the human activity as resulting from private interests— special, or if you will,
self-seeking designs— with this qualification, that the whole energy o f will and characters is devoted to
their attainment; that other interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims) or rather all
things else, are sacrificed to them.” It seems that Hegel is not quit satisfied with the word “passion,” in his
text, so he offers an explanation in what way the “passion” is rather the concept o f the human motivational
side o f nature.
104 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
105 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History o f Philosophy, vol. 1., (trans, E.S. Haldane, Lincoln,
Nebraska & London, UK: University o f Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 50-51.
106 Friedriech Nietzsche, The Will To Power in The Complete Works o f Nietzsche, O. Levy, ed.
(New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 200 -203.
107 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity: Twelve Lectures, (trans.
Frederick G. Lawrence, : Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 7: “Modernity can and will
no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch: it
has to create its normativity out o f itself Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility
o f escape. This explains the sensitiveness o f its self-understanding, the dynamism o f the attempt, carried
forward incessantly down to our time, to “pin itself down.”
108 J. Habermas, Des gespaltene Western, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 2004.
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109 Giovanna Borradori, ed., Philosophy in a Time o f Terror, Chicago: Chicago University Press,
2003) dialog with J. Habermas and J. Derrida. “ ... I consider Bush’s decision to call for a “war against
terrorism” a serious mistake, both normatively and pragmatically. Normatively, he is elevating these
criminals to the status o f war enemies; and pragmatically one cannot lead a war against a ‘network’ if the
term ‘war’is to retain any definite meaning.”
110 This work was presented as the lecture at an international conference on “Philosophy and
Religion” at Poland’s Lodz University.
111 A good review o f the classical theory o f religion is given in book by James Trower, Religion:
The Classical Theories, Georgetown University Press: W ashington, D.C. 1999.
112 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o f Christinatiy, (trans. George Eliot, New York: Harper &
Row, 1957), p. 13: “All divine attributes, all the attributes which make God God, are attributes o f the
species - attributes with in the individual are limited, but the limits o f which are abolished in the essence o f
the species.” p. 33 “Religion is disuniting o f man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis o f
himself. God is not what man is - man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is
prefect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; it is the absolutely positive, the sum o f all realities;
man is the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.” p. 184. “We have reduced the superhuman,
supernatural nature o f God to the elements o f human nature and its fundamental elements. Our process o f
analysis has brought us again to the position with which we set out. The beginning, middle and end of
religion is M AN.”
113 One o f the best M arx’s analysis o f the relationship between the state and religion is given in his
On the Jewish Question (1843) where he made a famous critical analysis o f the modem legislation in
different European and American Constitutions, stressing that religious freedom means that religion is
becoming a private matter, and that further secularization processes will result in abolition o f any religion
o f the state. This text is dedicated to the Jewish scholar and Hegelian, Bruno Bauer, who struggled for the
Jewish emancipation rights in a modem German state. See: Karl Marx, Early Writings, (translation:
Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton), Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, London,
1992., pp. 211-243.
114 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f H egel's Philosophy o f Right in Early Writings,
(trans. Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton, London: Penguin Books in association with New Left
Review, 1992), p. 244: “The foundation o f irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not
make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem o f man who has either not yet won
through to him self or has already lost him self again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the
world. Mans is the world o f man, state society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an
inverted consciousness o f the world, because they are an inverted world.”
115 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f H egel's Philosophy o f Right in Early Writings,
(translation: Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton), Penguin Books in association with New Left Review,
London, 1992. pp. 244 - 145: “Religious suffering is at the same time the expression o f real suffering and
the protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh o f the oppressed creature, the heart o f a heartless
world, and the soul o f soulless conditions. It is the opium o f the people.” (. . .) “Thus the criticism of
heaven turns into the criticism o f earth, the criticism o f religion into the criticism o f law, and the criticism
o f theology into the criticism o f politics.”
116 Cliford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Interpretation o f Cultures: Selected Essays,
(New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 90: “Religion is a system o f symbols which acts to establish powerful,
pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions o f a general order of
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existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura o f factuality that the moods and motivations
seem uniquely realistic.”
117 Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, (trans. John Cumming,
New York: Continuum, 1986) p. 3: “In the most general sense o f progressive thought, the Enlightenment
has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty.”
118 One o f the most compelling interpretations on H egel’s philosophy o f religion is given by
Rudolf J. Siebert, The Critical Theory o f Religion: The Frankfurt School, (Lanham, Maryland, and London:
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2001). See “Absolute Presence”, pp. 110 - 115.
119 “When in the Course o f human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the
political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers o f the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws o f Nature and o f N ature’s God entitle them a decent respect to
the opinions o f mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.—
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit o f Happiness.”
The original text o f the Declaration o f the Independence was taken from the book Five Centuries in
America. Donald F. Drummond, Dorothy M. Fraser, ed., (New York, Cincinnati, Atlanta, Dallas, Millbrae:
American book Company, 1964).
120 Mark A. Noll, The Work We Have to Do: A History o f Protestants in America, (Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), See: “Protestants in Colonial America, 1607-1789” pp. 15-30.
121 Catherine L. Albanese, America Religions and Religion, 3rd edition, (Belmont, CA,
International Edition: W adsworth Publishing Company, 1999), See: “The Reformation in the English
Colonies,” pp. 109-119.
122 Ibid., p. 123.
123 Ibid., p p .123-124: “Deism was carried through the colonies within the Freemasonic lodges.
Indeed, as brother Masons, deists played a key role in the political process that brought the new nation into
being. (....) Enshrined in the Freemasonic lodges, deism existed cordially beside Protestant Christianity
and by so doing m obbed Protestant Masonic brothers in liberal direction.”
124 Ben Klassen in http://www.rahowa.com/ (accessed May 5, 2005).
125 Charles S. Peirce was raised as an Unitarian, and he accepted the idea that the universe/nature
is manifestation o f God. In 1903 lecture he wrote: “The universe is a book written for m an’s reading.” (CP
5. 119). Also, Peirce understood religion as a “deep mystery expressed,” and that mystery for him meant “a
religion o f science.” (CP 6 432-433)
126 “M an’s highest developments are social; and religion, thought it begins in a seminal, individual
inspiration, only comes to full flower in a great church coextensive with a civilization. This is true o f every
religion, but supereminently so o f the religion o f love.” Charles S. Peirce, CP 6. 433.
127 Francis Schussler Fiorenza & Don S. Browing ed., Habermas, Modernity, and Public
Theology, (New York: Crossroad, 1992). See Habermas’ text “Transcendence from Within, Transcendence
in this W orld,” pp. 2 2 6 -2 5 4 1 .
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128 Ibid. p. 233. “This problematization unavoidably occurs when theontic, normative, and
expressive aspects o f validity, which must reamin fused together in the conception o f the creator and
redeemer God, o f theodicy, and o f the event o f salvation, are separated analytically from one another.”
129 Jiiregen Habermas, Eduardo Mendieta (ed.): Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God,
and Modernity, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002. See the interview “A Conversation about
God and the W orld.”
130 Ibid. See the text To Seek to Salvage an Unconditional Meaning Without G od is a Futile
Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark o f Max Horheimer, pp. 95-109.
131 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms o f the Religious Life, (trans, Joseph Ward Swain, New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1915), pp. 415-419. The definition o f religion proposed by E. Durkehim is
given as follows: “A religion is a unified system o f beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to
say, things set apart and forbidden— beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community
called a Church, all those who adhere to them. ( .. .) The idea o f religion is inseparable from that o f the
Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing.”
132 J. Habermas, The Theory o f Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1984). See Chapter 1, part II “Some Characteristics o f the M ythical and the Modern Ways o f
Understanding the W orld,” the unit on “Some Characteristics o f the Mythical and the M odem Ways of
Understanding W orld,” pp. 43-77.
133 Genesis 1: 28, “be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it. Have dominion over
the fish o f the sea, the birds o f the air, cattle, and all the animals that crawl on the earth.”
134 C hief Seattle Reply to U.S. Government was translated by Henry A. Smith and this speech was
delivered in 1853 in a village that became Seattle, Washington. C hief Seattle was chief and in 1854
Governor Isaac Stevens, Commissioner o f Indian Affairs for the W ashington territories arranged with the
Indians that 2 million acres o f Indian territory becomes the property o f the US Government.
135 James Sterba, Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 82: “Is there, then, something that we in W estern culture
can learn from these non-W estem cultures? At the very least, an appreciation for these cultures should lead
us to consider whether we have legitimate grounds for failing to constrain our own interests for the sake o f
nonhuman nature. In W estern culture, people tend to think o f themselves as radically separate from and
superior to non-human nature, so as to allow for domination over it.”
136 Ibid. p. 87
137 For these population numbers James Sterba used sources given in David Stannard, American
Holocaust, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Lenore Stiffarm with Phil Lane Jr., “The
Demography o f Native N orth America,” in The State o f Native America, ed., Annette Jaimes, (Boston:
South End Press, 1992).
138 Umberto Eco, Kant and the Platypus, (trans. Alastair McEwen, New York, San Diego, London:
Harcourt brace & Company, 2000), p. 3.
139 Ibid., p. 15.
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140 Ib id , p. 10-15.
141 Ib id , p. 13
142 Ib id , p. 14
143

Yuri M. Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000). See Umberto E co’s introduction pp. vii - xiii.
144http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem-gloss.html#U (accessed June 2, 2006). See
Jakob von Uexkiill and Thomas A. Sebeok.
145 Edna Andrews, Conversations with Lotman: Cultural Semiotics in Language, Literature, and
Cognition, (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University o f Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 14, 15.
146 Yuri Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: a Semiotic Theory o f Culture, (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. xi.
147 “Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is
not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.” S.N.
Deane (ed. and translator), La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962. Proslogium 3.
148 “We see that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is
evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it
is plain that they achieve their end, not fortuitously, but designedly. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot
move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
arrowis directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are
directed to their end; and this being we call God.” Anton C. Pegis, Basic Writings o f Saint Thomas
Aquinas, (London: Random House, Inc, 1957), p.67.
149 149 Yurj Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000). See Introduction, p. xii.

150 Gustav Rene Hocke, Die welt als Labyrinth: Manier und Manie in der europaischen Kunst Von
1520 bis 1650 und in der Gegenwart (Hamburg: Rowohlt Tschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1977).
151 Ernst Robert Curtius, Europaische Literatur und Lateinisches M ittelalter (Bern: Francke
Verlag, 1967).
152 Gustav Rend Hocke, Die welt als Labyrinth: Manier and Manie in der europaischen Kunst Von
1520 bis 1650 und in der Gegenwart (Hamburg: Rowohlt Tschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 1977), p. 9.
153 Umberto Eco (ed.), H istory o f Beauty (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, Inc.,
2004), p. 220: “By apparently imitating the models o f Classical Beauty, the M annerists dissolved its rules.
Classical Beauty is perceived as empty, soulless.”
I54Yuri Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000)., p. 191-202.
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155 Ibid. p. 134: “The avant-garde started life as a “rebellious fringe”, then It became a
phenomenon o f the centre, dictating its laws to the period and trying to impose its colours on the whole
semiosphere, and then, when it in fact had become set in its ways, it became the object o f intense theorizing
on the metacultural level.”
156 Ibid., p. 13 “There is an amazing similarity, even between civilizations which have no contact
with each other, in the expressions they use to describe the world beyond the boundary. The eleventhcentury Kievan chronicler-monk, describing the life o f other eastern Slav tribes who were still pagan,
wrote: ‘The Drevlyans lived like animals, like cattle; they killed each other, ate unclean foods, had no
marriage, but abducted girls at the waterside. While the Radimichi, Vyatichi, and northern tribes shared the
same custom: they lived in the forest like wild beasts, ate unclean food and used foul language in front of
fathers and female relatives, and they had no marriages, but held games between villages and gathered at
these games for dancing and all kinds o f devilish songs.’
157 Ibid., pp. 131-134
158 David E. Stannard, American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest o f the New World
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press 1992).
159 Wisdom and Freedom produced by World Newsstand Copyright © 1999. “The Annihilation of
Native Americans: M edia W eapon”, http://www.wealth4freedom.eom/truth/l/indian4.htm (accessed April
4, 2005).
160 Ibid., pp. 2-3 (accessed April 4, 2005).
161 Yuri Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 36-38,
162 Joel W. Martin, The L and Looks After Us: A History o f Native American Religion .(Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 68-69
163 The whole story about Catharine Brown was thoroughly presented in Joel W. M artin’s book
The Land Looks After Us: A History o f Native American Religion, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001). See in the chapter Native and Christian, pp. 68-76.
164 Joel W. Martin, The Land Looks After Us: A History o f Native American Religion, (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, New York, 2001), pp. 80-81.
165 Yuri Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 136-137,
166 Joel W. Martin, The Land Looks After Us: A History o f Native American Religion, (Oxford,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 63.
167 Sources given for Sterba’s research are substantiated from: Sharon O ’Brien, American Tribal
Governments (Norman: Unviersity o f Iklahoma Press, 1989), David Stannard, American Holocaust (New
York: Oxford Unviersity Press, 1992), and Lenore Stiffarm with Phil Lane Jr., “The Demography o f Native
North America,” in The State o f Native America, e d ., Annette Jaimes, (Boston: south End Press, 1992).
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l68Yuri Lotman, Universe o f the Mind: A Semiotic Theory o f Culture (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 179.
169 Ibid., pp. 171-204.
170 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
171 Daniel Defoe, The Life and Adventures o f Robinson Crusoe, (New Yrok: Robert Howard
Russell, Copyright, 1900), Illustrated edition by the brothers Louis and Frederick Rhead.
172 Edna Andrews, Conversations with Lotman, (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University o f Toronto
Press, 2003), pp. 42-44.
173 Ibid., p. 33.
174 Umberto Eco, F oucalut’s Pendulum, (New York: Ballantine Book, 1989), p. 511. Eco’s
quotation used from Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (London: Rutledge, 1969), iv, p. 123.
175 M. Magre, Magicians, Seers, and Mystics, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1932), pp. 111-127.
176 David Hicks, R itual and B elief (New York: McGraw Hill, 2000) .See chapter 11, pp. 444 478, “Agents o f Change.”
177 Ibid., see the text by Peter Worsley: “Revitalization M ovements,” pp. 455 -468.
178 Jonathan Z. Smith, William Scott Green, ed., The Harper Collins Dictionary o f Religion, (San
Francisco: Harper, 1989). Umbanda: the Brazilian new religion developed by native Brazilian African
spirits and Christian traditions, led by ritual priestesses and priests who belief in the possession o f the
disembodied spirits in order to enhance personal spiritual developments.
179 Aristotle, Poetics, (trans. S.H. Butcher, Englewood, CO: Hyper Text Presentation, Procyon
Publishing, 1995), chapter IX, p. 6 “It is, moreover evident from what has been said, that it is not the
function o f the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen— what is possible according to the
law o f probability or necessity. The poet and the historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. The
world o f Herodotus might be put into verse, and it would still be a species o f history, with meter no less
than without it. The true difference is that one relates what has happened, the other what may happen.
Poetry (poiesis), therefore, is mach more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to
express the universal, history the particular.” .
180 U. Eco, The Role o f the Reader, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1984), p. 163. “We
have, therefore, seen that (i) “open” works, insofar as they are in movement, are characterized by the
invitation to make the work together with the author and that (ii) on a wider level (as a subgenus in the
species “work in m ovem ent”) there exist works which, tough organically completed, are “open” to a
continuous generation o f internal relations with the addressee must uncover and select in his act of
perceiving the totality o f incoming stimuli, (iii) Every work o f art, even though it is produced by following
and explicit or implicit poetics o f necessity, is effectively open to a virtually unlimited range o f possible
readings, each o f which causes the work to acquire new vitality in terms o f one particular taste, or
perspective or personal performance."
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181 The text here is written in this manner in U .Eco’s novel, where the author tried to imitate how
would one write in original Frascheta language. This text is also the first writing o f Baudolino, which still
didn’t learn how to properly write.
182.” Catherine L. Albanese, America Religions and religion, (Wadsworth Publishing Company:
International, US, 1999), “events at Salem Village (later Danvers), in the Massachusetts Bay colony began
with Betty Parris, daughter o f the town minister, and her cousin Abigail Williams. The two girls, one nine
and the other eleven years old, spent many hours with Tituba, a slave from the West Indies, who apparently
taught the children something o f the magical traditions she had learned. The magic lore attracted other girls
in the village, many o f them teenagers. Then, when Betty parries and subsequently Abigail Williams fell
into trances, creaming, crying, barking like dogs, and moving on all fours, the diagnosis o f witchcraft was
pronounced. Neither doctors nor ministers could help, and so events moved to the local courthouse. In a
gradual series o f escalations, more and more witches were named by the afflicted girls. There was Tituba
and then Sarah Good and Sarah Osborne. Before the trials ended, nineteen witches had been hanged, and
one, a man, had been pressed to death.”
183 Dr. Ljudevit RupCic, Gospina Ukazanja u Medjugorju, Samobor: Tisak A.G. Matos, 1983.
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